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1. Introduction to the thesis 
With this first part of the dissertation in your hand I want to invite you, as 
reader, to join me in analyzing the role of cooperation and knowledge ex-
change with regards to the performance of firms and especially with regards to 
the performance of young and innovative start-ups. You might ask: Why 
should this analysis even matter? Why is it worth joining the author here? 
Well, we live in a society where the pace of development increases year by 
year. Children start to go to school earlier, students study shorter, new products 
have to be established on the market much faster, firms need to be increasingly 
flexible and shall not risk to miss any market opportunity. This dissertation is 
picking out one of these aspects, specifically the firms that have to be fast and 
innovative to sustain the competitive forces in the market. By analyzing inter-
active behavior of innovative actors in the economy, I tried to shed light on the 
processes shaping inter-firm cooperation and the resulting innovator networks. 
I travel my way through this thesis by first taking a look at the factors that in-
fluence bilateral cooperation dynamics and then embracing a larger perspective 
by analyzing the role of complex social networks of innovators. Surprisingly, I 
find that mainly human characteristics like trust, social proximity, personal 
experience and social connections play a major role in shaping the innovative 
and economic performance of firms. This is a quite nice finding which shall 
remind us that firms are always a byproduct of humanity and human nature. 
Since innovativeness and networks are widely measured by means of patents, 
the last road I take in this dissertation is the one into the propensity to patent 
for young and innovative firms, a widely neglected group when it comes to the 
analysis of patenting behavior.  
I kindly invite you as reader to enter into this work which took roughly eight 
years to be finished. Sure, I was writing this dissertation on my own but there 
have been many beloved people who supported me. Without them, this work 
would not have been possible. Firstly, I am deeply thankful to my doctoral fa-
ther, who was always patient and had enriched my thesis with fruitful feedback 
and tremendously valuable ideas. My partner and my family were always 
standing behind me and supported me with everything they had. Your support 
and love means everything to me. I also thank my inspiring colleagues who 
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helped me by giving feedback, evaluating my ideas and sharing coffee breaks 
with me. 
 
1.1 This thesis 
This thesis is devoted to contribute to a better understanding of the role coop-
eration and knowledge exchange plays for the success and failure of innovative 
firms. Most of the work in this dissertation is based on the big shoulders of 
Josef Alois Schumpeter’s ideas from 1912 – “The theory of economic devel-
opment”. Schumpeter was the first to delve into the process behind innovation 
and evolutionary processes in the economy. Some years later, Allen (1983) and 
von Hippel (1987) initiated empirical research on actors that cooperate in their 
knowledge production processes. The motivation for firms to cooperate, either 
with other firms or with research entities like universities or research institutes, 
lies in a couple of factors. Since innovation is a highly risky activity with re-
spect to the dimensions of timing, costs and outcome, it is easier to bear when 
it is pooled (Bayona et al. 2001). Additionally, also the increased complexity of 
technical development requires a certain division of labour. According to the 
resource based view of the firm (Penrose 1959), which later on has been trans-
lated into the knowledge based theory of the firm (Grant 1996), a main part of 
the existing knowledge resources in the world lied outside the single firm. This 
translates access to external sources of knowledge into a main factor influenc-
ing the chances of a firm to be successful in its R&D activities (Cowan et al. 
2006, Hagedoorn 2002, Freeman 1991). Therefore in today’s world, and this 
stands in contrast to Schumpeter’s idea of the single entrepreneur-innovator, 
innovation can be seen as a collective process of learning and recombining 
existing knowledge into marketable creations (Cantner and Meder 2007; 
Lundvall 1992; Kogut et al. 1992). However, cooperation might be rejected or 
even fail for several reasons. The first two papers (chapters 2 and 3) intend to 
go further into this direction and analyse factors that influence determinants for 
cooperation failure as well as determinants of cooperation dynamics. Chapter 2 
analyses two determinants of bilateral cooperation failure, namely the lacks of 
intermediation and of reciprocity, two problems that might even lead a whole 
regional innovation system to fail (Cantner 2000, Cantner and Graf 2003). Be-
fore this chapter has been written there was basically no study on the determi-
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nants of cooperation failure, a research gap this paper started to fill. Since to 
date dynamic models of cooperative activities have been only analysed by a 
small group of authors (Balland et al. 2013, Broekel 2015, ter Wal 2014), the 
third chapter of this thesis adds to a new research stream where there still exists 
a large gap in the understanding of the mechanisms of cooperative behaviour 
and the dynamics of innovative networks. 
Of course, the aforementioned processes of collective learning and exchange of 
knowledge between actors does not happen in a vacuum between only two 
partners. Many entities are active in the innovative environment and built up a 
network of actors which cooperatively engage in the creation of new ideas and 
then economize on the results – either within an existing firm or by founding a 
new one (Cantner and Graf 2007, Balconi et al. 2004). In these networks, 
knowledge spillovers which might be intended or unintended, facilitate the 
recombination of existing knowledge and therefore lead to higher innovative 
performance of its members (Edwards and Gordon 1984).  
Entrepreneurial start-ups who bring up and disseminate innovation can be seen 
as one important driver of evolutionary economic change (Pyka 1999). How-
ever, the investigation of the role of new ventures in innovation networks and 
the role of innovation networks for new ventures is still in its infancy stage. 
Most studies see the innovator network as one regional factor influencing start-
up (e.g. Jaffe 1986, Audretsch and Feldman 2004, Audretsch and Lehmann 
2005, Cassia et al. 2009). However, none of the existing studies could directly 
connect the innovator network with the single start-up. By adapting Murray’s 
(2004) observation on academic scientists to entrepreneurs, one can expect that 
an entrepreneur who is connected to the regional research community brings 
his scientific social capital into the firm and translates this into the firms’ scien-
tific social capital. Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation step exactly into this 
gap and connect the scientific social capital of start-up founders with the suc-
cess of their firms. For Thuringia, which according to Granato and Farhauer 
(2007), can be subdivided into 12 travel-to-work areas (see figure 1-1), it is 
analysed whether there is an influence of the mere connection to the network as 
compared to an isolated situation as well as which network structure might be 
favourable and which position of the founders might help the firm to be more 
innovative and to survive. 
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Figure 1-1 Thuringia and its travel-to-work areas 
 
Thuringian travel to work areas according to the estimations of Granato and Farhauer (2007) 
 
In chapters 4 and 5 the innovator network is measured by means of co-patent 
applications, a quite common approach in innovation economics. However, 
studies on the patenting activities have shown that there exist tremendous dif-
ferences in propensity to patent for innovative firms, depending on their indi-
vidual characteristics (Scherer 1983, Bound et al. 1984, Brouwer and Klein-
knecht 1999, Blind et al. 2006, Hall et al. 2012). Acs and Audretsch (1990) 
have shown that innovative start-ups show also significant differences in their 
characteristics. Notwithstanding, previous studies were not able to study the 
propensity to patent for young start-ups due to a lack of data (most studies use 
official statistical data bases where firms are observed when they have more 
than ten employees what is by far not often the case for start-ups in their first 
three business years). Chapter 6 intends to add to this research gap and anal-
yses the determinants of the propensity to patent for innovative start-ups using 
questionnaire data. Additionally, be identifying the patents belonging to an 
innovative start-up via patent applications of the founder(s), this chapter is pro-
posing a new approach for the identification of patents. 
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The next paragraph presents the structure of the thesis and summarizes the five 
main chapters. 
 
1.2 Structure of this thesis 
My thesis consists of five empirical studies. All of them have been presented 
on Jena Economic Research Workshops (JERW) of the doctoral research train-
ing group “The Economics of Innovative Change” (DFG RTG1411) as well as 
on national and international workshops and conferences including: 
 DIME Workshop (Local and sectoral systems of innovations - Policy 
measures and possibilities, 19.-21. November 2008, Marburg (Germa-
ny)),  
 EMEAA 2009 (6th European Meeting on Applied Evolutionary Eco-
nomics, 21–23 May 2009, Jena (Germany)),  
 DRUID Winter 2010 (DRUID-DIME Winter Conference 2010, 21–23 
January 2010, Aalborg (Denmark)),  
 ERSA 2010 (50th Anniversary European Congress of the Regional Sci-
ence Association: Sustainable Regional Growth and Development in 
the Creative Knowledge Economy, 19 – 23 August 2010, Jönköping 
(Sweden)) 
 International Ph.D. course on Economic Geography (‘Geography of 
Knowledge, Networks, and Clusters', October and November 2012, 
Utrecht, Netherlands) 
 35th DRUID Celebration Conference 17-19 June 2013, Barcelona 
(Spain) 
 1st IWH ENIC Workshop (‘The Evolution of Networks, Industries and 
Clusters‘18-19 July 2013, Halle, Germany) 
 15th Conference of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society 
(27-30 July 2014, Jena, Germany) 
 
The first empirical study named ‘Success and failure of firms' innovation coop-
erations – the role of intermediaries and reciprocity’ (chapter 2) has been co-
authored by Uwe Cantner and Andreas Meder. I contributed to this paper by 
providing the research idea, preparing the literature, formulating the hypothesis 
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as well as by exploiting the data. The other two authors provided support, 
mainly in guiding the estimations and by helping to interpret the results and 
draw conclusions out of it. This paper has been published 2011 in the peer-
reviewed journal ‘Papers in Regional Science’ (Volume 90, Issue 2, pages 
313–329). 
The second study with the title ‘The Coevolution of Innovative Ties, Proximi-
ty, and Competencies: Toward a Dynamic Approach to Innovation Coopera-
tion’ (chapter 3) has been co-authored by Uwe Cantner and Susanne Walter 
(born Hinzmann). I contributed to this paper mainly by conducting the empiri-
cal analysis and interpreting the results. My co-authors provided a literature 
review, prepared the database and together we discussed how to include our 
findings into the existing scientific landscape. After going through a blind peer 
review process, this paper has been finally accepted to the series ‘Knowledge 
and Space’ Volume 11 (Knowledge and Networks) which is forthcoming in 
2017. 
The third and fourth paper, ‘On regional innovator networks as hubs for inno-
vative ventures’ (chapter 4) and ‘The selective nature of innovator networks: 
from the nascent to the early growth phase of the organizational life cycle’ 
(chapter 5) have been co-authored by Uwe Cantner. For both papers, I was 
doing the literature review, collected and exploited the data, processed the es-
timations and interpreted the results. My co-author helped in guiding to the 
focus of the paper and the estimation strategies, conceptualizing the paper and 
in finding interpretations of as well as conclusions from the results. ‘On re-
gional innovator networks as hubs for innovative ventures’ is published in the 
working paper series Jena Economic Research Papers as JERP # 2016 – 006. 
‘The selective nature of innovator networks: from the nascent to the early 
growth phase of the organizational life cycle’ is not published yet. 
The fifth paper which I include into my dissertation thesis is called ‘Innovative 
start-up patenting: a new approach towards identification and determinants’. It 
is single authored, published in the working paper series Jena Economic Re-
search Papers as JERP # 2013 – 023 and currently under review at ‘the Journal 
of Industrial Economics. 
Table 1-1 presents an overview of my contribution to the papers combined into 
this thesis. 
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Table 1-1 Declaration of the candidate’s contribution to the papers following §7Abs.2 PromO 
 
Paper  Authors Idea Conception Empirical 
analysis 
Theory sec-
tion 
Literature 
research 
Chapter 2:  
“Success and failure of firms' innova-
tion cooperations: the role of interme-
diaries and reciprocity” 
Uwe Cantner, 
Andreas Meder, 
Tina Wolf 
leading proportional proportional leading leading 
Chapter 3: 
 “The Coevolution of Innovative Ties, 
Proximity, and Competencies: Toward 
a Dynamic Approach to Innovation 
Cooperation” 
Uwe Cantner, 
Susanne Hinzmann, 
Tina Wolf 
proportional proportional leading slight slight 
Chapter 4:  
“On regional innovator networks as 
hubs for innovative ventures” 
Uwe Cantner, 
Tina Wolf 
proportional proportional leading leading leading 
Chapter 5: 
“The selective nature of innovator 
networks: from the nascent to the early 
growth phase of the organizational life 
cycle” 
Uwe Cantner, 
Tina Wolf 
proportional proportional leading leading leading 
Chapter 6: 
Innovative start-up patenting: a new 
approach towards identification and 
determinants 
Tina Wolf leading leading leading leading leading 
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1.2.1 Success and failure of firms' innovation cooperations - the role of 
intermediaries and reciprocity 
There is rich literature dealing with cooperative activities of firms. However, 
no empirical study seems to have investigated the factors leading to malfunc-
tions in cooperation projects in terms of a low likelihood of cooperation, low 
rate of success, and failed cooperation. The chapter attempts to fill this gap by 
investigating the possible presence of two problems in cooperation: the lack of 
intermediation and of reciprocity. Based on data gathered for firms in two 
German regions and one French region, we find that the success of cooperation 
projects depends on the perceived importance, rather than on the perceived 
quality, of intermediate actors. Hence, the major problem for intermediating 
suitable partners is more related to communication than it is a programmatic 
issue. Trust and reciprocity in cooperation between firms are found to be rele-
vant ex-post in the sense of being the main determinant of failed cooperation 
projects. 
 
Introduction 
The theory of evolutionary economics argues that economic change is the re-
sult of the emergence and diffusion of innovations (Pyka 1999). Innovations 
are developed and introduced to the market by firms which are seeking for first 
mover advantages and (at least) temporary monopolies. Being innovative, 
however, requires technological knowledge, which may not be completely ap-
propriable to the firm because some of its parts are tacit (Thornhill 2006). Ad-
ditionally, uncertainty and risk involved in inventive and innovative processes 
are easier to bear when pooled (Baum et al. 2000, Bayona et al. 2001). Fur-
thermore, the generation of innovations requires a recombination of existing 
knowledge (Cantner and Meder 2007) which may not be accessible to the sin-
gle firm (Cowan et al. 2006). Access to such external knowledge as well as the 
potential to internalize knowledge spillovers is the rationale for firms to engage 
in R&D collaboration (Teece 1986, Nooteboom 1999, Griliches 1992). Thus, 
firms do not usually innovate in isolation but in collaboration and interaction 
with other organizations as other firms, universities, schools or ministries 
(Fagerberg 2005, Edquist 2005). By definition, organizations and institutions 
are components of systems for the generation and diffusion of innovations, 
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namely the systems of innovation where special combinations of organizations 
and institutions can enhance a firm’s ability to innovate and to compete suc-
cessfully (Edquist 2005, Cantner et al. 2003). 
Despite these presumed advantages, the establishment and continuation of co-
operation-based knowledge exchanges face own problems that can affect the 
generation of new ideas in a significant way. Assume that the firm under con-
sideration is willing to conduct R&D projects in collaboration with other actors 
(other firms, universities, research institutes). One may nevertheless observe a 
low level and intensity of cooperation-based exchanges. First, if there are 
enough potential cooperation partners available the firm may simply have 
failed to make contact with possible partners, presumably due to a lack of in-
termediation. This problem is just similar to the problems of asymmetrically 
informed borrowers and lenders in financial markets. Searching for an appro-
priate collaboration partner may cause high transaction costs related to gather-
ing information about the existence of potential partners, their knowledge fea-
tures and their reputations. If these costs are high or uncertain, actors may be 
reluctant and refrain from searching for potential cooperation partners. Inter-
mediaries are entities whose function is to overcome this problem (Cantner and 
Graf 2003). Intermediaries in this sense are offices devoted to technology 
transfer, public agencies (regional politicians, business development agencies), 
conferences and know-how markets, collaborative research ventures, patents, 
other sources of information such as consultants and scientific journals, as well 
as employees' mobility and their function is to mediate contacts and to transfer 
knowledge between actors (Karlsson 1997). In this chapter, the three authors 
concentrated on ‘chambers of commerce and industry’ and ‘business promo-
tion entities’ as intermediating actors. The presumed difficulties show two di-
mensions: the perceived importance and quality of intermediaries work. When 
they are in need of a cooperation partner, firms will only approach an interme-
diary if they are aware of them offering such a service and if they consider the 
services offered important. Thus, whether actors find an appropriate coopera-
tion partner is a function of the alleged importance of intermediate actors. 
Therefore the authors hypothesize that a comparably higher perceived im-
portance of intermediaries fosters the initiation of collaborative R&D projects 
(H2-1). With respect to the quality of the intermediaries’ service, their ability 
to connect actors in a most fitting way serves as indicator. In the case of a low 
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fitting, collaboration is more likely to fail such that the success of collaboration 
can be seen as a function of the quality of intermediaries’ services. The second 
hypothesis (H2-2) of this chapter goes in line with this argument and says that 
a higher perceived quality of the intermediaries’ services fosters comparably 
more successful collaborative R&D projects. 
Another explanation of a low level of cooperation refers to the lack of trust and 
reciprocity in firms’ cooperative relationships, which reduces the incentive to 
engage in cooperation-based knowledge exchanges, the lack of reciprocity. The 
principles of reciprocity and fairness of economically acting persons as ana-
lyzed by Gouldner (1960), Güth and Yaari (1992), as well as by Cialdini and 
Trost (1998) can be applied to collective invention and innovation. There, co-
operative activity in R&D, “is based on proven past performance and reliability 
of a cooperative relation, and thus has a rational basis even though it is no 
longer based on conscious deliberation” (Nooteboom 1999, p.797f.). In this 
context, reciprocity means that the transmission of knowledge by one actor is 
reciprocated by the other actor (Fehr and Gächter 2000). In other words, part-
ners have to open their own knowledge stock to get access to the knowledge 
stock of the other. If there is a lack of reciprocity, the exchange of knowledge 
will not take place. Accordingly, two types of reciprocity problems can be dis-
tinguished, an ex-ante and an ex-post lack of reciprocity. If there is an ex-ante 
lack of reciprocity at hand, the actors are not cooperating because they have 
prejudices toward the potential partners and are doubtful about bi- or multilat-
eral know-how streams (Cantner 2000). If, however, an ex-post lack of reci-
procity is at hand, tensions between current cooperation partners lead to one 
partner withholding his knowledge stock or even breaking off the cooperation. 
Since the first type of a lack of reciprocity, the ex-ante type, could not be tested 
with the data at hand, the authors formulated a hypothesis only for the ex-post 
type of reciprocity problems. According to the argumentation above, the hy-
pothesis goes as follows: The less trust collaborative firms have to their part-
ners, the higher the probability that cooperation will fail (H2-3). 
 
Data and Method 
The data used was drawn from a questionnaire-based company survey in 2006 
which was embedded in the research project "Second Order Innovations" fi-
nanced by the Volkswagen Foundation. Firms were asked about development, 
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R&D effort, innovative and economic success, as well as cooperative behavior 
for the period 2003-2006. Altogether, 832 firms, whereof 529 are located in 
Northern Hesse (DE), 248 in Jena (DE) and 55 in Sophia Antipolis (FR) an-
swered the questionnaire. 
Since in the estimations, the dependent variables are of a binary or of a Likert-
scale nature, we used logistic and ordered logistic regression methods. 
 
Main Results 
Hypotheses 2-1 and 2-2, which are related to the importance and quality of 
intermediaries, had to be rejected. This means that a lack of intermediation is 
not related to a higher likelihood of cooperative behavior as such and the quali-
ty of intermediation is not related to cooperation success. However, we found 
that, among the cooperative firms, the importance of intermediaries is positive-
ly related to cooperation success and there seem to be regional differences: 
First, in Sophia Antipolis the likelihood to cooperate in innovation seems to be 
much lower, which is surprising because this site was constructed by political 
will in order to enhance cooperation. Second, for Northern Hesse, the relation 
of intermediaries’ importance on cooperative success appears to be much 
stronger, suggesting that the major problem for intermediation actors is com-
munication rather than programmatic work. Both issues ask for further scrutiny 
by taking into account the characteristics of the respective region, the innova-
tion system and/or the network of innovators which unfortunately was not 
within the scope of this paper. 
Second, as to the problem of reciprocity in knowledge exchange, actors tend to 
break off cooperative projects because of missing trust to the cooperation part-
ners, which supports hypothesis 2-3. 
 
Contribution 
While earlier papers on cooperative activities usually addressed the mecha-
nisms of why they exist, how they work out and when they are successful, this 
paper goes into another direction and asks: Why may did not work? Basically, 
the intuition of asking for the problems that may hinder cooperation is taken 
from the theoretical construct of problems in systems of innovations as formu-
lated by Cantner and Graf (2003). Here, three problems are enunciated in order 
to explain why the establishment and continuation of network-based 
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knowledge exchange (which is basically cooperative research) may not work. 
You may consider a number of potentially cooperating actors and after some 
time observe the level and intensity of network based exchanges to be consid-
erably low. This may indicate that actors failed to know of each other and get-
ting into contact –- the problem of intermediation. Also, it may be the case that 
lacking trust and reciprocity in the actors' relationships reduces their incentives 
to engage in network exchanges – the problem of reciprocity. Or, the 
knowledge pieces that might be exchanged do not fit well to the network part-
ners' knowledge requirements – the problem of complementarity (Cantner et al. 
2008). The paper at hand was the first to address these kinds of problems on a 
basis of cooperative activities of firms and therefore contributes to a better un-
derstanding of this important facing of economic life. 
In future research, it would be eligible to analyze the three problems as formu-
lated by Cantner and Graf (2003) altogether and using a database which has 
been created for this purpose. 
 
1.2.2 The Coevolution of Innovative Ties, Proximity, and Compe-
tencies: Toward a Dynamic Approach to Innovation Coopera-
tion 
Different dimensions of proximity have been identified as crucial factors for 
the formation of innovative alliances providing for efficient knowledge flows 
therein. However, the determinants that keep these linkages alive are yet to be 
explored. We take a dynamic approach to investigating the coevolution of co-
operation ties and various dimensions of proximity between potential collabo-
ration partners. Specifically, we highlight the predominant role of cognitive 
proximity for the continuity of innovation-oriented alliances and take into ac-
count that this proximity changes over time. 
We observe partner switching more often than the repetition of collaboration. 
Neither knowledge transfer nor mutual experience with cooperation shows 
significant effects on repeated cooperation. Instead, we found that similarity 
(overlap) between the firms’ knowledge bases, an imbalance of the reciprocal 
potential for knowledge exchange, the general experience the partners have 
with collaboration, and similarity in the popularity of collaboration partners 
favor cooperation. 
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Introduction 
The relation between the proximity dimensions and the continuation of formed 
collaborations is by no means an unidirectional one (ter Wal and Boschma 
2011). The proximity of partners’ characteristics co-evolves along their coop-
erative relationship (Balland et al. 2015, ter Wal and Boschma 2011). Balland 
et al. (2015), Broekel (2015) and ter Wal (2014) recently have developed 
frameworks to dynamically analyze the evolution in networks. Ter Wal (2014) 
analyzed the role of geographic distance and triadic closure on network dynam-
ics and found that the effect of geography disappears but the importance of 
social aspects increases over time. Conversely, Balland et al. (2013) find that 
social and geographic proximity are always important while cognitive aspects 
become more important later on. Broekel (2015) has additionally shown that 
cognitive, social institutional and geographical proximity do co-evolve over 
time. Having a look at the regional level, Cantner and Graf (2006) examined 
the network of innovators in Jena and found that technological proximity 
changes over time and that this comes with a high degree of instability in col-
laborative relationships. However, neither the mechanisms that cause change of 
proximities, nor the association with the multi-level has been sufficiently ana-
lyzed yet. We step into this research gap and take a dynamic perspective to 
describe the co-evolution of collaboration decisions, proximity and competen-
cies. Cognitive proximity can be defined as a small level of difference between 
the knowledge bases of two actors (Boschma 2005). If the knowledge bases are 
quite similar, the potential to learn from each other is quite low. However, if 
the cognitive distance is too high, the potential to understand each other is re-
duced due to a lower absorptive capacity (Boschma 2005, Cohen and Levinthal 
1990). Therefore, the level of cognitive distance presumes the success potential 
of collaborative ties. From a dynamic perspective, we can say that in order to 
step into collaboration, the knowledge bases have to overlap to a certain 
amount such that there are sufficient absorptive capacities. If partners move 
along the collaboration, knowledge is exchanged which leads to more and more 
similarity in knowledge bases until there is no knowledge to be exchanged an-
ymore and the newness potential in this collaboration decreases (Balland et al. 
2015, Nooteboom 1998, Wuyts et al. 2005). Therefore, the authors hypothesize 
that the relation between the cognitive overlap of two actors and the likelihood 
 14 
 
of their continued collaboration follows an inverse u-shaped curve (H3-1a). As 
Mowery et al. (1998) argue: the sheer overlap of knowledge might not measure 
the full learning potential in an innovative collaboration. Therefore, in this 
chapter the reciprocal potential –which measures in how far the collaboration 
partners can reciprocate the amount of new knowledge they offer to their part-
ner– is measured in addition to the overlap (Cantner et al. 2011). According to 
Cantner and Meder (2007), we hypothesize that the reciprocal potential be-
tween two actors is positively correlated with the likelihood of their continued 
collaboration (H3-1b). Besides these two factors, we also argue that reciprocal 
learning (we also call it knowledge transfer) plays a major role in the sustaina-
bility of collaborative activities (Hamel 1991, Khanna et al. 1998). The collab-
oration partner who learns first gains bargaining power since the lagging part-
ner becomes less attractive. Therefore, we hypothesize that knowledge transfer 
between two actors is negatively correlated with the likelihood of their contin-
ued collaboration (H3-1c). 
Also social proximity or distance; associated with trust, the establishment of 
mutually agreed social norms and control over undesired, non-cooperative be-
havior (Boschma 2005, Granovetter 2005, Walker et al. 2003); shall play a role 
in the dynamics of collaborative relationships (Dahlander and McFarland 2013, 
Gulati 1995). Social proximity develops along with repeated interaction in 
form of successful cooperation which leads to trust that can explain the persis-
tence of cooperation alliances (Gulati 1995, Mowery at al. 1998). Taking these 
arguments together, we formulate the related hypothesis as follows: The likeli-
hood of continued collaboration between two actors increases with their prior 
common experience (H3-2). 
Besides cognitive and social proximity, competence can be a factor influencing 
the evolution of collaborative relationships. It has been found that innovative 
capabilities and experience in managing collaborative agreements can increase 
an actors’ attractiveness as collaboration partner (Ahuja 2000, Gulati 1999, 
Stuart 2000). Therefore, potential partners who had more collaboration in the 
past might be more attractive. If we assume that the condition of reciprocity 
needs to be fulfilled for repeated collaboration, we expect the likelihood of 
continued cooperation to be positively associated with the combined innovative 
and collaborative experience of both partners. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
the greater the general inventive or innovative experience of both partners is, 
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the higher is the likelihood of their continued collaboration (H3-3a) and the 
greater the general collaboration experience of both partners is, the more likely 
it is that their collaboration will continue (H3-3b). Additionally to the experi-
ence the partners bring into the innovative collaboration, the number of collab-
orative ties that the actor has established also determines the number of oppor-
tunities for additional collaborations. Barabási and Albert (1999) have shown 
that in the evolution of networks, central actors tend to become more central 
over time. This phenomenon is known as preferential attachment and might be 
explained by the broad access that central actors have to information about 
potential partners and by the high visibility that central actors have for other 
potential partners (Ahuja 2000, Barabási and Albert 1999, Dahlander and 
McFarland 2013). Central actors are more likely to find that their invested ef-
forts are reciprocated by actors who exhibit the same degree of popularity. If 
collaboration is to continue, then that power needs to be equally distributed 
among the partners so as to avoid unilateral dependence (Hamel, 1991). Since 
partners are therefore more likely to connect with each other and to maintain 
this connection if they possess a similar number of collaborative ties (Dahland-
er and McFarland 2013), we hypothesize that: the more similar the popularity 
of two actors is, the more likely it is that their collaboration will continue (H3-
3c). 
 
Data and Method 
In order to analyze the hypotheses stated in the chapter introduction, we use 
information from patents that have been filed between 1978 and 2010 by Ger-
man applicants in the field of Biotechnology. The data was gathered from the 
OECD REGPAT (January 2012) database and covers patent applications to the 
‘European Patent Office’ and the ‘United States Patent and Trademark Office’. 
The correct matching of one applicant’s patents has been done by using the 
Harmonized Applicants’ Names (HAN) database. Since we wanted to analyze 
the development of collaborations, we created an unbalanced panel where we 
observe collaboration-pairs and the development of their relationship over 
time. The basic sample consisted of 197 firms that have applied for patents 
with partners in the timeframe analyzed. If a firm was co-operating more than 
once in the whole time span (91 firms out of 197), we paired it to each of the 
potential cooperation partners that were active in the pool at that time. The size 
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of the pool of potential cooperation partners amounted to a maximum of 2,369 
potential partners such that over the whole time span, we identified 321,683 
possible dyads of which 293 were actually realized. 
In our analysis, the decision to cooperate with a certain possible partner at a 
certain point in time is a binary one. Therefore, we applied a logistic model and 
a random-effects panel model and - to obtain robust standard errors - resampled 
the original dataset 1,000 times. 
 
Main Results 
In a descriptive analysis, we find on the one hand that a repeated collaboration 
with only one partner seems not to be a dominant behavior in our sample and 
that repeated links are not very probable. With our estimations, we intended to 
find out more about the incentives to form and repeat alliances. On the side of 
cognitive proximity, we analyzed three dimensions – overlap, reciprocal poten-
tial, and knowledge transfer. We find that a higher overlap in the knowledge 
bases of the partners and in line with this a small reciprocal potential leads to a 
higher collaboration probability which contradicts the assumption that 
knowledge diversity positively influences the development of cooperation. 
Regarding social proximity we analyzed the connection between the propensity 
to cooperate and prior common experience. Since we could not find significant 
coefficients, we have to state that in our database social proximity does not 
seem to be an incentive for collaboration. However cooperation experience, in 
general, has a significant effect. The third dimension analyzed was similarity in 
competencies. We find that the probability for two potential partners to collab-
orate is higher if both partners have the similar level of experience and popu-
larity. 
 
Contribution 
This study aimed at the analysis of the coevolution of cognitive proximity, so-
cial proximity and similarity in competencies and their role in the development 
of collaboration in innovation. First, it contributed to the debate, whether inno-
vative networks are rather stable or volatile. What we find is that firms rather 
switch their cooperation partners and do not persist in repeating collaboration 
with the same partner. This goes in line with the analyses by Wuyts et al. 
(2005) and well as Cantner and Graf (2006) who have also shown that collabo-
 17 
 
ration between two partners tends to be rather a single than a repeated event. 
However, they argue that it is the search for diversity in knowledge sources 
which leads them to be less faithful. We instead find that they are looking for 
partners with similar knowledge bases and competencies which lead us to ex-
pect that there is some other motive for the change in collaboration partners. 
This leaves space for future research. In sum, we argued that this study was a 
further step into disentangling the co-evolution of proximity in R&D collabora-
tions and the repetitiveness of ties. Also, although much work has been done to 
identify factors that lead to tie formation and breakup, most studies on innova-
tion networks relied on static approaches. In this chapter, we contributed to the 
literature on dynamic analyses on innovation networks. 
The methodology applied comes with some limitations that shall be mentioned 
here. Since we can only measure collaboration that led to a patent, we might 
underestimate the actual number of linkages in the network. Also, informal ties 
cannot be detected here. The study only analyzed firms that are active in the 
Biotechnology sector. In order to secure the generalizability of the results in a 
future study, one could conduct this analysis in other sectors. Since we only 
analyze the micro-level of the network, we may also resort to macro-level 
analysis and test the effects of the overall network, not just of bilateral coopera-
tion. 
 
1.2.3 On regional innovator networks as hubs for innovative ven-
tures 
A wide body of literature has focused on the evolutionary process behind firm 
growth and survival. Growing interest is devoted to the variable ‘location’ as 
critical factor, shaping firm performance. However, less attention has been paid 
to the region-specific characteristics e.g. university-based knowledge spillovers 
that may play a relevant role in determining the growth and survival of a firm. 
This paper extends this approach to the regional innovator network promoting 
region-specific knowledge spillovers and shows that the firm’s individual 
probability to be innovative and connected to the innovator network positively 
influences the chances of this firm to survive. 
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Introduction 
Economic change is a selective process where firms with competitive ad-
vantages (the fittest firms) gain market share while the other firms lose and will 
be selected out of the market at a certain point in time. The innovation process, 
however, is a complex sequence of events that lead to something new to the 
market (Edwards and Gordon 1984, Kline and Rosenberg 1986). Since one 
firm or one inventor cannot hold all necessary knowledge in the world to find 
relevant new technological combinations, innovation activities must be collec-
tive and social processes, where various pieces of knowledge are combined 
into innovation (Lundvall 1992, Doloreux and Parto 2005). The ability of a 
firm to generate innovation is seen as a key driver for economic success of 
firms. This relation has been empirically proven by several authors (e.g. Jaffe 
1986, Hall and Bagchi-Sen 2002, Thornhill 2006). Since not all knowledge 
pieces which are relevant for the generation of innovation might be in the im-
mediate reach of a firm, personal knowledge spillover-producing interactions 
are of a special relevance (Cantner and Meder 2007, Cowan et al. 2006, Bre-
schi and Lissoni 2006). These interactions occur in interpersonal contacts be-
tween employees of firms, of research institutes or of universities, students or 
self-employed persons who actively conduct research. Per definition, this net-
work comprises persons who cooperatively engage in the creation of new ideas 
and then economize the results (Cantner and Graf 2007). This economization 
happens either within an existing firm or by the formation of a new venture. 
Such a social network can be defined as innovator network (IN). The research-
oriented relationships between the actors indicate knowledge transfers and ex-
changes respectively knowledge spillovers which form the basis for new ideas 
facilitated by the recombination of existing knowledge (Edwards and Gordon 
1984). However, it is not just their innovative effort which brings them togeth-
er. They may, of course, be partners in formal research cooperations between 
several firms. Additionally, they may be former colleagues, thus innovator mo-
bility may play a role. It can also not be excluded that they may know each 
other from playing tennis in the same sports club, eating in the same restaurant 
or from bringing their little ones to the same nursery.  
For a firm that has been founded by or employs an actor who is socially con-
nected to the innovator network, the connection to the IN promotes the expan-
sion of its knowledge base and it's potential to innovate. Consequently, an actor 
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who is connected to the IN can provide an important prerequisite for the gener-
ation of innovations and therefore it may serve as an important facilitating de-
vice for long-term firm survival of a firm (Thornhill 2006). 
Therefore we hypothesize that: firms that are connected to the innovator net-
work are more innovative than non-connected ones (H4-2). Furthermore, we 
hypothesize that innovative firms survive longer than non-innovative firms 
(H4-1) and this effect is driven by the connection to the innovator network 
(H4-3). 
 
Data and Method 
For this chapter, a biographical firm dataset has been constructed based on two 
data sources. Data on incorporations founded in the years between 1993 and 
2006 in Thuringia was gained from the German commercial register. The sec-
ond one is patent data comprising all German patents applied for at the German 
Patent Office in the time period between 1993 and 2004. For a survey popula-
tion of 12,505 founders and their 7,016 companies, we have information on the 
founders (date of birth, name, surname, academic title, address, gender) and on 
the firms (date of founding, date of closing, trade name, location, legal form, 
spin-off or not, industry). 
The second database was drawn from the German Patent Office, where we 
used information on patents that have been registered between 1993 and 2004. 
Here at least one Thuringian inventor (the assignment was made by postal 
codes of inventors’ address) should be listed on the patent. The resulting data 
base contains information on 6,969 inventors (name, surname, address) and 
5,381 patent applications (IPC-Code, name, and address of the applicant, appli-
cation date and year). Using this data, we could create a one-mode affiliation 
network if innovators in Thuringia where the connection was defined by co-
applications of patent. 
By matching names of firm founders with names of inventors in the innovator 
network, we combined these two databases. All firms where we could find a 
match have been identified to be innovative. By analyzing the network, we 
were then able to find out whether the founder of those firms that are innova-
tive are isolated from or connected to the innovator network. 
Survival and the number of patents applied for were the two main dependent 
variables. For all estimations where survival was the dependent variable, we 
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applied Cox’s proportional hazards model (1972) which gives a valid estimate 
of the survival rate for data which is right-censored and left-truncated. Since 
the number of patents applied for is a count variable which is highly skewed to 
the left, we applied negative binomial regression methods when the dependent 
variable was the number of patents (Greene 2003, Cameron and Trivedi 2013). 
 
Main Results 
In this chapter, we intended to find out how much the performance of a newly 
founded venture relies on the influence of the innovator network. The analysis 
was conducted in several steps. In a first one, we wanted to prove that our 
sample behaves like other samples that have been analysed before by other 
researchers. Therefore, we tested whether the performance of the firm, meas-
ured in terms of survival, positively depends on innovativeness, measured as 
number of patents applied for. Using Cox’s proportional hazard model for a 
sample of 2,199 incorporations, we find that indeed the hazard ratio is reduced 
when firms are innovative. The next step was to test whether within the group 
innovative firms (442 out of 2,199 incorporations), we find differences in in-
novative performance (number of patents applied for) between connected and 
isolated actors. Indeed connected firms show up to have significantly more 
patents than isolated ones. Since we have hypothesized that not just being in-
novative but being innovative and connected to the innovator network leads to 
a high firm performance, we go one step further and combine these two as-
pects. By regressing different firm characteristics on a dummy take the value of 
one if the firm is innovative and connected to the innovator network at the 
same time, we create a variable which is describing the probability to be inno-
vative and connected to the network, dependent on certain characteristics (fit-
ted value). This probability is then, together with several control variables, re-
gressed on the hazard rate of the firm, which comes out to be reduced by this 
variable. Therefore, we could provide evidence for the overall hypothesis of 
this paper, that being innovative is an important prerequisite for firms’ survival 
but that this is also moderated by the connection to the innovator network. 
 
Contribution 
While earlier papers on entrepreneurial ventures usually analyze the two as-
pects of innovation and the innovator network separately, in this chapter we 
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make a first attempt to combine these two. Thanks to the combination of data 
from the commercial register with data from the German Patent Office, we 
were able to include the innovator network not just as one (external) factor 
influencing firm success, but we could integrate it into the firms’ resources. 
Regarding the results, we could show that innovative firms have higher chanc-
es to survive as compared to non-innovating firms. Additionally, this shows up 
to be driven by the connection to the innovator network. By being a capital 
company, by the region, the firm is located at and by the stage of the respective 
industry's life cycle. 
 
1.2.4  The selective nature of innovator networks: from the nascent 
to the early growth phase of the organizational life cycle 
Earlier studies have shown that entrepreneurs play a key role in shaping re-
gional development. Innovator networks where these entrepreneurs are mem-
bers of have been identified as one among many critical factors for their firms’ 
success. This paper intents to go one step further and analyses in how far dif-
fering characteristics of these networks lead to different firm performances 
along the early stages of the organizational life cycle (nascent stage, emergent 
stage, early growth stage). A sample of 149 patenting (innovative) firms in 
Thuringia is analysed, using data from the commercial register and the German 
patent office. The results show that there is an inverted u-shaped relationship 
between the chances of a firm to survive and the connectivity of the network 
the firms are connected to but only in the later stage of the early organizational 
life cycle; while the structure of the ego-network never plays a role. A quite 
central position in the network shows-up to be unfavourable. 
 
Introduction 
The regional innovator network (RIN) and his functioning have been defined 
already in the introduction to chapter 4 of this dissertation. Chapter 4 has also 
shown that the connection to such a network can be favourable for the survival 
of young and innovative companies since they might receive more knowledge 
spillovers, which in turn have been shown to positively influence firms’ inno-
vativeness (Feldman and Audretsch 1999, Meagher and Rogers 2004) and 
productivity growth (Griliches 1992). If we consider start-ups, connected to the 
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RIN, specific effects of network structures on the organizational performance 
may play a role. Dependent on the structure of the network, spillovers between 
the nodes (actors in the net) may be eased or hindered. However, an analysis of 
the relationship between the selectivity of the innovator network and start-ups’ 
survival cannot be conducted independently of the organizational life cycle 
status of the individual firm (Hite and Hesterly 2011). Therefore, chapter 5 of 
this dissertation asks the following research question: What role does the struc-
ture of the innovator network, the position of the founder(s) in the network and 
the structure of the founder’s ego-network play for the survival of firms in the 
early stages of the organizational life cycle? 
The early stages of the organizational life cycle considered here are the nascent 
stage, the emergent stage and the early growth stage. The nascent entrepreneur 
is experimenting with different business ideas, starts to take care of the first 
stages in the founding process and starts to collect resources along with apply-
ing for financial funds and therefore there seems to be no real strategic orienta-
tion (Kessler and Frank 2009, Cantner and Stuetzer 2013). Due to this fact, 
other factors than the social scientific network might play major roles for the 
development of the young firm (H5-1a, H5-2a, H5-3a).  
After the legal founding of the firm, the emergence stage begins where the firm 
starts to act on the real market. In this phase the only strategic goal of the firm 
is not to die, thus to survive the selection process (Gartner et al. 1992, Hite and 
Hesterly 2001). In this phase, the founders need to know everything that is go-
ing on in the technological field. The best conditions for this can be found in 
quite dens networks and if he takes there a central position with a quite closed 
ego-network (H5-1b, H5-2b, H5-3b). 
However, in the early growth stage, the firm is settled in the market, starts to 
make real strategic decisions and therefore requires a broader scope of re-
sources (Hite and Hesterly 2001). When the firm develops and enters into the 
early growth stage, the advantages of a very cohesive network may turn into 
disadvantages and the fragmented network and many possibilities to broker and 
control knowledge flows becomes more appropriate (H5-1c, H5-2c, H5-3c) 
(Hite and Hesterly 2001). 
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Data and Method 
As for the research paper which is presented in chapter 4 of this dissertation, 
we used a biographical firm dataset which has been constructed based on two 
data sources. Since it is basically the same data base as in chapter 3 of this dis-
sertation, please refer to the data description in chapter 1.2.3.  
Using this data, we could create one-mode affiliation networks of innovators. 
In contrast to chapter 4, where we had networks for the whole innovative scene 
of Thuringia, in this chapter we crated 12 regional innovator networks accord-
ing to the travel-to-work areas of Thuringia (see figure 1-1) and analysed 
whether this connection influences the chances to survive of young and innova-
tive companies. 
The dependent variable in the estimations was survival/the hazard ratio. There-
fore, we applied Cox’s proportional hazards model (1972) which gives a valid 
estimate of the survival rate for data which is right-censored and left-truncated.  
 
Main Results 
Over all analyses, we find that there is no influence of the network structure, in 
the year of founding and three years before that. However, we were able to 
identify significant effects five years afterward. The relationship between sur-
vival of firms and connectivity of their networks seems to be inverted u-
shaped. This indicates that Burt (1992) and Coleman (1988) could both have 
been right: high fragmentation and high connectivity can be favourable condi-
tions. Future research should look at the determinants which are influencing 
which kind of network is favorable for a firm. Potential determinants for this 
are the sector the firm is active in, the stage in the industry life cycle or the age 
of the firm. 
Having a look at the ego-network, which is basically the influence of opportu-
nities to broker knowledge on firms’ survival, we find no significant results. 
With respect to the influence of the founder’s position in the network on firms’ 
success, we looked at his centrality and on his membership to the main compo-
nent. We find that being a member of the network’s main component has a 
negative influence on the survivability of firms in the early growth stage. For 
Eigenvector centrality, we find a small negative effect indicating that a central 
position in the innovator network is not too favorable in the nascent stage of 
the firm’ life. 
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Contribution 
The research paper could contribute to the research on the influence of innova-
tive networks on firm success. It is new that an analysis sees the innovator 
network as social scientific capital of the founder and integrates it as resource 
of the individual firm. Additionally, the interesting result that there seems to be 
an inverted u-relationship between the connectivity of the network and the 
chances to survive of a young and innovative firm might be reheating the de-
bate on the opposite views of Coleman and Burt. 
 
1.2.5 Innovative start-up patenting: a new approach towards iden-
tification and determinants 
There already exists broad literature investigating small and innovative firms in 
many respects. However, there have been few attempts to assess this group of 
firms’ propensity to patent or its patenting activities. This chapter intends to fill 
that gap. By applying a new approach to account for young and innovative 
companies’ patents, this paper avoids an undercounting of small firm patenting, 
which has been a limit of most of the previous studies. A dataset is used that 
comprises information on R&D, capital stock, state promotion etc. for 534 
Thuringian firms in their first three business years. The results of the zero-
inflated negative binomial regression analysis suggest that patenting is an ac-
tivity of science-oriented, cooperative young firms that are conducting R&D 
even before the firm has been launched. 
 
Introduction 
Although they come with various limitations, intellectual property rights or 
patents have been proved to be a useful indicator for innovative performance in 
innovation studies (Griliches 1990). However, it has been shown that not every 
firm has the same propensity to patent, which means that given the same 
amount of innovation intensity, different firms may still differ with respect to 
patenting intensity (Scherer 1983, Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999). Although 
there have been many studies on the question in how far large and established 
firms differ in their propensity to apply for a patent and on the determinants 
influencing this (e.g. Scherer 1983, Bound et al. 1984, Brouwer and Klein-
knecht 1999, Blind et al. 2006, Hall et al. 2012), few attempts have been made 
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to analyse differences in the propensity to patent for small and innovative 
firms, especially for innovative start-ups. This paper is devoted to step into this 
gap and asks: What are the determinants of innovative start-ups’ propensity to 
patent? Five factors can be identified that might explain differences in the pa-
tenting behavior of new ventures. 
Regarding pre-founding experience, it can be expected that founders who have 
applied for patents before founding a firm show a higher propensity to go for 
patents after founding the firm. This might be due to the fact that they have 
experience with the patenting process, know about the value of protecting intel-
lectual property from imitation or maybe they just have more innovative busi-
ness ideas (Arundel 2001, Harter 1994, Walter et al. 2010, Dosi 1997). There-
fore the first hypothesis states the following: Patenting behavior is path-
dependent in the sense that patenting in the preparation process for founding 
the firm increases the patenting intensity after the firm has been founded (H6-
1). 
Since Cantner and Kösters (2009) find that R&D subsidies for start-ups come 
with an additionality effect such that subsidized start-ups show a higher patent 
output as compared to non-subsidized ones, the second hypothesis is that: 
Start-ups receiving state promotion show a higher propensity to patent (H6-2). 
Venture capital is a hot topic in entrepreneurship research in these times. 
Cordes et al. (1999) find that the costs of applying and reinforcing a patent 
were a reason for young firms to not apply for a patent and Graham et al. 
(2010) found that financial constraints are a significant barrier for young firms 
to patent. Firms receiving venture capital might be in a more relaxed situation 
such that it can be hypothesized that start-ups with a venture capital budget are 
more innovative, can more easily apply for patents and will, therefore, patent 
more (H6-3). 
Cooperative R&D activities are usually more successful as compared to indi-
vidual R&D (Cowan et al. 2006). Also since patenting services serve as a vehi-
cle for the formalisation of technology exchange agreements it can be expect 
firms engaged in R&D collaboration projects to have an above-average pro-
pensity to patent since patenting may make it easier to treat a firm’s knowledge 
as a tradable asset when it comes to negotiations over the conditions of techno-
logical partnerships (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999). Therefore it can be ar-
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gued that firms that cooperate patent more since they are more innovative (H6-
4). 
Since patenting is generally associated with R&D activity (Hall et. al. 2012) 
firms with a higher scientific orientation should also patent more. Therefore, it 
is hypothesized that: Firms conducting science-oriented R&D are more active 
in patenting with regard to the number of patents applied for (H6-5). The em-
pirical analysis in this paper tries to test these five hypotheses. 
 
Data and Method 
The data used in this paper has been provided by the Thuringian Founder 
Study. In this study, the main founders 639 start-ups in Thuringia have been 
interviewed on their social-demographic profile, their psychological factors 
and on the economic situation of the firm in the year of founding and three 
years after. After removing some observations due to the fact that they were 
not genuinely new and due to incomplete data, a population of 534 firms was 
left for analysis. For these 534 firms, patent information was searched in the 
database of the German Patent Office. Only 11.98% of the population applied 
for patents in the time span three years before the firm founding (via their 
founders) and three years afterward. These 64 firms applied for 633 patents but 
only 5.46% of them have been applied for in the company's' name. Therefore, 
the author argued in this paper that an identification of patents for young start-
ups is only possible if one is able to search for the founders’ name(s) among 
the applicants. 
The outcome variable in this analysis is the number of patents applied for in the 
first three business years. This variable is highly skewed to the left. However, a 
zero might have two reasons. First, the firm didn't try to do R&D and apply for 
a patent and second, the firm was unlucky in its R&D activities and did not 
come to a patentable result. The author used a zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression model in order to take care of the fact that the excess zeros can stem 
from two different processes. The inflation parameter used is R&D activity 
before firm founding. 
 
Main Results  
The results show that there are four main factors that influence small firms’ 
decision to apply for patents. First, the positive influence of patenting experi-
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ence allows interpreting the results in the light of the success-breeds-success 
hypothesis (Dosi 1997). Firms whose founders have been successful innovators 
in the past will be successful in patenting in the future. 
Second, start-ups that cooperate are more likely to apply for patents. This goes 
in line with the arguments of the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose 
1959) which stated that there might be resources, especially knowledge, which 
lie outside the firm and need to be gained by cooperation. 
R&D promotion by the State is one further factor which positively influences 
the firm propensity to patent for start-ups. On the one hand, these firms have 
more financial scope for the application of a patent, second their innovative-
ness is already higher in advance since only those firms with a high innova-
tiveness score will receive R&D support (Cantner and Kösters 2009). 
The fourth factor which is positively influencing the propensity of a start-up to 
apply for a patent is scientific orientation. This means, if the firms state that 
their R&D efforts are scientifically oriented, they apply more for patents. 
 
Contribution 
The propensity to patent has been intensively analyzed in the past (see Scherer 
1983, Bound et al. 1984, Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999, Blind et al. 2006, 
Hall et al. 2012). However, all these studies receive their data from larger com-
pany databases which do not catch young and innovative (and very often small) 
ventures. This paper steps into this gap and analyses the patenting behavior if 
entrepreneurial ventures. 
Since founders of young firms –entrepreneurs- will lose the right to the patent 
if the firm gets bankrupt, they might not be willing (in the first time) to apply 
for a patent on the companies' name. Indeed, descriptive statistics have shown 
that only about 5.5% of the patents applied for by start-ups are applied on the 
companies' name. Therefore, in contrast to previous studies on patenting activi-
ties, this paper votes for taking the founder’s patent applications into account 
when analyzing patent activities of innovative start-ups. 
Of course, this study comes with drawbacks which might be solved in the fu-
ture. First, the chapter only takes Thuringian start-ups into account; second, the 
strategic reasoning behind patenting could not be analyzed in this study. This 
leaves open room for future research. 
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2. Success and failure of firms' innovation cooperations: the 
role of intermediaries and reciprocity 
2.1 Introduction 
At least since Schumpeter published his book ‘The Theory of Economic De-
velopment’ (1912), innovations have been seen as the driving force behind 
economic development. Empirically-founded work by Allen (1983) on blast 
furnace production, and by von Hippel (1987) on the US  mini-mill steel indus-
try, initiated a line of research focusing on actors that cooperate and coordinate 
their work in order to generate new knowledge and, subsequently, to introduce 
it via innovations into the market collectively. The motivation for such cooper-
ation based innovative activities is related to a couple of different factors (Bay-
ona et al. 2001). One such factor is the complexity of technological develop-
ment that often requires several specialized actors and a certain division of la-
bor. Another is that the uncertainty and risk involved in inventive and innova-
tive processes is easier to bear when pooled. In addition, market access is often 
facilitated by cooperative agreements.  
Besides these factors, the uneven spread of knowledge and competencies re-
quired to generate new ideas and for these new ideas to result in innovation has 
also been taken into consideration. As Schumpeter (1912) put it, innovation 
can be seen as bringing new combinations of resources to the market. Hence, to 
generate innovations requires recombining existing knowledge (Cantner and 
Meder 2007). In particular, the appropriate knowledge necessary for successful 
innovation may not be in the immediate reach of an actor but may rather lie 
outside (Cowan et al. 2006). Access to such external knowledge may, there-
fore, be an important prerequisite for innovative success. With these arguments 
in mind, inventive and innovative activities can be said to rely on processes of 
collective or social learning and on the exchange of knowledge between actors 
(Lundvall 1992, Doloreux and Parto 2005).  
Despite these presumed advantages of cooperation-based knowledge exchang-
es, their establishment and continuation face own problems that can affect the 
generation of new ideas in a significant way. For example, consider a firm with 
a low level and intensity of cooperation-based exchanges, although there are 
available enough potential cooperation partners. This may indicate that the firm 
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simply failed to make contact with potential partners, presumably due to a lack 
of intermediation. Another explanation refers to the lack of trust and reciproci-
ty in firms’ cooperative relationships, which reduces the incentive to engage in 
cooperation-based knowledge exchanges, a problem related to the lack of reci-
procity.
1
 
These two problems potentially affecting innovation cooperation are at the 
heart of this paper. We look at the role they play for the innovative perfor-
mance of firms.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the theoretical background on 
which hypotheses are derived. Section 2.3 introduces the data used. Sections 
2.4 and 2.5 are devoted to the potential problems of intermediation and of reci-
procity. Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
2.2.1 Innovation and Cooperation at the Firm Level 
As Chris Freeman (1987, p. 266) said: “… not to innovate is to die.” This is the 
general situation which firms face in today’s economic world. Freeman’s 
phrase nicely describes the core of the theory of evolutionary economics, 
which sees economic change as the result of the emergence and diffusion of 
innovations (Pyka 1999). Consider a population of actors, different in their 
ideas and in their behaviors, where some of the individuals begin to search for 
new and better opportunities and ways to break trough the existing barriers. 
These individuals are so called “creative entrepreneurs” who, by implementing 
an innovation and bringing it to the market, create a technological gap 
(Dosi 1988). The process of creative destruction compels incumbent firms to 
hold pace with new technological developments and thus to be innovative. The 
most important ingredient of an innovation is new technological knowledge, 
                                                          
1
 As a third problem, the issue of complementarity of the potentially cooperating partners in 
terms of knowledge, experience and capabilities is frequently discussed. The low intensity of 
cooperation-based exchange can also indicate that the knowledge bases of the actors do not fit, 
i.e. the lack of compatibility. With the data used in this paper, lacking information on the ac-
tors’ knowledge, experience and capabilities, an appropriate analysis cannot be performed. For 
a respective investigation on the basis of patent data for Germany, see Cantner and Meder 
(2007).  
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which may not be completely appropriable to a firm because some of its parts 
are tacit (Thornhill 2005). The ability of a firm to understand and to exploit 
such new technological knowledge, respective the absorptive capacity, deter-
mines a firm’s ability to innovate as well as to imitate (Cohen and Levin-
thal 1990). 
However, innovative activities do not come without constraints for a single 
firm, which may be abolished by cooperative agreements. First, uncertainty 
and risk involved in inventive and innovative processes is easier to bear when 
pooled (Baum et al. 2000, Bayona et al. 2001). Second, the generation of inno-
vations is a process of recombining existing knowledge (Cant-
ner and Meder 2007), since it can be defined as a social process of interactive 
learning, which occurs through cooperation and interaction between firms and 
the actors in their environment (Lundvall 1992). The knowledge necessary to 
innovate successfully, however, may lie outside the firm’s boundaries, which 
may make the access to external knowledge crucial (Cowan et al. 2006). These 
arguments point to the resource-based-view of the firm, which sees access to 
productive resources, here mainly technological knowledge, of the partners as 
main incentive to engage in research cooperation (Penrose 1959). Penrose 
treats firms as collections of productive resources that are tied semi permanent-
ly to the firm. By combining such productive resources of complementary 
firms, cooperation may enhance the propensity of a successful development 
project (Teece 1986, Nooteboom 1999). Additionally, the internalization of 
knowledge spillovers may be another reason to engage in R&D collaboration 
(Griliches 1992). Following these considerations, firms do not usually innovate 
in isolation but in collaboration and interaction with other organizations 
(Fagerberg 2005). These other organizations may be other firms, universities, 
schools or ministries, the behaviors of which are shaped by institutions 
(Edquist 2005). Organizations and institutions are components of systems for 
the generation and diffusion of innovations, namely the systems of innovation 
(Edquist 2005). The theory of systems of innovation claims that special combi-
nations of organizations and institutions can enhance a firm’s ability to inno-
vate and to compete successfully (Cantner et al. 2003). 
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2.2.2 Problems of Intermediation and Reciprocity in Cooperation 
Having described the relationship between innovation and cooperation at the 
firm level, in the following we will discuss failures that prevent the emergence 
and the functioning of cooperative projects. The arguments we put forward are 
based on the assumption that organizations are usually willing to transfer and 
to exchange knowledge. For that to take place, they have to know where possi-
ble partners are or where to search for them; furthermore, for relationships to 
be sustainable, they have to be reciprocal in the sense that the transfer of 
knowledge is not one way. Failures with respect to cooperative projects show 
up if one or both of these two conditions fail. Firms then face a lack of inter-
mediation and/or a lack of reciprocity in (potential) cooperation partners. 
Lack of intermediation 
To understand the lack of intermediation, it is useful to take a look at the 
asymmetrically informed borrowers and lenders in financial markets. Seeking 
information about a potential finance partner causes high transaction costs for 
firms and private households (Williamson 1986). This can force the actors on 
the financial market to put up with the high costs, to make contracts without 
information, or to omit financial transactions (Diamond 1984). Financial in-
termediation, e.g. by a bank, can bear a net cost advantage in comparison to the 
direct financing. 
The lack of intermediation is just similar. Searching for an appropriate collabo-
ration partner may cause high transaction costs related to gathering information 
about the existence of potential partners, their knowledge features and their 
reputations. Firms may be aware of those costs or, more reasonably, they may 
anticipate but not exactly know their levels. In both cases, if these costs are 
high or uncertain, actors may be reluctant and refrain from searching for poten-
tial cooperation partners.  
To overcome this is just the function of intermediaries. The emergence or set-
ting up and partly also the continuation of knowledge exchange between coop-
eration partners may require an initiator and/or mediator. Those entities are 
subsumed under the notion of intermediaries. Following Cantner and Graf 
(2003), among the intermediaries in this sense are offices devoted to technolo-
gy transfer, public agencies (regional politicians, business development agen-
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cies), conferences and know-how markets, collaborative research ventures, 
patents, other sources of information such as consultants and scientific jour-
nals, as well as employees' mobility. Their principle function is to mediate con-
tacts and to transfer knowledge between actors (Karlsson 1997). Obviously, the 
intermediaries mentioned are different in their abilities to fulfill both of these 
tasks. Some of them are deliberately installed and formal; others seem to work 
unconsciously and on a more informal basis. For the purpose of this paper, we 
look at public agencies, in fact at ‘chambers of commerce and industry’ and 
‘business promotion entities’, as they act as mediators between regional actors 
(von Malmborg 2007). For realizing this function, their role could be that of a 
"teacher" or a "tutor". As to the former, the initiation and continuation of coop-
eration projects relies on the knowledge and ideas held by the intermediary. 
Acting as a 'tutor', the intermediary's central position between the actors is not 
based on an ability to hold, to generate and to diffuse knowledge, but rather 
consists in enabling actors to make contact with other actors holding the 
knowledge searched for and required. By looking at the above mentioned pub-
lic agencies, we here concentrate on intermediaries who act rather as a tutor 
than as a teacher. Consequently, a lack of intermediation arises when 
knowledge exchanges among actors do not take place at all or only on a rather 
low level of success (Cantner 2000). Since ‘chambers of commerce and indus-
try’ and ‘business promotion entities’ act as mediators between regional actors, 
problems with respect to a lack of intermediation automatically comprehend a 
regional dimension. This, however, will not be the main focus of this paper.  
The presumed difficulties in intermediaries’ work show two dimensions. First, 
one task of intermediaries is to arrange cooperation partners for organizations 
that are willing to cooperate, but as yet have not found the appropriate partner 
by themselves. This requires firms, when in need of a cooperation partner, to 
approach an intermediary and to express this need. Firms will only do this if 
they are aware of intermediaries offering such a service and if they consider the 
services offered important for the solution of their problems. Thus, whether 
actors find an appropriate cooperation partner is a function of the alleged im-
portance of intermediate actors. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2-1: 
A comparably higher perceived importance of intermediaries fosters the initia-
tion of collaborative R&D projects. 
 
The second dimension refers to the quality of intermediaries’ services and re-
lates it to the success of cooperation. The intermediaries’ ability to connect 
actors in a most fitting way reflects their quality. In the case of a low fitting, 
collaboration is more likely to fail. Thus, the success of collaboration can be 
seen as a function of the quality of intermediaries’ services. This leads to our 
second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2-2: 
A higher perceived quality of the intermediaries’ services fosters comparably 
more successful collaborative R&D projects. 
 
Lack of reciprocity 
Güth et al. (2002) consider the German proverb "Wie Du mir, so ich Dir!" ("Tit 
for tat") [p.6] a suitable signpost to understand what reciprocity means for so-
cial interaction. It can be defined as the inner tendency of individuals to answer 
to benevolent or to harming behavior in the same sense (Gouldner 1960, Güth 
and Yaari 1992, Cialdini and Trost 1998). Reciprocity is the reaction, the an-
swer, to the behavior of others. Consequently, they react friendly and nice to 
friendly actions and they are nasty and even brutal in reaction to hostile actions 
(Fehr and Gächter 2000). These principles can be applied to collective inven-
tion and innovation. There, cooperative activity in R&D, as one routine to de-
velop new products or processes, "is based on proven past performance and 
reliability of a cooperative relation, and thus has a rational basis even though it 
is no longer based on conscious deliberation" (Nooteboom 1999, p.797f.). 
Hence, reciprocity relies heavily on the reliability and trust among cooperation 
partners. 
Lacking reciprocity causes considerable problems for R&D cooperation; it may 
even cause no cooperation to occur. Reciprocity in this context means that the 
transmission of knowledge by one actor is reciprocated by the other actor - not 
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necessarily uno actu
2
. Fehr and Gächter (2000) describe cooperation as recip-
rocal because the partners have to open their own knowledge stock to get, sim-
ultaneously, access to the knowledge stock of the partner. Hence, cooperation 
partners are required to have mutual incentives (Cantner and Meder 2007). In 
the case where reciprocity is not given, the exchange of knowledge will not 
take place. In principle, this can be related to a lack of trust on the level of bi-
lateral relationships, as well as on the system's level. 
Accordingly, two types of reciprocity problems can be distinguished. The first 
type is an ex-ante lack of reciprocity, where the actors are not cooperating be-
cause they have prejudices toward the potential partners. In this case, the actors 
are doubtful about bi- or multilateral know-how streams (Cantner 2000). In 
order to avoid the danger of opening the own knowledge stock without receiv-
ing an appropriate part of the partner's knowledge, actors attempt to go without 
networking. Hence, because of a lack of trust in a potential partner’s reciproca-
tion, knowledge exchange relations will not be taken up
3
.  
The second type of reciprocity problems is an ex-post lack of reciprocity, 
which arises from tensions between current cooperation partners. These ten-
sions may be related to one partner free-riding on the others’ knowledge stock4. 
Thus, the cheated partner will react by withholding his knowledge stock or by 
breaking off the cooperation. Hence, if trust is not reinforced or if it is disap-
pointed, actors are not willing to collaborate further (Cantner and Graf 2003). 
This discussion allows us to formulate the third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2-3: 
The less trust collaborative firms have to their partners, the higher the proba-
bility that cooperation will fail. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Reciprocity by no means requires exchange in equal quantities or equally valuable "quanti-
ties" of knowledge – for the reason that objective values for the "quantities" do not exist. 
3
 With the data at hand, we cannot test this relationship empirically. 
4
 Here, it can also be the case that one partner only has the feeling that the other is free riding 
on his knowledge. 
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2.3 Data  
Data Base and Variables 
The data we use are drawn from a questionnaire-based company survey in 
2006 which was embedded in the research project "Second Order Innovations" 
financed by the Volkswagen Foundation. The survey was based on a basic 
population of 1,793 firms in Northern Hesse, 953 firms in Jena and 365 firms 
in Sophia Antipolis – all taken from the trade registers. The sectors covered are 
manufacturing, ICT and research services; the minimum firms size is four em-
ployees. For Sophia Antipolis compared to the two other regions, there is a 
focus on firms mainly from ICT and a few from the pharmaceutical industry. 
Firms were asked about development, R&D effort, innovative and economic 
success, as well as cooperative behavior for the period 2003-2006. The re-
sponse rate was higher than 20% (Northern Hesse 29.5%, Jena 24% and Sophia 
Antipolis 15%), leading to  832 firms, whereof 529 are located in Northern 
Hesse, 248 in Jena and 55 in Sophia Antipolis . The sample is representative 
with respect to industries and to size classes. Table 2-1 describes the variables 
and table 2-2 shows the correlation matrix.  
 
The core dependent variables in our analyses account for cooperative activities 
of firms. The binary variable Coop indicates whether innovative firms also do 
R&D in cooperation, with 1 if so and 0 otherwise. The cooperation success is 
represented by Coop-suc, a binary variable, indicating with 1 that cooperation 
has led to an innovation and 0 otherwise. Cooperation failure is accounted for 
by Coop-fai, a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the cooperation 
failed and 0 otherwise.  
Indicators for intermediation and trust serve as both dependent and independent 
variables. The perceived importance of intermediaries’ services is measured by 
the binary variable Int-imp, which is the answer to the question: Are the loca-
tion factors ‘chambers of commerce and industry’ and ‘business promotion 
entities’ important for the innovative activities of your firm? The variable Int-
imp takes a value of 1 if the firm replies with ‘yes’, and 0 otherwise. Besides 
the evaluation of the importance of intermediaries, firms were asked to evalu-
ate intermediaries’ quality on a 5-digit-Likert-scale, with higher values indicat-
ing better evaluations. The variable Int-qua accounts for this quality dimension. 
The variable Ex-post-trust is constructed from three 5-digit-Likert scales on 
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trust to regional, national and international cooperation partners. The question 
we asked is: How would you evaluate the mutual trust to your regional, na-
tional or international cooperation partners? A higher value of Ex-post-trust 
indicates a higher level of trust.  
In order to account for a range of other determinants of interest, we use control 
variables with respect to the cooperation structure of the firms considered. The 
binary variables Coopsc, Coopco, and coopers indicate whether cooperative 
firms worked together with suppliers/customers (Coopsc), competitors (Coop-
co) and/or research institutes (Coopres). Binary control variable Group indi-
cates whether the respondent firm belongs to a firm group. A firm’s share of 
high-educated employees in total employees is accounted for by Edu-r. The 
variable Age measures the firms’ age in years in 2006, when the questionnaire 
was conducted. The variable Size measures the firm size as the natural loga-
rithm of the number of employees. Finally, several dummies indicating the 
firms’ industry by two-digit NACE codes are used. 
For the sake of taking into account regional specific effects, we use dummy 
variables indicating whether a firm belongs to the region of Jena (Je), Northern 
Hesse (Nh) od Sophia Antipolis (Sa). As to correlations among the independent 
variables in table 2-2, we find if at all only low indications. 
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Table 2-1 Variables used for analyzing the role of intermediaries and reciprocity for innovation cooperation 
 
Use Variable Description Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
variable 
Coop Binary variable with a value of 1 if this firm engaged 
in cooperation within the last three years and 0 other-
wise. 
829 0.448 0.498 0 1 
 Coop-suc Binary variable with a value of 1 if this firm has suc-
cessfully developed a new product or process with a 
cooperation partner within the last 3 years and 0 oth-
erwise. 
827 0.244 0.430 0 1 
 Coop-fai Binary variable with a value of 1 if this firm engaged 
in cooperation within the last three years and this co-
operation failed. Otherwise this value is 0. 
827 0.036 0.187 0 1 
H2-1 Int-imp Binary variable with a value of 1 if this firm claimed 
that regional intermediate actors are important for the 
firm development and 0 otherwise. 
764 0.191 0.393 0 1 
H2-2 Int-qua The firms were asked to evaluate the quality of re-
gional intermediate actors on a 5-digit-Likert-scale. 
The higher the value, the better the quality. 
489 2.679 1.070 1 5 
H2-3 Ex-post-trust Average value from a 5-digit-Likert-scale on trust to 
regional, national and international cooperation part-
ners. The higher the value the higher the trust to part-
ners. 
318 3.854 0.702 1 5 
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Table 2-1 continued 
Use Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Controls Je Regional dummy with a value of 1 if this firm is located 
in Jena and 0 otherwise. 
832 0.298 0.458 0 1 
 Nh Regional dummy with a value of 1 if this firm is located 
in Northern Hesse and 0 otherwise. 
832 0.636 0.481 0 1 
 Sa Regional dummy with a value of 1 if this firm is located 
in Sophia Antipolis and 0 otherwise. 
832 0.066 0.249 0 1 
 Coopsc Binary variable, indicating whether cooperation partners 
are stemming from the firm’s supply chain (customers 
and suppliers). 
436 0.456 0.499 0 1 
 Coopco Binary variable, indicating whether cooperation partners 
are competitors of the respective firm. 
437 0192 0.394 0 1 
 Coopres Binary variable, indicating whether cooperation partners 
are research institutes. 
437 0.279 0.449 0 1 
 Group Binary variable with a value of 1 if this firm is a mem-
ber of a firm group and 0 otherwise. 
826 0.229 0.420 0 1 
 Edu-r Share of high-educated employees in total employees. 733 0.289 0.324 0 1 
 Age Firm age, measured in years. 816 28.366 39.669 1 606 
 Size Firm size, measured in natural logarithm of the number 
of employees. 
820 2.801 1.465 0 8.846 
 Industry Several dummies were included for two-digit industry 
codes (NACE). 
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Table 2-2 Correlation matrix of variables used for analyzing the role of intermediaries and reciprocity for innovation coopera-
tion 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Size 1          
2 Age 0.2275 1         
3 Group 0.3650 -0.0323 1        
4 Edu-r -0.2561 -0.2491 0.1343 1       
5 Coop 0.1734 -0.0604 0.2687 0.2203 1      
6 Coop-suc 0.1899 -0.0565 0.1985 0.2164 0.6334 1     
7 Coop-fai 0.0940 -0.0400 0.1249 0.0270 0.2161 0.1004 1    
8 Int-imp 0.0148 -0.0402 -0.0506 0.0127 0.0485 0.1197 0.0554 1   
9 Int-qua 0.0500 -0.0177 0.0420 0.0759 0.0004 0.0383 0.0419 0.1460 1  
10 Ex-post-trust -0.0229 -0.0857 0.1087 0.2438 . 0.1374 -0.0580 0.0989 0.0568 1 
11 Coopsc 0.2429 0.0615 0.1402 0.0686 0.5537 0.3690 0.1111 -0.0236 -0.0239 -0.0646 
12 Coopco 0.1520 0.1224 0.0042 0.0058 0.2941 0.0927 0.0978 -0.0718 -0.1111 -0.0707 
13 Coopres 0.2751 0.0122 0.2177 0.1947 0.3753 0.3443 0.0217 0.0345 0.0285 0.1615 
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Table 2-2 continued 
  11 12 13 
11 Coopsc 1   
12 Coopco 0.1378 1  
13 Coopres 0.3679 0.0778 1 
 
First Descriptives 
Table 2-3 gives an overview on the structure of the empirical basis with respect 
to innovation and cooperation. We find that 73.20% of the firms in our data-
base report conducting innovative activities. A glance at the percentage of 
those innovative firms which have been successful reveals that 61.41% of all 
innovative firms brought their innovative activities to a success, namely to an 
innovation. Looking additionally at R&D cooperation, we find 50.90% of the 
responding firms report being cooperative, whereof 65.16% succeed with a 
marketable innovation.  
 
Table 2-3 Describing the database for the analysis of success and failure in 
innovation cooperation 
Number of firms 832 
Innovators 609 
     In % of all firms 73.20 
Successful innovators 374 
     In % of innovative firms 61.41 
Cooperators 310 
     In % of innovative firms 50.90 
Successful cooperators 202 
    In % of cooperative firms 65.16 
Unsuccessful cooperators 30 
     In % of cooperative firms 9.68 
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2.4 Empirical investigation 
2.4.1 Lack of Intermediation 
The first problem analyzed is the role of intermediaries, whose task it is to get 
suitable actors into contact. For being successful herein, the existence of inter-
mediaries has to be considered important or necessary, because, otherwise, 
actors would not consider preoccupying their services. Additionally, the ser-
vice of the intermediate actors has to be of good quality. We test for both con-
ditions and suggest an intermediation problem to exist if there is a low propen-
sity to cooperate, combined with a low perceived importance, and/or if there is 
a low propensity to cooperate successfully, combined with a low perceived 
quality of the intermediate actors’ services. 
As stated in section 2.2, technology transfer offices, public agencies, patents, 
conferences etc. may take the role of an intermediary. For our analysis, we 
concentrate on public agencies, in particular on the role of ‘chambers of com-
merce and industry’ and of ‘business promotion entities’.  
 
2.4.1.1 Importance of Intermediaries 
As a first step, we test whether the perceived importance of the intermediate 
actors has an influence on the actors' probability of being engaged in coopera-
tive R&D projects. We here restrict our sample to innovative firms and, due to 
the binary nature of Int-imp, run logit regression models on the variable Coop. 
If intermediaries just fulfill their assumed role as initiators, the variable Int-imp 
should have a positive coefficient, thus increasing the cooperation probability. 
Our results are presented in table 2-4, where the models are distinguished by 
the separate inclusion of independent variables. 
We find neither a significant effect of the variable Int-imp nor of the region 
specific variables Int-imp*Sa, Int-imp*Je, Int-imp*Nh on the cooperation prob-
ability. Thus, we conclude that, at least for our data, no direct effect of the per-
ceived importance of intermediate actors on the cooperation propensity shows 
up. Hence, we reject hypothesis 2-1. 
The coefficients of control variables indicate that being member of a firm 
group and employing a larger share of higher-educated persons are related to a 
higher probability to cooperate. These results contribute to former empirical 
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studies on cooperation propensity which find membership in a firm group 
(Baum et al. 2000), and the internal education level, indicating firm's absorp-
tive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), to influence positively the coop-
eration propensity. 
 
Table 2-4 Influence of intermediaries' importance on cooperation 
Method Logit regression  
Dep. Var. Coop       
Population innovative firms  
 model 1 model 2  model 3  model 4  
Int-imp 0.307 0.243  0.238    
(1.43) (0.90)  (0.88)   
Int-imp * Sa      0.700  
  (0.73)  
Int-imp * Je      0.150  
  (0.27)  
Int-imp * Nh      0.212  
  (0.65)  
Je    0.223  0.239  
 (0.71)  (0.71)  
Sa    -20.274  -20.258  
 (-15.09) *** (-12.93) *** 
Size  0.037  0.047  0.046  
(0.43)  (0.55)  (0.54)  
Age  -0.000  0.000  0.000  
(-0.12)  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Group  1.087  1.107  1.112  
(4.11) *** (4.14) *** (4.15) *** 
Edu-r  1.247  1.175  1.159  
(2.94) *** (2.66) *** (2.61) *** 
Industry 
 
 yes  yes  yes  
Intercept -0.008 -0.896  19.391  19.291  
(-0.09) (-1.65) * (14.39) *** (12.90) *** 
No. of Obs.
 a
 592 487  487  487  
Mc Fadden 
Pseudo R
2
 
0.0025 0.1175  0.1241  0.1245  
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% level, 1% levels respectively. 
 
Besides these two main factors, the dummy for firms located in Sophia Antipo-
lis is negatively significant, indicating that these firms are less likely to cooper-
ate compared to the firms from the other two regions. Firm size, as well as age, 
do not show significant coefficients. 
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Since we could not find a direct effect of intermediaries’ importance on the 
likelihood to cooperate per se, we restrict our analysis to cooperative actors and 
test whether the perceived importance of intermediaries has an influence on 
cooperative success. We use the same model specification as before and run 
logit regressions on the effect of the importance of ‘chambers of commerce and 
industry’ and ‘business promotion agencies’ on the success of collaboration 
projects. Table 2-5 shows the results. 
Looking first at the control variables, we find a positive relation to cooperation 
with research institutes, whereas we cannot find significant relations to cooper-
ation along the supply chain, namely with suppliers and customers, or with 
competitors. Moreover, the size is positively related to the successful comple-
tion of cooperative projects, whereas a firm’s age shows a negative relation. 
The importance of intermediaries on cooperation success is analyzed in models 
2 and 3 of table 2-5. Our analysis shows a significantly positive coefficient of 
the Int-imp in model 2, indicating that firms that consider intermediaries’ work 
as important tend to be more successful in cooperating. In order to find out 
which of the regions may be responsible for this finding, we additionally re-
gressed region specific coefficients of Int-imp in model 3. The regional coeffi-
cient of the perceived importance of intermediaries on cooperation success is 
positively significant only for Northern Hesse, whereas the coefficient for Jena 
is not significant. Thus, the perceived importance of intermediary actors corre-
lates with the success probability of cooperation in R&D, but not everywhere. 
Taking the results of table 2-5, we find that those actors that recognize the im-
portance or the worthiness of intermediaries’ services tend to cooperate more 
successfully. However, this effect seems to be driven by actors located in 
Northern Hesse, which points to regional specificities of this issue.  
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Table 2-5 Influence of intermediaries' importance on cooperation success 
 
 
2.4.1.2 Quality of intermediaries 
As a second step in analyzing intermediation problems, we look at the quality 
of intermediaries as evaluated by the firms. We first attempt to determine firm 
specific differences in the quality evaluation. Since Likert-scale-type depend-
ent variables require running ordered logistic regressions, we regress our firm 
Method Logit regression 
Coop-suc 
Cooperative firms (Coop = 1) 
Dep. Var. 
Population 
 model 1   model 2   model 3  
Int-imp   1.103    
  (2.56) ***   
Int-imp * Je     0.275  
    (0.47)  
Int-imp * Nh     1.546 *** 
    (2.90)  
Int-imp *  Sa
a
     dropped  
      
Size 0.237 * 0.418 *** 0.424 *** 
(1.88)  (2.84)  (2.85)  
Age -0.007  -0.012  -0.014  
(-1.27)  (-2.00) *** (-2.22) ** 
Group 0.031  0.137  0.184  
(0.10)  (0.40)  (0.54)  
Edu-r 0.448  0.317  0.518  
(0.75)  (0.50)  (0.79)  
Coopsc 0.270  0.485  0.447  
(0.89)  (1.48)  (1.36)  
Coopco -0.143  -0.260  -0.240  
(-0.44)  (-0.73)  (-0.67)  
Coopres 0.614 * 0.789 ** 0.825 ** 
(1.88)  (2.15)  (2.24)  
Industry 
 
 
yes  yes  yes  
Intercept -0.747  -0.075  0.041  
(-0.49)  (-0.05)  (0.03)  
No. of Obs.
 b
 267  242  242  
Mc Fadden Pseudo R
2
 0.0996  0.1507  0.1587  
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% level, 
1% levels respectively. 
a
 Note that Int-imp *  Sa was dropped due to collinearity. 
b
 Note that the number of observations changes between the models 
since there are missing observations for some variables.
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specific control variables on the perceived quality (Int-qua) using OLogit
5
. The 
results are presented in table 2-6. We run two models, where the first accounts 
for the control variables only. Model 1 in table 2-6 shows that all control varia-
bles, except Edu-r, show no significant influence on the evaluation of interme-
diaries at all. Thus, a higher share of high-educated employees increases the 
quality evaluation of the firms. Model 2 provides an additional analysis by 
looking at the relation of the perceived importance of intermediate actors to 
their perceived quality. Our analysis of intermediaries reveals a relationship 
between the perceived importance of intermediaries and cooperation success, 
which in this step of analysis is the variable of interest. We find that firms 
claiming regional intermediaries to be important tend also to give a better eval-
uation for these actors. This finding strengthens our intuition in combining both 
steps of analysis (relationship between Int-qua and Int-imp). The awareness of 
the use of intermediaries’ services seems to have a positive influence on the 
perceived quality of these services. 
 
From the results in model 3 of table 2-5, we have already seen an indication of 
this point, where we find that those actors who recognize the importance or the 
worthiness of intermediaries’ services tend to cooperate more successfully. 
This effect, however, is specific to firms located in Northern Hesse, implying 
that the intermediation of contacts in this region seems to be successful, but 
most firms in this region do not recognize that. Therefore, presumably the ma-
jor problem for intermediating suitable partners is rather a communication than 
a programmatic problem. Intermediaries have to communicate what they can 
do for firms and the worthiness of the mediation of suitable partners. If they 
can communicate this, the quality of their work may not have such a big influ-
ence because actors then automatically feel confident about the service. With 
respect to our theoretical considerations, we conclude that the perceived im-
portance, rather than the perceived quality, of intermediaries in a region may be 
the key for more successful cooperation. In other words, firms have to recog-
nize what intermediaries can do for them, if they seek successful cooperation. 
                                                          
5
 Here the actual values taken on by the dependent variable are irrelevant, except that larger 
values are assumed to correspond to "higher" outcomes. This is due to the fact that this evalua-
tion method has clear cut definitions for each scale. 
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Table 2-6 Firm specific differences in quality evaluation 
Method Ordered logistic regres-
sion 
 
Dep. Var. Int-qua  
Population all firms 
 model 1  model 2  
Int-imp   0.799  
  (3.59) *** 
Size 0.092  0.101  
(1.14)  (1.24)  
Age -0.001  -0.001  
(-0.27)  (-0.27)  
Group -0.189  -0.133  
(-0.79)  (-0.55)  
Edu-r 0.735  0.683  
(1.86) * (1.72) * 
Industry yes  Yes 
 
 
No. of Obs.
 a
 427  424  
McFadden Pseudo R
2
 0.0285  0.0417  
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% level, 
1% levels respectively. 
a
 Note that the number of observations changes 
between the models since there are missing ob-
servations for some variables. 
 
 
In a further step, we test whether the perceived quality of intermediaries’ ser-
vices is positively correlated to the binary variable Coop-suc. Table 2-7 con-
tains the estimation results. 
For models 1 to 3, looking at the relation of the overall Int-qua to the coopera-
tion success probability, no significant coefficients are estimated. This leads us 
to reject hypothesis 2-2. Also in model 4, attempting to find region specific 
relations between the intermediaries’ quality and cooperation success, no sig-
nificant coefficients are found. With respect to the controls, Size has a signifi-
cantly positive coefficient, whereas Age shows a (weakly) significant negative 
relation to cooperative success. 
 
Summarizing this section, we neither identify a direct effect of the perceived 
importance of intermediaries’ services on cooperation, nor do we find a direct 
relationship between the perceived quality of intermediaries’ services and co-
operation success. However, we identify an indirect effect which may lead us 
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to identify a failure in Northern Hesse. Looking only at cooperative firms, we 
find that firms that perceive intermediaries important state also a successful 
cooperation. This result is mainly driven by firms located in Northern Hesse. 
Of course, this cannot be taken as a causal relationship and it may equally hold 
true that only those who had cooperation success then ex-post consider inter-
mediaries important. Nevertheless, the failure in Northern Hesse may lie in the 
misjudgement of intermediaries’ worthiness. If an actor in Northern Hesse, 
however, understands intermediaries’ services as important, then he usually 
cooperates more successfully. 
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Table 2-7 Influence of intermediaries' quality on cooperation success 
Method Logistic regression  
Dep. Var. Coop-suc  
Population Cooperative firms  
 model 1 model 2  model 3  model 4  
Int-qua 0.147 0.271  0.269    
(1.12) (1.39)  (1.37)    
Int-qua * Sa
a
      dropped  
Int-qua * Je      0.605  
     (1.43)  
Int-qua * Nh      0.168  
     (0.75)  
Je    0.110  -1.177  
   (0.18)  (-0.77)  
Sa
a
    dropped  dropped  
Size  0.606  0.613  0.601  
 (2.88) *** (2.86) *** (2.81) *** 
Age  -0.015  -0.015  -0.015  
 (-1.84) * (-1.77) * (-1.76) * 
Group  0.329  0.313  0.313  
 (0.70)  (0.66)  (0.65)  
Edu-r  0.726  0.672  0.752  
 (0.81)  (0.71)  (0.80)  
Coopsc  0.494  0.490  0.540  
 (1.15)  (1.14)  (1.24)  
Coopco  -0.261  -0.264  -0.240  
 (-0.58)  (-0.58)  (-0.53)  
Coopres  -0.009  -0.020  0.029  
 (-0.02)  (-0.04)  (-0.06)  
Industry 
 
 yes  yes  yes  
Intercept -0.189 -1.502  -1.509  -1.360  
(-0.51) (-0.95)  (-0.96)  (-0.86)  
No. of Obs.
 b
 227 158  158  158  
Mc Fadden 
Pseudo R
2
 
0.0041 0.0480  0.1806  0.1846  
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% level, 1% levels respectively. 
a
 Note that int-qua * Sa and Sa were dropped due to collinearity. 
b
 Note that the number of observations changes between the models since there are 
missing observations for some variables.
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2.4.2 Lack of Reciprocity 
Our next step is concerned with the issue of reciprocity governing the coopera-
tive activities of firms. We operationalize reciprocity with the firms' evaluation 
of the trust they have in current cooperation partners. We decided to ask firms 
for an evaluation of trust, instead of reciprocity, because trust is a more com-
mon concept which is easier to evaluate for individuals. Moreover, trust be-
tween cooperation partners who are usually market oriented firms is very likely 
to be the result of reciprocity. Without reciprocity, no cooperation would occur 
because of the danger of free riding. If actors get in touch and cooperate for a 
while, what they ‘feel’ and can evaluate is more related to trust than to reci-
procity. Therefore, it should make sense to ask for trust rather than for reci-
procity.  
In our analysis, we investigate whether the failure of cooperative ventures is 
related to missing trust towards partners involved herein. This relation points to 
an ex-post lack of reciprocity. 
We first use cooperation success as a dependent variable, represented by the 
binary variable Coop-fai which takes the value of 1 if the cooperation failed. 
The core independent variable we use here is the ex-post reciprocity variable 
Ex-post-trust. In addition, we use region specific Ex-post-trust variables, Ex-
post-trust*Nh, Ex-post-trust*Sa, Ex-post-trust*Je, as well as the control varia-
bles Size, Age, Group, Edu-r, Coopsc, Coopco and Coopres. The logit regres-
sion results on Coop-fai are presented in table 2-8. Model 1 looks only at the 
control variables and finds that breaking off of cooperative projects without 
finding an innovation is negatively related to cooperating with research insti-
tutes. Thus, fewer cooperative projects are broken off if the cooperation partner 
is a research institute. 
In model 2, we test for the impact of trust in general. The variable Ex-post-trust 
shows a significantly negative coefficient, indicating that a higher level of trust 
is related to a lower probability of failure, which supports our hypothesis 2-3. 
To account for regional differences, in model 3 we include region specific trust 
variables. 
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Table 2-8 Influence of trust on cooperation failure 
Method Logistic regression  
Dep. Var. Coop-fai 
Population cooperative firms 
  model 1  model 2  model 3  
Ex-post-trust   -4.029 **   
 (-2.14)    
Ex-post-trust  * Je     -3.983 ** 
  (-2.11)  
Ex-post-trust * Nh     -4.117 ** 
  (-2.14)  
Ex-post-trust * Sa
a
       
    
Size 0.395  -1.204  -1.255  
(1.30)  (-1.25)  (-1.28)  
Age -0.009  -0.100 * -0.100  
(-0.64)  (-1.76)  (-1.79)  
Group 0.663  3.084  3.175  
(0.90)  (1.47)  (1.48)  
Edu-r -0.949  -1.130  -1.345  
(-0.71)  (-0.39)  (-0.44)  
Coopsc 0.156  -2.691  -2.831  
(0.22)  (-1.08)  (-1.10)  
Coopco 0.163  -0.956  -0.904  
(0.24)  (-0.44)  (-0.45)  
Coopres
a
 -1.525 *     
(-1.85)      
Industry yes  yes  yes  
Intercept -0.940  16.704 * 24.572 ** 
(-0.56)  (1.88)  (2.18)  
No. of Obs.
b
 144  49  61  
Mc Fadden Pseudo R
2
 0.1741  0.4989  0.5004  
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% level,  
1% levels respectively. 
a
 Note that Ex-post-trust * Sa as well as Coopres was dropped due to col-
linearity. 
b
 Note that the number of observations changes between the models since 
there are missing observations for some variables.
 
 
For Jena and Northern Hes e, we find signi icant coeff cients, where the one 
for Northern Hesse is larger. We take this as an indication that trust and reci-
procity play a larger role in Northern Hesse compared to Jena. The reasons for 
that require further scrutiny by taking into account region’s specificities in fu-
ture work. 
  51 
2.4.3 Conclusions 
In this paper, we looked at the relation between cooperation propensity and 
cooperation success of firms, on the one hand, and the perceived problems of 
intermediation and reciprocity on the other. In particular, we attempted to an-
swer the following question: Is the likelihood to be engaged in cooperative 
innovation related to the perceived importance and quality of intermediaries? 
Can we provide evidence for differences in cooperative innovative success 
between firms, stemming from a lack of intermediation and of reciprocity? In 
order to answer these questions, we analyzed firm questionnaire data for the 
three regions, Northern Hesse and Jena in Germany, and Sophia Antipolis in 
France. On the basis of four hypotheses, we tested the influence of a lack of 
intermediation and of reciprocity on cooperative innovation.  
As to our results, first, we had to reject our hypotheses 2-1 and 2-2 related to 
the importance and quality of intermediaries: The lack of intermediation is not 
related to a higher likelihood of cooperative behavior as such (hypothesis 2-1), 
and the quality of intermediation is not related to cooperation success (hypoth-
esis 2-2). However, we found that, among the cooperative firms, the im-
portance of intermediaries is positively related to cooperation success. In addi-
tion, we found regional differences: First, in Sophia Antipolis the likelihood to 
cooperate in innovation seems to be much lower, which is surprising because 
this site was constructed by political will in order to enhance cooperation. Sec-
ond, for Northern Hesse, the relation of intermediaries’ importance on coopera-
tive success appears to be much stronger, suggesting that the major problem for 
intermediation actors is communication rather than programmatic work. Both 
issues ask for further scrutiny by taking into account the characteristics of the 
respective region, the innovation system and/or the network of innovators.  
Second, as to the problem of reciprocity in knowledge exchange, we found that 
actors tend to break off cooperative projects because of missing trust to the 
cooperation partners, which supports our third hypothesis. 
Drawing some policy implications from these results, we propose that local 
intermediary organizations in Northern Hesse should check for the visibility of 
their activities if they observe a lack of demand for their services from firms. 
Missing trust seems to be a driver of discontinued research cooperation. How-
ever, trust may also be related to the definition of agreements and contracts. In 
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line with making contacts between the actors, regional intermediaries may pro-
vide advice with respect to cooperative agreements. 
Despite the fact that we were able to identify a lack of reciprocity as a driver of 
differences in collaborative-innovation success and that Northern Hesse seems 
to be coined by a systematic failure with respect to its intermediaries’ work, 
some limitations of the analysis have to be mentioned. First, the number of 
returns of the questionnaire differed much among the regions. We compared 
Northern Hesse – 529 answers – with Jena – 248 answers – and with Sophia 
Antipolis – 55 answers.  Second, besides a lack of intermediation and of reci-
procity, there may be a third problem, crucial to the success of collaborative 
innovation, the lack of compatibility. Due to the limited data base we used, we 
were not able to test for that. Future research aims on filling this gap. We plan 
to conduct an analysis aiming at all of the three dimensions of lack.  
 
  53 
3. The Coevolution of Innovative Ties, Proximity, and Competencies: 
Toward a Dynamic Approach to Innovation Cooperation 
3.1 Introduction 
The growing complexity and shortening of cycles inherent in the innovation 
process have changed the industrial and technological environment in which 
firms operate. The associated increase in uncertainty and costs accompanying 
R&D projects has shaped a landscape that favors collaboration (Hagedoorn 
2002). Especially in high-tech industries, where knowledge creation and accu-
mulation is a crucial input factor and competition has become a learning race, 
joint research has steadily grown since the 1980s (Mowery et al. 1996, Powell 
1998). 
A basic feature of joint research is the exchange and sharing of knowledge 
among the cooperation partners. Actors choose research cooperation in the 
expectation that it will maximize their potential gain in knowledge. In this con-
text several scholars have stressed the importance that similarity between co-
operation partners has for knowledge transfer and successful collaboration. 
Similarity determines with whom one connects, for it creates trust, facilitates 
knowledge flows, and increases the mutual attractiveness of potential collabo-
ration partners (Boschma 2005, McPherson et al. 2001). Similarity or proximi-
ty in three dimensions—cognitive, social, and competence-related—seems to 
play a cardinal role in knowledge exchange in collaborations intended to gen-
erate innovation. 
These three dimensions are not simply exogenously given and static; they de-
velop in the course of the partners’ collaboration. Continued collaboration 
leads trust, experience and common understanding to eventually increase, and 
knowledge differences to decrease. These dynamics are expected to determine 
whether the same partners always cooperate or whether they switch partners 
over time. Increasing trust, experience, and common understanding tend to 
contribute to the continuation of the partnership because they increase the effi-
ciency of knowledge exchange and sharing. Conversely, the declining differ-
ence between knowledge stocks of continuously cooperating partners —that is, 
an increase in their cognitive proximity (the degree of similarity of their 
knowledge bases)—indicates that opportunities to exchange and share 
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knowledge have been exploited by them and should therefore lead to partner-
switching. 
Hence, the relation between certain proximity dimensions and continuation of 
collaboration is by no means unidirectional (Ter Wal and Boschma 2011). In 
fact, individual characteristics (e.g., technological capabilities), and thus the 
proximity to others, co-evolve with continuous collaboration (Balland et al. 
2015, Ter Wal and Boschma 2011). These dynamics have undergone little em-
pirical analysis (Balland et al. 2015). Although the coevolution of factors driv-
ing collaboration choice and the evolution of ties can be explored only with a 
dynamic approach, most of the studies on the relation between proximity and 
cooperation have been rather static (e.g., Wuyts et al. 2005, Cantner and Meder 
2007, Paier and Scherngell 2011). 
In this chapter we want to contribute to the field of dynamic approaches and 
analyze the interplay between cognitive proximity, knowledge exchange and 
collaboration. We focus our analysis on ties within innovator networks defined 
as an ensemble of direct and indirect connections, with the direct ones being 
research collaborations intended to produce innovations (Cantner and Graf 
2006). Tracking the individual actors and their collaborations over time, we 
pursue the following core research question: To what extent do knowledge 
dynamics between two cooperating actors determine the continuation of their 
innovative ties? Accordingly, we concentrate mainly on the dynamics of part-
ners’ cognitive proximity; in addition we analyze the other two dimensions, 
trust and competencies, as further important covariates. 
Our descriptive analysis suggests that firms are generally prone to switching 
their cooperation partner rather than to repeating the collaboration with that 
partner. We thus find that the knowledge transfer and cooperation that partners 
have experienced with each other have no significant effect on the likelihood 
that they will repeat their cooperation. Our empirical analysis also shows that 
cooperation is promoted by several factors: an overlap between the firms’ 
knowledge bases, an uneven distribution of the reciprocal potential for 
knowledge exchange, general collaboration experience of the partners, and 
similarity in the popularity of the collaboration partners. We also find that 
firms prefer to cooperate with partners that are different in organizational na-
ture and age. 
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We begin by providing a general overview of basic concepts and principle ar-
guments that describe the relation between similarity in knowledge, experi-
ence, and their effect on tie formation. We then characterize how these rela-
tions dynamically co-evolve with ongoing collaboration and present our hy-
potheses. In the second section we explain our methodological approach, in-
cluding data and variable descriptions. The third section presents the final re-
sults and our discussion of them. In the final section we offer suggestions for 
further research. 
 
3.2 Knowledge Dynamics and the Evolution of Innovation Linkages 
3.2.1 The Role of Cognitive Proximity, Social Proximity, and Simi-
larity in Competencies in the Formation of Innovative Ties 
The increased orientation to collaboration, especially in research and develop-
ment (R&D), has led to an upsurge of studies analyzing the advantages and 
incentives that are encouraging the trend toward the formation of alliances (e.g. 
Ahuja 2000, Gilsing et al. 2008, Gulati 1999, Hagedoorn 2002, Hamel 1991, 
Khanna et al. 1998, Mowery et al. 1996, Powell 1998). Essentially, most alli-
ances are prompted by concerns about access to external resources that are too 
costly to be acquired internally (Kogut et al. 1992). In innovation-oriented alli-
ances the access to a partner’s technology and knowledge-related resources—
be they a particular technical infrastructure or, more important, technological 
capabilities and complementary skills—is the primary motive for joint re-
search, besides the sharing of risks and R&D costs (Hagedoorn 2002). Firms, 
especially those in high-tech industries, are unable to generate internally all the 
resources they need in order to survive the rapid pace of technological change 
(Powell and Grodal 2006). According to the knowledge-based view of the firm 
(which draws on the resource-based view of the firm originally proposed by 
Penrose (1959)), a firm’s knowledge base, understood as a unique resource 
difficult to imitate, is a key competitive advantage (Grant and Baden-Fuller 
1995). In this regard firms can be seen as bundles of competencies (Hamel 
1991, p. 83) that they have accumulated throughout their lifespan. Because 
environments and solutions to problems differ between firms, knowledge gath-
ered by firms is an idiosyncratic property and quite heterogeneous among them 
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(Cantner and Graf 2011). Even firms operating in the same industry or market 
differ in what they know and what they are able to accomplish with their com-
petencies. Although this proprietary knowledge resource affords a basis for 
opportunities, its exploitation within the firm’s boundaries is limited and leads 
mostly to incremental, not necessarily optimal, improvements (Ahuja 2000, 
March 1991, Yang et al. 2010). To broaden the knowledge base and explore 
new possibilities for recombination and radical innovations, firms depend on 
external sources of knowledge (March 1991, Yang et al. 2010). In looking for 
solutions to complex problems, successful innovators extend their search to the 
environment beyond their own boundaries (Freeman 1991). The generation of 
knowledge and innovation thus results progressively from a collective learning 
process among various actors interacting formally or informally (Asheim and 
Gertler 2005). 
In innovation-oriented alliances rational actors choose their potential interac-
tion partners according to the highest expected outcome in terms of successful 
knowledge exchange and potential innovations. The efficacy of knowledge 
exchange between two or more actors is governed by the degree of heterogene-
ity between them. The proximity approach, proposed originally by Boschma 
(2005), emphasizes that similarity (conceptually the inverse of heterogeneity) 
or as he calls it proximity affects the ease of knowledge transfer between ac-
tors. He thereby differentiates between various dimensions of proximity whose 
prominence can differ from one type of alliance to another. In R&D alliances 
explicitly conceived to generate novel ideas and innovations, cognitive proxim-
ity might predominate over other forms of proximity as the basis for potential 
knowledge flows, and social proximity (also called the strength of social ties 
between collaborators) might take precedence as the control mechanism for 
knowledge flows. 
Understood as the similarity of knowledge bases, cognitive proximity can de-
termine the degree of knowledge exchange between actors through two central 
characteristics representing a trade-off in collective learning: mutual under-
standing and learning potential. Mutual understanding is the degree to which 
different actors comprehend each other, and it increases with cognitive proxim-
ity. Potential partners therefore need to exhibit some minimum degree of cog-
nitive proximity to warrant mutual understanding.  Learning potential has to do 
with the amount of what can be mutually learned, and it decreases with cogni-
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tive proximity. The heterogeneity of firms in knowledge space is a source of 
learning effects because relatively great dissimilarity can increase learning po-
tential and the exchange of knowledge (Nooteboom 2005). 
The idea of combining the two dimensions of cognitive proximity—that of 
being a condition for mutual understanding and that of being a source of 
knowledge exchange—suggests the existence of an intermediate degree of 
proximity at which beneficial exchange of knowledge is maximized (Boschma 
2005, Gilsing et al. 2008, Nooteboom 1999). A deviation from this level will 
lead either to increased potential for exchanging knowledge combined with 
lowered common understanding or to increased common understanding com-
bined with lowered potential for novelty. Consequently, an actor conducting a 
strategic and rational search for a research partner should, at least theoretically, 
try to connect with a candidate who are similar in knowledge stocks and partly 
complement his or her own so as to acquire the potential for creating novelty. 
Besides the relevance of an optimal degree of cognitive proximity for under-
standing and learning, the second condition for effective collaboration to take 
place is the controllability of the knowledge-exchange-and-sharing relation. It 
is here that social proximity comes in. Social proximity accounts for familiarity 
and trust between cooperation partners, two facets that facilitate the transfer of 
tacit knowledge and reduce the occurrence of opportunistic behavior. Trust 
affects the efficiency of knowledge transfer as familiar and trusting partners 
have internalized norms of communication and therefore can better control 
undesired behavior such as free riding (Granovetter 2005). Hence, the coopera-
tion with trusted partners warrants increased reciprocity for their efforts. Fre-
quently proposed mechanisms for developing social proximity include mobile 
inventors, who often maintain social relations with their former workplace; the 
existence of positive experience gained in previous collaboration; familiarity 
with each other before cooperation; and acquaintance through a common part-
ner (Ter Wal and Boschma 2009). A strategic and rational actor should there-
fore prefer to link up with actors who are already in his or her circle of ac-
quaintances. In addition to cognitive and social proximity as means to develop 
social proximity, Boschma (2005) suggested geographic, organizational, and 
institutional proximity between partners to support learning and innovation. 
For successful R&D collaboration and the generation of innovations, we as-
sume that social and cognitive proximity outweigh other dimensions of prox-
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imity because the creation of new ideas and the generation of innovation is a 
costly and uncertain process primarily determined by the knowledge involved 
(Moweryet al. 1998). In focusing on the examination of learning dynamics in 
R&D collaborations, we concentrate our argumentation on these two relevant 
dimensions of proximity. The likelihood of collaboration increases with the 
social proximity and shows an inverted-u relationship with respect to the cog-
nitive proximity of the potential partners. 
Recent empirical findings underpin these arguments. Despite the differences in 
the measurement of the proximity dimensions, the positive effect of social 
proximity on the probability of collaboration has developed as stylized fact in 
most of the studies on bilateral collaboration and the factors that explain its 
establishment and the exchange of knowledge (Ahuja 2000, Broekel and 
Boschma 2012, Cantner and Meder 2007, Criscuolo et al. 2010, Gulati 1995/ 
1999, Gulati and Gargiuolo 1999, Mowery et al. 1998, Paier and Scherngell 
2011, Powell 1998, Singh 2005). 
The results concerning cognitive proximity are less congruent chiefly due to 
the difficulty of finding appropriate proxies and the divergence of applied 
measures. Paier and Scherngell (2011), Cantner and Meder (2007), and Singh 
(2005) found a purely positive effect of knowledge proximity on tie formation, 
whereas Criscuolo et al. (2010), Mowery et al. (1998), and Wuyts et al. (2005) 
gave evidence of the inverted-U relationship between cognitive proximity and 
the proclivity to cooperate or to share knowledge as originally proposed by 
Nooteboom (1999). Consistently, Gilsing et al. (2008), and Wuyts et al. (2005), 
observed also an inverted U-shaped curve for the relation between cognitive 
proximity and the innovative performance of R&D projects. By contrast, 
Broekel und Boschma (2012) observed what is called the proximity paradox in 
their analysis of link formation and link performance in the aviation industry: 
Although proximity seemed to guide the formation of new R&D alliances, 
cognitive proximity especially hindered the innovative performance of the ob-
served links. 
Scholars have also identified factors that go beyond the link-specific proximity 
as inducers of opportunities for actors to collaborate. Among them are econom-
ic factors (e.g., accumulated capabilities and resources) and the general em-
beddedness of a firm in its relevant environment (e.g., the industry, the region). 
Signalling competence to other actors in the network (Ahuja 2000, Stuart 
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2000), both aspects enhance the perceived attractiveness of actors as a potential 
collaboration partner. In general, firms relatively well endowed with resources, 
such as innovative capabilities (past innovation activity) or technical capital 
(technology stock), can exploit more opportunities to form links than less well-
endowed firms, for potential partners perceive them as more competent than 
other firms and as better able to offer more knowledge and relevant infor-
mation (Ahuja 2000). In turn, the number of connections that the firm already 
possesses—its embeddedness—favors new collaborations. In network studies 
the popularity of actors (or centrality as defined by their number of linkages) is 
highly contingent on their popularity in prior periods. This continually recur-
ring phenomenon (often referred to as preferential attachment, Barabási and 
Albert 1999, p. 510), is attributable to two effects. First, highly connected ac-
tors have broader access than less connected actors to information about poten-
tial partners (Gilsing et al. 2008). The more connections an actor has, the more 
information that actor automatically also has about the partners of his or her 
partners, and the more visible potential partners are. Second, potential partners 
perceive the central firm or actor as more attractive than other candidates be-
cause the information about the central actor diffuses more widely and quickly 
among a high number of potential partners than is the case for noncentral firms. 
Moreover, a high number of connections signals to potential partners a high 
level of competence and experience in managing and organizing alliances, a 
large repertoire of technical capabilities, and access to a broad and diverse 
knowledge pool (Ahuja 2000, Gulati 1999). Giuliani (2007), for instance, 
found that the most central actors in the knowledge network possess the most 
comprehensive knowledge base. The causal direction of this link is not clear, 
however. 
Firms or actors do not have infinite capacity to establish new links. The returns 
on the creation of new links decrease with the total number of linkages because 
the costs of managing all the linkages increase as the information benefits de-
crease (Ahuja 2000, Hagedoorn and Frankort 2008). Besides, overembed-
dedness poses the risk of becoming locked in, of forfeiting access to novel and 
nonredundant information, and of thereby losing innovative potential (Gilsing 
et al. 2008, Uzzi 1997). Corroborating this curvilinear relationship for the 
composition of linkages as well, Wuyts et al. (2005) found that the diversity of 
the collaboration portfolio positively influences innovativeness up to a certain 
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optimal threshold. Actors whose popularity and opportunities are growing have 
to be increasingly selective in their partner choice (Ahuja 2000). 
In the context of mutual agreements on collaboration and the search for the 
optimal linkages out of a pool of potential partners, reciprocity becomes para-
mount. Firms or actors want a return on the effort and resources they invest in 
the collaboration. Reciprocity creates trust among the potential partners and 
makes collaboration more likely and sustainable (Cantner et al. 2011). Fur-
thermore, the balance between partners’ invested effort and reciprocated learn-
ing determines how well the alliance functions and how long it endures. Uni-
lateral learning or an imbalance of resources might result in asymmetric bar-
gaining power and dependency (Hamel 1991, Khanna et al. 1998). Firms (ac-
tors) find that their attractiveness in terms of resources and efforts is recipro-
cated in collaborations with others similarly endowed. In sociological studies 
on the relations of individuals, the attractiveness of similarity has been termed 
homophily (McPherson et al. 2001, p. 370, Rogers and Bhowmik 1970, p. 
526). In the context of R&D collaborations, homophily might be driven by the 
search for reciprocity. If so, then actors similar in experience and competence 
will exhibit higher reciprocal potential than dissimilar actors and will thus have 
mutual incentive to associate with each other (Cantner and Meder 2007). 
 
3.2.2 The Dynamics of Tie Formation 
Although much work has been done to identify factors that lead to the for-
mation of innovative alliances, little is known about the factors that determine 
the continuation of these alliances (Dahlander and McFarland 2013). Because 
comprehensive longitudinal data on collaboration is difficult to find, most stud-
ies on innovation networks have relied on static analyses. Conceptual frame-
works, too, such as Boschma’s proximity approach, are basically static in na-
ture (Balland et al. 2015). In addition, the relation between, the competence, 
proximity, and collaboration of a firm is characterized by strong interconnect-
edness. The embeddedness of firms also feeds back into the proximity to other 
actors, influencing their attractiveness as potential partners and future collabo-
ration opportunities (Balland et al. 2015). The proximity of the partners chang-
es throughout their bilateral collaboration as well, a shift that has consequences 
for its continuation. Both the underexplored coevolution of these factors and 
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the evidence of the paradoxical effects of proximity and embeddedness make it 
unclear whether collaboration alliances are finite (develop toward a specific 
date of expiration) and whether one can use an alliance’s continuation or ter-
mination to indicate an R&D alliance’s success. These coevolutionary process-
es can be captured only by dynamic approaches. 
Advances in this direction have been recently made mainly in the research on 
networks by scholars such as Balland et al. (2013), Broekel (2015), and Ter 
Wal (2014). They have developed frameworks for empirically analyzing the 
parallel development of proximity, structural embeddedness, and the overall 
linkage distribution. One of this literature’s foremost contributions has been the 
inclusion of endogenous network forces (the feedback effects of structural po-
sition in the network) as an explanation for the probability of link formation 
other than relational effects (proximity) (Gilsing et al. 2008). Initial findings 
consistently have shown that the relevance of different proximity dimensions 
for the network configuration changes over time. Ter Wal (2014) elaborated 
the role of geographic proximity and triadic closure (which is close to social 
proximity; see Boschma and Frenken (2010)) in the network dynamics of the 
German biotech industry.  He found that the effect of geographic proximity 
disappears over time, whereas the effect of social aspects increases in im-
portance over time. Conversely, analysis of a creative industry, such as that for 
video games, showed that the effects of geographical and social proximity were 
pronounced throughout all stages of the industry, whereas cognitive aspects 
were relevant only in later stages (Balland et al. 2013). The interrelations be-
tween the various proximity dimensions have also come under study. Cogni-
tive, social, institutional, and geographical proximity were found to co-evolve 
over time, whereas the association between cognitive and institutional proximi-
ty did not decrease over time (Broekel 2015). At the regional level, Cantner 
and Graf (2006) examined the network of innovators in Jena over two periods 
and found that the configuration of technological proximity among the actors 
changed over time in conjunction with the instability of collaboration. From 
this observation they concluded that the very process of knowledge exchange 
depletes the cooperation potential between two partners and eventually renders 
cooperation obsolete. 
However, neither the various mechanisms that cause a change of proximities 
nor the association with actions at the microlevel has been sufficiently consid-
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ered yet (Balland et al. 2013). Given this gap in the literature, we adopt a dy-
namic perspective to take a step toward describing the coevolution of collabo-
ration decisions, proximity, and competencies. By analyzing the endurance of 
innovative ties and relating them to the change in the underlying cognitive and 
social proximity and to the competencies of actors, we go beyond the mere 
explanation of the formation of these linkages.  
Two opposite dynamics have been identified in the ongoing debate about the 
effects that social aspects and cognitive aspects have on the continuation and 
discontinuation of collaborative ties, respectively. First, familiarity breeds trust 
and facilitates communication among partners (Gulati 1995), so building up 
link-specific social capital and the social proximity it entails contributes to the 
continuation and stability of linkages (Cantner et al. 2010, Gulati 1995, Gulati 
and Gargiuolo 1999). Second, an increase in cognitive proximity between col-
laborating partners promotes their mutual understanding but depletes the poten-
tial for novelty and reduces incentive to continue the collaboration (Wuyts et 
al. 2005). As for the development of innovation potential over time, we expect 
the positive returns of increased social proximity and mutual understanding 
between partners to be outweighed by the negative returns of excessively simi-
lar knowledge bases. The argument against long-term relations derives from 
the need for a diversity of knowledge for successful innovation (Nooteboom 
1998, Gilsing et al. 2008). In summary, repeated ties accelerate the diffusion of 
information, whereas infrequent ties serve as a source of novel and nonredun-
dant knowledge (Granovetter 2005). 
 
Cognitive proximity 
Adding to what has already been done, we unravel the multifaceted concept of 
cognitive proximity into overlap, reciprocal potential, and knowledge transfer 
and track their dynamics within the evolution of collaboration. Basically, the 
decision on forming or maintaining a link is continuously evaluated according 
to the potential gains in knowledge and in innovation (Hamel 1991, Wuyts et 
al. 2005). The knowledge endowment of partners can be considered a pool of 
potential knowledge flows. For these flows to be take place, two conditions 
must be met. First, a certain minimum similarity of knowledge bases, the over-
lap, is necessary to provide a basis for mutual understanding. The ability to 
absorb external knowledge is largely a function of the relatedness of the 
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knowledge bases of collaboration partners (Boschma 2005, Cantner and Meder 
2007, Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Second, the exchange of knowledge requires 
potential knowledge that can be acquired because it is novel for the partner and 
not similar to the knowledge that the partner already possesses. The implication 
is that the dissimilarity of knowledge bases is also fruitful for potential 
knowledge flows. Collaboration will be established or continued only if the 
expected knowledge gains are positive. 
From a dynamic perspective partners move along this proposed scale of cogni-
tive proximity by increasing their overlap when collaborations evolve. After 
collaboration has been initiated, partners who are able to learn will experience 
an assimilation of knowledge bases that results in both an increase in overlap 
and a decrease in novelty potential (Balland et al. 2015, Nooteboom 1998, 
Wuyts et al. 2005). The positive effects that overlap has on mutual understand-
ing will eventually be offset by the negative effects on novelty creation (Bal-
land, et al. 2015). These dynamic reverse effects have been found in empirical 
studies on the persistence of collaboration between researchers (Dahlander and 
McFarland 2013) and on the performance of continuing cooperation between 
organizations (Beaudry and Schiffauerova 2011, Wuyts et al. 2005). At Stan-
ford University, too much intellectual similarity (overlap) of the literature cited 
in publications by collaborating researchers has hampered the perpetuation of 
their collaborative ties (Dahlander and McFarland 2013). Lack of diversity 
decreases innovative performance in repeated collaborations as patent rates and 
the quality of patents diminish in long-term collaborations (Beaudry and 
Schiffauerova 2011), and the less variation a collaboration portfolio has, the 
less likely it is to result in technical novelty (Wuyts et al. 2005). We therefore 
assume that strategic actors who seek to maximize the benefits of collaboration 
for innovation will terminate their teamwork after it has exceeded the optimal 
level of overlap. 
 
Hypothesis 3-1a:  
The relation between the cognitive overlap of two actors and the likelihood of 
their continued collaboration follows an inverse-U curve. 
 
Considering only the sheer overlap of knowledge, does not necessarily imply 
the full exploitation of learning potential, for the remaining novel and comple-
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mentary knowledge in the partner’s knowledge base is not taken into account 
(Mowery et al. 1998). The need to broaden that perspective becomes especially 
relevant in a dynamic examination of collaborations. If the knowledge bases of 
partners increase disproportionally to the overlap, the novelty potential does 
not necessarily decrease with overlap over time. Remaining potential for novel-
ty is a key incentive to continue collaboration. Furthermore, collaborations as 
mutual agreements are established or continued only if both partners have in-
centives to engage in them. In general these incentives encompass a certain 
level of reciprocity: Actors want their invested efforts and competencies to be 
reciprocated. Seeking potential knowledge flows, actors search for collabora-
tion that they can expect to reciprocate the amount of new knowledge they “of-
fer” the partner (Cantner et al. 2011). The greater this reciprocal potential is, 
the more attractive they rate the collaborative opportunity to be (Cantner and 
Meder 2007). In other words, the likelihood of collaboration increases as the 
knowledge gains of the respective partners approach equality (referred to as the 
increase in reciprocal potential). We assume that the search for reciprocity in 
knowledge gains is also relevant for the continuation of collaboration. 
 
Hypothesis 3-1b: 
The reciprocal potential between two actors is positively correlated with the 
likelihood of their continued collaboration. 
 
Apart from overlap and reciprocal potential, the very process of learning by the 
partners has consequences for the continuation or termination of collaboration 
(Hamel 1991, Khanna et al. 1998). We define learning as the outcome of suc-
cessful knowledge transfer, that is, as the successful integration of external 
knowledge into the given partner’s own knowledge stock. This definition in-
cludes the possibility that the newly integrated knowledge is applicable outside 
the cooperative activity as well (Khanna et al. 1998). When learning potential 
is exploited and knowledge has been transferred, the collaboration becomes 
obsolete to the partner who benefits from learning (Hamel 1991). Learning also 
influences the power distribution among the partners. An asymmetry in learn-
ing might lead to an imbalance in bargaining power and dependency structures. 
Competitive collaboration can be understood as a learning race in which the 
“first learner” gains a higher bargaining power than the lagging partner, who 
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thereby becomes less attractive (Hamel 1991, Khanna et al. 1998). Hence, 
learning might cause the termination of collaboration by shifting the power 
balance and by decreasing innovative potential. In this regard the continuity of 
an alliance can be interpreted as learning failure rather than as success (Hamel 
1991). We hypothesize that the degree of learning determines the continuation 
of collaboration. In line with the cognitive and power-related arguments, our 
assumption is that effective knowledge exchange will decrease the incentives 
to maintain the collaboration. If, on the contrary, knowledge is only shared but 
not transferred, actors will retain sufficient diversity in knowledge to benefit 
from the continuation of the collaboration. We thus expect that knowledge ex-
change between partners will lead to the termination of their collaboration, 
whereas mere knowledge-sharing will result in continued collaboration. 
 
Hypothesis 3-1c: 
Knowledge transfer between two actors is negatively correlated with the likeli-
hood of their continued collaboration. 
 
Social proximity 
In the case of the collaboration among researchers at Stanford University, a 
shared history likewise has increased the probability of continuing the relation-
ship (Dahlander and McFarland 2013). Established link-specific social capital 
seems to reinforce collaboration (Gulati 1995). A reason for this conjecture lies 
in the effect that social proximity has on the degree of comfort that accompa-
nies communication. Social proximity is associated with trust, the establish-
ment of mutually agreed social norms, and the control over undesired, nonco-
operative behavior such as opportunism (Boschma 2005, Granovetter 2005, 
Walker et al. 2003). Because social proximity is rooted in experience gained 
through successful cooperation, its supportive effects on knowledge exchange 
become increasingly evident with repetition of the cooperation. In this sense, 
increasing trust could explain the persistence of cooperation observed for alli-
ances of firms (e.g., Gulati 1995, Mowery et al. 1998). However, the relevance 
of social aspects might be contingent on the context of the collaboration. Cant-
ner et al. (2010), for instance, found that social capital as measured by the fre-
quency of the contact plays a role only for innovative outcomes of cooperation 
with research institutes. In a dynamic context, we expect that social proximity 
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as indicated by the experience that partners have shared through cooperation on 
innovation will promote future collaboration, all other factors remaining the 
same. 
 
Hypothesis 3-2:  
The likelihood of continued collaboration between two actors increases with 
their prior common experience. 
 
Competence 
Other factors that co-evolve with collaboration and that are subject to temporal 
changes are the actor’s capabilities, overall experiences, and embeddedness in 
the overall network. Innovative capabilities and experience in managing col-
laborative agreements have been found to increase an actor’s attractiveness as a 
collaboration partner (Ahuja 2000, Gulati 1999, Stuart 2000). As the number of 
innovative collaborations increases, the experience in running an alliance, 
managing skills, and developing innovative capabilities mounts, attracting fur-
ther potential partners. Assuming that the condition of reciprocity needs to be 
fulfilled if collaboration is to be maintained, we expect the likelihood of con-
tinued cooperation to be positively associated with the combined innovative 
and collaborative experience of both partners. 
 
Hypothesis 3-3a: 
The greater the general inventive or innovative experience of both partners is, 
the higher the likelihood of their continued collaboration. 
 
Hypothesis 3-3b: 
The greater the general collaboration experience of both partners is, the more 
likely it is that their collaboration will continue. 
 
The embeddedness of an actor as defined by the number of collaborative ties 
that the actor has established also determines the number of opportunities for 
additional collaborations. The mechanism by which the rich eventually get 
richer explains a certain path dependency in the evolution of networks: Central 
actors tend to become more central over time (Barabási and Albert 1999). This 
phenomenon is known as preferential attachment, or cumulative advantage 
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(Barabási and Albert 1999, Dahlander and McFarland 2013). This process 
might be explained by the broad access that central actors have to information 
about potential partners and by the high visibility that central actors have for 
other potential partners (Ahuja 2000). However, the reciprocity criterion ap-
plies as well. When seeking to maximize the benefits of the collaboration, cen-
tral actors are more likely to find that their invested efforts are reciprocated by 
actors who exhibit the same degree of popularity. Moreover, the bargaining 
power of central firms is greater than that of the less connected actor. (Gilsing 
et al. 2008). If collaboration is to continue, then that power needs to be equally 
distributed among the partners so as to avoid unilateral dependence (Hamel 
1991). Partners are therefore more likely to connect with each other and to 
maintain this connection if they possess a similar number of collaborative ties 
(Dahlander and McFarland 2013). 
 
Hypothesis 3-3c: 
The more similar the popularity of two actors is, the more likely it is that their 
collaboration will continue. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
In our theoretical considerations we identified three main factors that might 
explain the repetition of innovative linkages in our longitudinal study: (a) cog-
nitive proximity between the cooperation partners, (b) social proximity be-
tween the cooperation partners, and (c) similarity in competencies that the 
partners bring to the collaboration. This section presents the database we used, 
the variables we created, and the methodology we applied. 
 
3.3.1 Data 
To construct potential and realized linkages, we used relational information 
found in patent applications. Successful collaboration leaves a trail in public 
patent data because patented inventions can be considered the output of a pre-
ceding intensive cooperative research process (Singh 2005). By definition, co-
operative patents comprise inventive success in this context. Although patent 
data come with certain limitations (see Griliches 1990, Ter Wal and Boschma 
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2009), they offer a rich and comprehensive database on inventive activities. 
While working with patents, one must carefully define the scope of analysis in 
order to avoid the bias stemming from unobserved heterogeneity in patenting 
behavior (across industries and nations, for example). To reduce this bias aris-
ing from intercountry and interindustry differences, we narrowed our analysis 
to patents that were filed by German applicants in the field of biotechnology 
between 1978 and 2010. The biotech industry is characterized by a high pro-
pensity to patent and a high frequency of joint research (Griliches 1990, Powell 
and Grodal 2006, Ter Wal 2014). We gathered the data from the OECD 
REGPAT database (January 2012 ed.), which covers patent applications to the 
European Patent Office (EPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO). To match the collaborative actors to their respective other 
patents, we used the OECD Harmonised Applicants’ Names (HAN) database, 
“which provides a dictionary of applicants’ names which have been elaborated 
with business register data, so that it can easily be matched by all users” (re-
trieved July 15, 2015, from http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/oecdpatentdatabases 
.htm). 
The use of patent data in our analysis requires some qualifications. First, our 
pool of potential collaborators encompassed all applicants that applied at least 
once for a patent between 1978 and 2010. The influx of entries meant that this 
pool was not fixed over time; it grew from year to year, so we had to deal with 
an unbalanced panel. Second, a link between actors occurred when actors ap-
peared together as applicants on one patent document (co-application). The 
probability of false positives in detecting collaborations was assumed to be 
very small because a co-application reduces the applicants’ claim to the patent. 
Third, it was debatable whether continuous cooperation was evident in patent 
data. If two applicants were persistently co-patenting, we assumed that they 
were still conducting joint research. In this sense, we were able to identify 
long-lasting relationships but may have underestimated the number of ongoing 
partnerships that did not result in patents. Fourth, patents have been established 
as a measure of technological capabilities (Mowery et al. 1996). The suitability 
of patent data as a proxy for firms’ knowledge stock derives from the disaggre-
gate information they convey. The International Patent Classification (IPC) 
offers a standardized and detailed technological classification system that ena-
bles one to assign the protected invention to a certain field of technology and to 
  69 
characterize the firms’ research activities by constructing firm-specific tech-
nology portfolios (Griliches 1990, Jaffe 1986, Benner and Waldfogel 2008). 
Jaffe (1986) was one of the first researchers to use patent data as a proxy for 
technological competencies of firms. He constructed the knowledge portfolios 
as a vector of patent classes in which firms patented, and he computed the dis-
tances between technology vectors of firms to obtain a measure of proximity 
among them. Researchers subsequently adopted Jaffe’s approach in using pa-
tent classes to show a firm’s technology portfolio, technological distances 
among firms, or potential pools of knowledge spillover in the firm’s environ-
ment (Benner and Waldfogel 2008, Boschma and Frenken 2010, Cantner and 
Graf 2006, Cantner and Meder 2007). We too, made use of this rich infor-
mation by constructing the knowledge portfolios of the actors and tracing their 
changes over time. Because it is unfeasible to approximate knowledge portfoli-
os of the individual inventor by means of patent information we focused our 
analysis on the organizational level. 
 
3.3.2 Sample 
The basic characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 3-1. The sample 
consisted of 197 firms that applied for patents with partners during the period 
under study—1983 to 2010. To analyze the dynamics of cooperation choice, 
we considered only the 91 firms that cooperated at least twice in this focal pe-
riod and observed their collaborative behavior over the years that followed the 
firms’ first appearance in the dataset. When a firm was cooperating in one year, 
we assigned it to each of the potential cooperation partners that were active in 
the pool at the same time. The pool of a firm’s potential cooperation partners 
consisted of all patenting actors that were active in the focal year or had en-
tered the sample before that point (Cantner and Meder 2007). For all possible 
combinations we assigned a 1 for each realized cooperation and a zero other-
wise. Double pairs were excluded. The size of the pool of potential partners 
was nondecreasing from year to year. It amounted to a maximum of 2,369 po-
tential partners. 
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Table 3-1 Description of Firms in the Sample Analyzed for the Dynamics of 
Cooperation, 1983–2010 
Actors 
Characteristics No. 
Size of the pool of potential partners       2,369 
Cooperating firms          197 
One-shot          106 
Repeaters            91 
Hop-on-Hop-off            27 
Mix-type            40 
Persistent            24 
Partner Diversity (Collaboration partners of focal firms) 
Min              1 
Max            17 
Median              2 
Links 
Possible links 321,683 
Realized links            293 
Repeated links              60 
Non-recurring link            138 
Continuity of links (distribution of linkages across times of repeti-
tion, without duplicates) 
0            138 
1              41 
2              11 
3                3 
4                3 
5                1 
6                1 
 
By definition, the collaborations we looked at included the subject firm and 
one potential partner in the pool that could be of any type (e.g., firm, universi-
ty), implying that the observations were not symmetric. All told, the 27-year 
span covered by our analysis encompassed 321,683 possibilities to form dyads, 
of which 293 were ultimately realized. 
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When we grouped actors according to their overall collaboration activity over 
the whole period or over their all-time partner portfolio (Wuyts et al. 2005), we 
identified 106 firms that had collaborated only once (one shot), 27 that had 
collaborated at least twice but with different partners (hop-on, hop-off), 24 that 
had collaborated persistently with the same partner (persistent), and 40 that had 
pursued a mixed strategy (mixed type). For the purpose of our analysis, we 
focused on the firms that collaborated at least twice (i.e., excluding the one-
shot collaborators). As for the continuity of linkages, we found that 60 of the 
293 linkages were persistent and that 138 did not recur. Most of the 293 link-
ages had been repeated once, and the maximum number of times that a link 
was subsequently observed to have recurred was 6. 
 
3.3.3 Variables 
We aim to explain the reappearance of linkages that were established between 
1983 and 2010. Assume, for example, that we observed a certain firm to have 
cooperated with a partner in 1997 and that this link recurred in 1998. This ac-
tivity is what we call repeated cooperation. Assume also that recurrence of this 
link ceased from 1999 on. With our analysis we seek to explain why the varia-
ble for cooperation (the dependent variable) became zero after 1998. To do so, 
we constructed variables based on the cooperation partners’ characteristics that 
had accumulated in the years before the cooperative relationship in 1998. All 
explanatory variables have been lagged by one year. Assuming that collabora-
tion was the outcome of a mutual agreement, we derived the explanatory varia-
bles (except for Knowledge Transfer – TransKnowledge) by matching the at-
tributes of a given firm with those of the partner it selected or was assigned to. 
In our analysis we have evaluated the mutual attractiveness of the collaboration 
opportunity according to social, technological, and experiential aspects of reci-
procity. Table 3-2 gives a comprehensive description of the variables used.
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Table 3-2 Variables used for explaining the reappearance of linkages between partners in the sample, 1978–2010 
Use Name  Description 
Number  
of obs.
 Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent 
variable 
Coop Binary variable indicating whether the pair 
actors cooperated in a certain year. 
321,683 0.0009 0.0302 0 1 
H3-1a RlOverlap Continuous variable indicating the overlap of 
the partners’ knowledge relative to the overall 
knowledge both partners possess. Measured as 
the ratio of common IPC classes to the sum of 
all IPC classes both partners cover. 
319,323 0.05197 0.0662 0 0.5 
 RlOverlap
2
 The squared values of knowledge overlap. 319,323 0.0071 0.0158 0 0.25 
H3-1b RciPot Continuous variable ranging from zero to one 
and measuring the ratio between the minimum 
and maximum of nonoverlapping knowledge 
classes of both partners. The higher the value, 
the closer the partners are to having an equal 
number of potential new classes. 
319,256 0.2307 0.2730 0 1 
H3-1c TransKnowledge Binary variable indicating whether a 
knowledge exchange occurred in the previous 
period. 
321,683 0.0006 0.0254 0 1 
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Table 3-2 continued 
Use Name of Variable Description Number 
of obs.
a 
Mean SD Min Max 
H3-2 CoopExp Count variable to measure social proximity. It 
indicates how often the partners cooperated 
before the cooperation in question. 
321,683 0.0016 0.0655 0 7 
H3-3a DyadSinglePAT5 Logarithm of the sum of single patents held by 
each of the partners in the previous 5 years. 
311,728 4.4010 2.7340 0 10.75658 
H3-3b DyadCoopPAT5 Logarithm of the sum of the number of co-
patents held by each partner in previous 
5 years. 
311,728 3.4156 1.6567 0 8.9363 
H3-3c DCentrality Absolute difference in the degree centrality of 
the two partners. 
321,683 1.4467 0.9919 0 11 
Controls DPatAge Difference in age (year of first patenting activi-
ty) of the two partners. 
321,683 7.7953 6.3583 0 30 
 DStatus Binary variable indicating whether the partners 
are of the same type: 1 means both are differ-
ent, zero means both are firms. 
321,683 0.5480 0.4977 0 1 
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Table 3-2 continued 
Use Name of Variable Description Number 
of obs.
a 
Mean SD Min Max 
Interactions TransKnowledge*
6
 
CoopExp 
Interaction of knowledge TransKnowledge with 
CoopExp. 
321,683 0.0010 0.0560 0 7 
 TransKnowledge* 
RlOverlap 
Interaction of TransKnowledge with RlOver-
lap. 
319,323 0.0001 0.0035 0 0.3478 
                                                          
6
 The * represents that the two variables are multiplied.  
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3.3.3.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, Coop, represents the cooperation between two actors 
in the current year and is binary. It has the value of 1 if there is cooperation 
between the actors as a pair; zero, if there is no cooperation. With our interest 
in explaining continuous collaboration and the dissolution of cooperation, pre-
viously existing nonrecurring links (expressed technically by the change of the 
dependent variable from 1 to zero) are detected by the variable for common 
experience (see Social proximity between the cooperation partners below). 
 
3.3.3.2 Independent variables 
Cognitive proximity between the cooperation partners 
Overlap 
A widely accepted procedure to operationalize the construct of cognitive prox-
imity is to categorize the innovative pursuits of the actors in some way. For this 
purpose, the IPC offers a practical, detailed system for documenting their tech-
nological activities. In empirical studies it is claimed that the IPC is useful for 
measuring technological proximity as an aspect of cognitive proximity (Gilsing 
et al. 2008, pp. 1719-1720, 1723). In keeping with previous studies (e.g. Jaffe 
1986, Cantner and Graf 2006, Cantner and Meder 2007, Gilsing et al. 2008), 
we, too, adopted this resource to classify patent documents and used technolog-
ical proximity as a proxy for the multifaceted concept of cognitive proximity. 
To test hypothesis 3-1a, we included a simple measure used in previous studies 
(e.g., Singh 2005, Cantner and Graf 2006). To observe whether a minimum 
level of mutual understanding of both partners was guaranteed, we calculated 
the two partners’ overlapping areas of knowledge (technically, just the count of 
the IPC classes that partners or potential partners share). To correct for the fact 
that a potential overlap is more likely between firms with relatively large port-
folios than between for firms with smaller ones, we divided the overlap by the 
sum of the IPC classes in the portfolios of both partners, using the relative 
overlap as one measure of cognitive proximity (RlOverlap). We also included 
this measure as a quadratic term to capture the trade-off between minimum 
levels of knowledge overlap (as a warrant for mutual understanding) and max-
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imum levels of overlap (as a hurdle that knowledge redundancy poses to inno-
vation) (RlOverlap2). 
 
Reciprocal potential 
Following Cantner and Meder (2007), we tested hypothesis 3-1b by operation-
alizing the potential knowledge benefits from a potential collaboration as the 
relation between partner A’s and partner B’s new knowledge that is brought to 
the collaboration. However, we extended the approach of that earlier study by 
differentiating the individual classes that were new to the partner rather than 
solely considering the absolute number of patents. We counted the number of 
nonoverlapping IPC classes for each actor and took the ratio between the min-
imum number and the maximum number of new knowledge classes. This 
measure is named RciPot. It is a continuous variable that ranges between 0 and 
1, taking a 1 when the amount of new knowledge that the one partner offers is 
equal to that of the other (perfect reciprocity). The greater the divergence be-
tween the amount of partner A’s and partner B’s nonoverlapping knowledge 
(i.e., the less reciprocal the gain is between the partners), the more the measure 
of potential benefit approaches zero. 
 
Knowledge transfer 
To test hypothesis 3-1c, we needed to measure the knowledge transfer between 
collaborators. Citations of previous documents (patents and publications) per-
taining to the patent have become a favored instrument with which scientific 
authors detect knowledge spillovers (e.g., Griliches 1990, Hall et al. 2001, 
Jaffe et al. 1993, Mowery et al. 1996, Nelson 2009, Nomaler and Verspagen 
2008, Schmoch 1993, Singh 2005). A frequent criticism, however, has been 
that patent citations may not imply real knowledge flows, for many citations 
are added by the patent examiner rather than the inventor or applicant. 
We took a different avenue and measured knowledge transfer between part-
ners. To do so, we defined the vector of a firm’s patented technological classes 
as its cumulated knowledge stock and compared pre- and post-collaboration 
knowledge stocks. We defined knowledge transfer as the appearance of a new 
patent class in the firm’s patent portfolio after the collaboration had taken place 
(i.e., after the co-patent had been filed).  To attribute the portfolio changes to 
the cooperation, the newly added class had to have been part of the partner’s 
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pre-collaboration knowledge base. This measure enabled us to differentiate 
pure knowledge-sharing (as the pure access to knowledge) from knowledge 
exchange (the integration of new knowledge into the firm’s own knowledge 
base). We assumed that if a class was subsequently assigned to single patents, 
then the knowledge had been successfully integrated and was applicable after-
ward without further collaboration. Used in conjunction with this procedure, 
the binary variable TransKnowledge indicates whether knowledge has been 
exchanged in prior collaborations. This variable takes the value 1 if either part-
ner has gained new knowledge; otherwise it takes the value zero. That is, the 
variable captures both symmetric and asymmetric learning. 
 
Our three measures of cognitive proximity—RlOverlap, RciPot, and 
TransKnowledge - do not develop independently of each other. Their changes 
over time go hand in hand. Figure 3-1 illustrates the dynamics of these three 
variables. Two actors, I and II, hold specific knowledge portfolios before co-
operating with each other (pre-collaboration). Actor I’s portfolio comprises 
ABCDEF; actor II’s, ABGH. The knowledge overlap in t1 is given by AB and 
amounts to .2, relative to the overall knowledge. The reciprocal potential 
equals .5 because actor II possesses two knowledge units that actor I can gain 
as opposed to four knowledge units that actor II might be able to acquire from 
actor I. In other words, actor I can gain at most only half the amount of 
knowledge that actor II, the partner, stands to gain. Formulated differently, 
actor II can earn twice the amount of new knowledge that is being offered to 
actor I. In this example, the potential gains are unequal. Assume that collabora-
tion then leads to symmetric learning in that C and G are exchanged. Actor I’s 
post-collaboration portfolio is thereby enlarged to ABCDEFG; actor II’s, to 
ABCGH. As a result, the overlap has increased to ABCEG and amounts now to 
.3 in relation to the overall knowledge possessed by the two firms. In turn, the 
ratio between the potential knowledge gains has decreased to .3 because actor 
II now offers only one new knowledge unit to actor I, whereas actor I now of-
fers three knowledge units to actor II. The potential for knowledge flows has 
thus decreased and become more uneven. The attractiveness of this fictive alli-
ance and the likelihood that it will continue have therefore declined. This ex-
ample illustrates the case of knowledge having been efficiently exchanged. 
When actors collaborate but are unable to integrate new knowledge into their 
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stock, then knowledge has only been shared and the collaboration is more like-
ly to continue. In this sense, a continuation of collaboration can be interpreted 
as a failure to learn (Hamel 1991). 
 
 
Figure 3-1 The dynamics in cognitive proximity and collaboration (example). 
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Social proximity between the cooperation partners 
To test whether the probability for the creation or re-creation of a link increases 
with the social proximity between the partners (hypothesis 3-2), we included a 
variable for common experience, CoopExp, as a proxy for social proximity. 
CoopExp measures how often the pair was cooperating prior to the cooperation 
in question. The number of prior research projects with the partner is common-
ly used as a measure of the strength of the tie and is assumed to capture the 
trust and ease of communication between the partners (Cantner and Meder 
2007). 
 
Similarity in competencies 
Innovative capabilities 
Patents are an approved proxy for innovative activities, for the number of pa-
tents an actor holds is highly correlated with his R&D activities (Mowery et al. 
1996). To elaborate on the relation between accumulated technological capital 
and the continuation of linkages (hypothesis 3-3a), we therefore added up the 
single patents (not co-patents) that both partners owned in the five years prior 
to their collaboration and regarded that sum as a proxy for their accumulated 
innovative capabilities (DyadSinglePAT5). To delimit the domain of the varia-
ble, we took the logarithm of these values. We limited the observation period 
to the five years preceding the collaboration of the two firms, assuming the 
knowledge to be almost obsolete thereafter and accounting for the depreciation 
of innovative capabilities. Studies on the depreciations of R&D activities 
(Czarnitzki et al. 2006, Hall 2007, Edworthy and Wallis 2009) have proposed 
that R&D investment is completely depreciated after 3 to 5 years. 
 
General collaboration experience 
Analogously, to capture the attractiveness of the collaboration opportunity in 
terms of management ease, we take the sum of the shared patents (co-patents) 
that both actors held in the five years prior to the collaboration as a proxy for 
their accumulated collaboration experience (DyadCoopPAT5). Since we want 
to detect the general collaboration experience, this measure adds up all collabo-
rations except the collaboration in question. The greater the collaborative expe-
rience is the higher is the likelihood for further collaborations (hypothesis 3-
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3b). Here we also assume average capability depreciation after five years and 
apply the logarithmic transformation to delimit the range of the variable. 
 
Popularity 
Giuliani (2007) argues, due to reciprocal incentives, it is more likely that popu-
lar (as measured by their number of other linkages), central actors connect to 
similarly embedded actors. We believe that the potential for knowledge spillo-
vers might be greater when partners are equally popular and possess a similar 
pool of potential knowledge sources (links). To test this relation (hypothesis 3-
3c) and following Dahlander and McFarland (2013), we used the absolute dif-
ference between the two partners’ degree of centrality (the number of links) in 
the year before their (potential) collaboration. We called this variable DCen-
trality. Theoretically, this measure is closely related to the general collabora-
tion experience. In our analysis, however, it captures the reciprocity of popular-
ity in collaboration activity rather than the pure amount of previous collabora-
tion activity. 
 
3.3.3.3 Control variables 
Apart from technological, social, and competence aspects, we also wanted to 
control for additional effects stemming from organizational and age similarity. 
Both variables might increase the likelihood of collaboration due to ease of 
communication when the cooperating partners are exposed to the same institu-
tional factors and environments (organizational similarity) or when they have 
had the same amount of time to operate in these environments and to accumu-
late experience and resources (age similarity). Organizational dissimilarity—
DStatus—is a binary variable taking the value 1 when the two actors differ in 
organizational nature and zero when they are of the same organizational type 
(interfirm collaboration). DPatAge is the absolute difference between the ages 
of the actors (measured as the length of appearance since their first appearance 
on a patent). Our age variable is also assumed to capture the effect of firm size 
because the age and the size of the firm are usually highly correlated. 
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3.3.4 Estimation Strategy 
The choice of a pair of partners to cooperate was modeled as the probability of 
observing the realization of a link (coopi,j,t  taking the value 1) contingent on 
the explanatory variables we have discussed in this section. The decision to 
collaborate in the form of a co-patent is a binary one (see Figure 3-2). We 
therefore estimate the following logistic model (see Kennedy 2009). 
 
Figure 3-2 Formal representation of the logistic model to explain the binary 
cooperation decision 
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We included all realized and potential i,j combinations over the period from 
1983 to 2010. To avoid potential biases from confining our sample to collabo-
rative actors only, we included all possible combinations between the focal 
firms and all actors that had patented at least once. However, inclusion of com-
binations with all potential actors in the sample (even those that have never 
collaborated) introduces a source of bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. That 
is, control-group dyads that were never realized might differ systematically in 
unobserved factors from dyads that were realized at least once. These differ-
ences in unobserved characteristics might account for systematic differences in 
the general propensity of actors to collaborate. Furthermore, other specific fac-
tors that are not observable and therefore cannot be included in our model 
might have caused the formation of each dyad (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999, 
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Heckman 1981). To account for pair-specific heterogeneity, we applied a ran-
dom-effects panel model by including a random intercept for each pair. We 
thereby assumed that the unobserved differences in the dyads were the results 
of a random process. However, this method also comes with the strong as-
sumption that the unobserved factors are not correlated with any of the explan-
atory variables. This assumption is hard to test empirically. Conversely, the 
fixed-effects estimator would remove these time-invariant factors but would 
dramatically shrink the size of the sample. This change would come at a cost: 
The number of observations would drop from more than 300,000 to 501. 
Moreover, random-effects estimation allows us to have the model include addi-
tional time-invariant variables, such as DStatus. Given these considerations, we 
prefer the random-effects over the fixed-effects model. 
Another issue that arises in the analysis of network data is the dependence of 
observations. The observations are not completely independent; individual ac-
tors might be part of multiple dyads. Consequently, the estimates are con-
sistent, but the standard errors might be underestimated (Kennedy 2009). Be-
cause we could not make any distributional assumption, we obtained robust 
standard errors by resorting to bootstrapping methods for panel data. We calcu-
lated the standard errors from the empirical distribution that was drawn by 
resampling the original dataset in 1,000 iterations. Another form of bootstrap-
ping commonly used to analyze dyadic data is that of gathering the empirical 
distribution by repeated random permutation of the complete adjacency ma-
trix—an approach known as multiple regression quadratic assignment proce-
dures (MRQAP). Although this method has proven to be appropriate for linear 
models with continuous a dependent variable, it is still unclear how it performs 
when employed to analyze binary models (Broekel et al. 2014, Dekker et al. 
2007). Besides, MRQAP has not been tested much in panel settings. 
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3.4  Results 
3.4.1 Descriptives 
3.4.1.1 Diversity in partner portfolio 
For an initial overview of the diversity of the firms’ partner portfolios, we con-
sidered the number of different partners firms cooperated with in the years 
from 1978 to 2010. Table 3-1 contains summary statistics about the number of 
partners and the continuity of links. As shown by the distribution of actors 
across the different partners (see Figure 3-3), most firms cooperated with two 
different partners, the median being 2. Only a few firms cooperated with a 
larger variety of actors. The maximum number of different partners in one 
portfolio was 17. In other words, one firm cooperated with 17 different actors 
during the period under study. For the firms in our sample, the implication was 
that repeated collaboration with only one partner was not a dominant behavior. 
 
Figure 3-3 Diversity of the partner portfolio among firms in the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.1.2 Dynamics of link formation 
Concerning the recurrence of links, we found that 138 of the 293 realized links 
came about just once (non-recurring), whereas 60 links were repeated at least 
once (the sum of repetitive links was 155). Without double-counting the re-
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peated links, we found 198 realized combinations, of which most (138, or 
70%) were non-recurring. Most (41) of the sustainable links were repeated only 
once, and the maximum number of link repetitions was 6. Unlike the findings 
reported by Gulati (1995) as well as Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), who found 
stability in link formation, our first findings suggest that firms are inclined to 
change partners regularly rather than repeat collaboration with the same part-
ner. Our findings complement the results by Wuyts et al. (2005) and Cantner 
and Graf (2006) in that the search for diversity of knowledge sources tends to 
lead firms to switch their R&D partners. 
 
3.4.2 Estimation Results 
Table 3-3 shows the bilateral correlations between the variables included in the 
estimations. With regard to correlations between the explanatory variables, we 
do not seem to have a severe problem of collinearity. With respect to the corre-
lation between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable (Coop), 
we find that RlOverlap, TransKnowledge, CoopExp, DyadSingle-PAT5, Dyad-
CoopPAT5, and DStatus are slightly positively correlated with cooperation, 
whereas RciPot, DCentrality, and DPatAge show a negative sign.  
 
To gain a more detailed understanding of the forces that determine the partner 
choice, we ran a random-effects logistic regression on our panel data. Table 3-4 
shows the outcome of our estimations for seven model variations. The results 
for the base model which comprises the two control variables, DStatus and 
DPatAge, are shown in the last column. We found that DStatus was highly 
significant and positively linked to the probability to cooperate (Coop), indicat-
ing that firms prefer to cooperate with partners that are of a different organiza-
tional form. 
 
Concerning the dynamics of cognitive proximity, we analyzed three dimen-
sions: overlap (RlOverlap), reciprocal potential (RciPot), and knowledge trans-
fer (TransKnowledge). First, we found that the squared term of the relative 
overlap (RlOverlapl2) between the knowledge bases of the two partners was 
positively and highly significantly related to the probability of collaboration. 
However, we found no evidence of a moderate overlap and, hence, no support 
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for hypothesis 3-1a. When controlling for combined effects of experience and 
overlap (see the column labeled “Interactions”), we found only a pure positive 
correlation between overlap and the likelihood of collaboration. Thus, the de-
gree of mutual understanding seems to increase the likelihood that linkages 
will be recreated. 
Second, our impression of the search for diversity as illustrated in Figure 3-2 
was confirmed by the results of our estimation. We found that firms were more 
likely to reconnect with actors who differed from them in the amount of poten-
tially new knowledge than with actors who were the same or similar in that 
respect. The negative relation between reciprocal potential (RciPot) and the 
likelihood of collaboration indicates that reciprocity in knowledge gains is not 
a necessary precondition for the continuity of collaborations. Our result was 
opposite to the assumed relation stated in hypothesis 3-1b. 
Third, concerning hypothesis 3-1c, we did not find a significantly positive rela-
tion between collaboration and previous knowledge transfer 
(TransKnowledge). Our results seem to contradict our hypotheses on the rele-
vance of knowledge diversity in the evolution of cooperation. Concerning cog-
nitive proximity, the need for mutual understanding seems to predominante 
over need for reciprocity in potential knowledge gains. 
Regarding social proximity, we found no empirical connection between the 
chances for cooperation and prior common experience (CoopExp), a result that 
does not support our suggestion in hypothesis 3-2 that the propensity of collab-
oration increases with prior common experience. 
Even though common experience did not play a significant role in partner 
choice among the firms in our sample, the combined overall cooperation expe-
rience (DyadCoopPAT5) was positively and significantly associated with the 
re-creation of linkages. That is, choices to collaborate were preferred when at 
least one actor exhibited a large amount of accumulated capabilities in manag-
ing cooperation. This finding is consistent with the results reported by Gulati 
(1999), who observed the same supportive effect that an actor’s general experi-
ence with collaboration has on that actor’s chances of forming linkages. 
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Table 3-3 Correlation Table of the variables used for analyzing the dynamics of cooperation 
 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Coop 1                     
2 RlOverlap 0.0471* 1 
         3 RlOverlap
2
 0.0673* 0.9098* 1 
        4 RciPot -0.0079* 0.2081* 0.1861* 1 
       5 TransKnowledge 0.2332* 0.0250* 0.0219* -0.0019 1 
      6 CoopExp 0.2479* 0.0265* 0.0253* -0.0058* 0.6577* 1 
     7 DCentrality -0.0182* -0.0381* -0.0255* 0.0252* 0.0059* -0.0004 1 
    8 DyadSinglePAT5 0.0105* -0.1366* -0.1083* -0.4396* 0.0241* 0.0172* 0.0222* 1 
   9 DyadCoopPAT5 0.0215* -0.1455* -0.1079* -0.3693* 0.0351* 0.0298* 0.0770* 0.6526* 1 
  10 DStatus 0.0123* -0.0120* -0.0001 -0.0652* 0.0071* 0.0058* 0.0005 -0.1169* -0.0053* 1 
 11 DPatAge -0.0021 -0.2131* -0.1684* -0.1866* -0.0029 -0.0046* 0.0937* 0.1638* 0.2781* -0.0054 1 
*p<=.01
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Table 3-4 Estimation results on repeated cooperation 
Method Random-Effects Logistic Regression  
Dep.Var coop  
Population All potential pairs per period  
 
H 3-1a 
 
H 3-1b 
 
H 3-1c 
 
H 3-2  
RlOverlap 5.5655   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
(1.58) 
 
     
 
RlOverlap
2
 49.711 *** 
     
 
 
(5.59) 
 
     
 
RciPot 
  
-2.2486 *** 
   
 
   
(-3.88) 
 
   
 
TransKnowledge 
    
0.9032 
 
 
 
     
(1.19) 
 
 
 
CoopExp 
      
0.0077  
       
(0.03)  
DStatus 1.247 *** 1.1283 *** 0.998 *** 1.0228 **
* 
 
(4.18) 
 
(4.39) 
 
(4.40) 
 
(4.29)  
DPatAge 0.0743 *** -0.0003 
 
-0.0041 
 
-0.0039  
 
(-3.43) 
 
(-0.01) 
 
(-0.23) 
 
(-0.23)  
Constant -20.9707 *** -17.1154 *** -14.1513 *** -14.3361 **
* 
 
(-15.62) 
 
(-13.09) 
 
(-8.44) 
 
(-8.17)  
No. of Observations 319,323   319,256   321,683   321,683  
No. of Groups 142,417 
 
142,384 
 
142,984 
 
142,984  
LR chi2 -1,610.31 
 
1,019.03 
 
479.56 
 
613.07  
Prob > chi2 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0  
Wald chi2(3) 
  
33.08 
 
19.68 
 
19.89  
Wald chi2(4) 164.27 
 
     
 
/lnsig2u 3.4286 
 
3.2234 
 
2.7003 
 
2.7382  
sigma_u 5.5528 
 
5.0114 
 
3.8579 
 
3.9318  
rho 0.9036 
 
0.8842 
 
0.819 
 
0.8245  
Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
*p<= .1 **p<= .05 *** p<= .01 
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Table 3-4 continued 
Method Random-Effects Logistic Regression 
Dep.Var Coop 
Population All potential pairs per period 
 H 3 a–c  Interactions  Controls  
RlOverlap 
 
  27.0777 *** 
 
  
   
(7.79) 
 
  TransKnowledge 
  
1.6796 
 
  
   
(1.53) 
 
  CoopExp 
  
-0.1455 
 
  
   
(-0.33) 
 
  DyadSinglePAT5 -0.0431 
 
    
 
(-1.00) 
 
    DyadCoopPAT5 0.6109 *** 
    
 
(9.53) 
 
    DCentrality -1.1718 ** 
    
 
(1.97) 
 
    TransKnowledge* 
CoopExp 
  
-0.9984 
(-1.51)  
  TransKnowledge* 
RlOverlap   
-4.3422 
(-0.70) 
 
  DStatus 1.1042 *** 1.4245 *** 1.0215 *** 
 
(4.42) 
 
(4.06) 
 
(4.15) 
 DPatAge -0.0393 ** 0.1149 *** -0.0039 
 
 
(-2.19) 
 
(4.69) 
 
(-0.23) 
 Constant -14.8631 *** -24.0424 *** -14.3457 *** 
 
(-7.66)   (-8.81) 
 
(-9.34) 
 No. of Observations 311,728 
 
319,323   321,683   
No. of Groups 139,318 
 
142,417 
 
142,984 
 LR chi2 542.03 
 
-1604.7 
 
-1808.19 
 Prob > chi2 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 Wald chi2(5) 178.66 
 
    Wald chi2(7) 
  
146.14 
 
  Wald chi2(2) 
    
17.62 
 /lnsig2u 2.7401 
 
3.6029 
 
2.7404 
 sigma_u 3.9355 
 
6.05834 
 
3.9362 
 rho 0.8248   0.9177   0.8249   
Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
*p<= .1 **p<= .05 *** p<= .01 
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The importance of cumulative advantages is also reflected in the negative rela-
tion between collaboration propensity and the difference in popularity (DCen-
trality). While firms did not search for reciprocal knowledge benefits, they tend 
to be guided by reciprocal incentives when it comes to accumulated coopera-
tion capabilities and experience. Our results indicate that firms prefer to link up 
with actors that offer an equal amount of accumulated resources. Dahlander 
and McFarland (2013) found the same negative association for the difference 
between the “cumulative advantage” of both partners (p. 72) and the persis-
tence of collaboration between researchers at Stanford University. Conversely, 
the common cumulative innovative potential as measured by the total number 
of single patents held by both actors (DyadSinglePAT5) seems rather irrelevant 
when it comes to partner choice. Therefore, we find support for our hypotheses 
3-3b and 3-3c but not for hypothesis 3-3a. 
Our findings lend support to the hypothesis that similarity in knowledge and 
accumulated capabilities enhance the attractiveness of collaboration options 
and link maintenance. Nevertheless, firms also seek some degree of heteroge-
neity in the controls DStatus and DPatAge, for the probability of repeated col-
laboration increases when the partner is not a firm or when the partner is signif-
icantly different in patenting experience. However, these findings can be par-
tially attributed to the specificities of research in biotechology. One reason is 
that relationships between industry and the university are prevalent in German 
biotechology. Because the innovation process is rather linear, with discoveries 
being introduced by public research institutes, collaboration between industry 
and the university is an important mechanism of technology transfer and thus 
increases its likelihood. Furthermore, the influence of the difference between 
the patenting ages of the partners might reflect another widespread form of 
collaborative combination in biotechology: the joint research by young, small 
companies as the creative engine and large pharmaceutical companies as a 
source of financial resources (McKelvey 1997, Powell et al. 1996, Ter Wal 
2014). 
In summary, our findings generally suggest that both similarity and diversity of 
actors afford incentives to form alliances. Similarity plays a specific role in 
partner choice with regard to general collaboration experience (DyadCoop-
PAT5) and the accumulation of resources (DCentrality). Actors seek to connect 
to actors who can reciprocate their general collaboration expertise and provide 
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a certain basis for mutual understanding. The reciprocity in knowledge gains 
and the amount of innovative capability seem to play a comparatively subordi-
nate role. As far as organizational similarity and patenting age are concerned, 
actors are inclined to choose diverse partners. 
 
3.5  Conclusion and Further Research 
The aim of this study was to elaborate on the coevolution of several attributes 
of cognitive proximity, social proximity, and similarity in competencies as col-
laboration between two actors progresses. We have contributed to the debate 
on whether networks are rather stable (i.e., with actors always cooperating with 
the same partners) or volatile (i.e., with actors changing partners regularly). 
Our findings suggest that firms are prone more to switching their cooperation 
partner than to repeating the collaboration with a given partner. We found no 
significant effect of knowledge transfer and prior common experience on re-
peated link formation. Instead, we found that firms prefer to cooperate with a 
partner whose knowledge bases and accumulated collaboration experience are 
rather similar to their own and whose organizational nature and patenting age 
rather dissimilar to their own. We did not find evidence to support the hypothe-
sis that potential for innovation and collaboration decreases as the overlap of 
the knowledge bases increases (Nooteboom 1998, Wuyts et al. 2005, Gilsing et 
al. 2008). 
Our methodology has limitations and drawbacks that one must consider when 
interpreting the final results. First, the revelation of realized linkages heavily 
depends on the patenting practices among actors (e.g., cross-patenting or cases 
in which a central institution may administrate the patenting process and is 
therefore the only applicant). Including only those collaborations that are de-
fined by co-application might underestimate the number of actual linkages. Yet 
if we were also to take account of the connections realized through shared in-
ventors, we might overestimate the number of linkages (Ter Wal and Boschma 
2009). In addition, we expect the number of disregarded cases to be rather 
small because inventor mobility is rare in Europe (Ter Wal and Boschma 
2009). Crescenzi et al. (2013) estimated that barely 5% of inventors change 
their employer. A closely related drawback to our methodology is the un-
derrepresentation of informal ties, for we considered only formal collaboration 
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agreements. Prior studies have emphasized the importance that informal ties 
have for innovative outcomes (e.g., Powell and Grodal 2006), but it has been 
found that formal ties, especially in the life sciences, are generally preceded by 
informal ties (Powell et al. 1996). On this basis we argue that preceding infor-
mal ties are manifest in formal ties and are therefore captured in the study of 
the latter. 
Second, by focusing on the research of the dynamics in bilateral R&D collabo-
ration, we set aside the study of the effects of the micromechanism on the 
overall network structure. We thereby also opted to forgo explicit consideration 
of the feedback effects that an actor’s position in the overall network has on 
partner choices at the microlevel. We tried to control for this limitation by in-
corporating information on whether an actor was highly connected (central) or 
rather peripheral and by adapting the standard errors accordingly. However, 
recent research on networks has made advances regarding the explicit model-
ing of endogenous structural mechanisms such as triadic closure and preferen-
tial attachment (Broekel et al. 2014). Our analysis could be extended by elabo-
rating the overall network evolution as a result of partner choice at the mi-
crolevel which is itself determined by similarity and diversity aspects. Stochas-
tic actor-oriented models, for instance, allow for examination of the relation-
ship between the individual partner choice and overall network dynamics (Bal-
land et al. 2013). In this context, however, it is debatable to what extent firms 
can directly influence and are aware of the network beyond their ego network 
(direct connections) (Gilsing et al. 2008). 
The third concern about studies that focus on analyzing a certain pattern in a 
specific industry is the generalizability of their results. Application of our re-
sults if limited, for example, by the appearance of patterns that might be caused 
by industry specificities. However, some of the factors that our analysis identi-
fies (e.g., positive effects of overlap, the reciprocal cumulative advantage and 
reciprocal general collaboration experience) have also been observed in other 
environments and levels of observations (Cantner and Meder 2007, Dahlander 
and McFarland 2013, Gulati 1999). 
In view of our results and the type of analysis suggested with this study we 
take a further step into disentangling the coevolution of the proximity of col-
laboration partners and the formation respectively repetition of cooperative 
ties. In doing so we already took on board factors that go beyond dyadic rela-
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tionships such as network characteristics. Extending this dimension in future 
research will help to find a better understanding of the dynamics of cooperation 
networks being at the core of clusters as well as local and regional innovation 
systems. 
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4. On regional innovator networks as hubs for innovative ventures  
4.1 Introduction 
Innovation can be defined as “a process that begins with an idea, proceeds with 
the development of an invention, and results in the introduction of a new prod-
uct, process or service to the marketplace” (Edwards and Gordon 1984, p.1). 
Both, (i) the founding of a new firm and (ii) the survival of existing firms are 
substantially affected by this complex construct. As to (i), innovation is con-
sidered to be one of three important characteristics entailed by entrepreneurship 
(OECD 1998). This view stems from Schumpeter’s (1912) suggestion that in-
novation is a creative modus operandi of an entrepreneur (Nijkamp 2011). 
Audretsch and Lehmann (2005, p. 1192) formulate the relationship as follows: 
“…entrepreneurship is an endogenous response to the potential for commer-
cializing knowledge that has not been adequately commercialized by the in-
cumbent firms”. Thus, entrepreneurs discover an opportunity to exploit a new 
technology (Shane 2000) and implement this by founding a firm. As to (ii) by 
creating new variations, new innovative firms compete with incumbent firms, 
which force the latter to improve or change their production processes or prod-
uct portfolios. Under these conditions, incumbent firms must be innovative if 
they are to survive (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). Non-innovators will fall be-
hind, while first movers respectively firms with an entrepreneurial orientation 
secure a position of competitive advantage (Lumpkin and Dess 1996, Pyka 
1999). 
Before World War II, and thus also in Schumpeter’s theory, the linear model of 
innovation was the generally accepted one (Kline and Rosenberg 1986). In this 
model, events flow smoothly in a one-way street. First, one does research, after 
that follows development which is followed by production which itself is fol-
lowed by marketing. Looking more closely on how new ideas are created and 
innovations come up, according to the definition of Edwards and Gordon 
(1984), a more complex process as compared to the linear model is going on. 
Kline and Rosenberg (1986) tried to formalize this complex process and pro-
posed the ‘chain-linked model’ which entails five different paths of activity 
and considers feedbacks between the different stages of innovation. This model 
however does not recover, where feedbacks and information flows are coming 
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from. Over the last decades the concept of collective invention and innovation, 
brought up by Allen (1983) and von Hippel (1987), has been developed which 
answers this question. This concept has been said to form the basis for the sys-
temic view of innovative activities and the innovation process (Cantner 2000). 
Innovations are considered as new combinations that are brought to the market 
(Schumpeter 1912). Consequently, they require recombining different pieces of 
existing knowledge (Cantner and Meder 2007). These pieces of knowledge, 
necessary to successfully innovate, may not be in the immediate reach of an 
actor or firm but may rather lay outside (Cowan et al. 2006). Thus, access to 
external knowledge may be an important prerequisite for innovative success. 
At this point, collectivity comes into play. No single individual or firm can 
solve all problems (Ejermo and Karlsson 2006) since it does not hold all 
knowledge available in the world. Especially invention processes are based on 
the combination of various pieces of knowledge which are possessed by vari-
ous economic actors. With this perspective in mind, we can argue that inven-
tion and innovation activities rely on processes of collective or social learning 
and exchange of knowledge between actors (Lundvall 1992, Doloreux and Par-
to 2005), whereas learning is the process whereby existing knowledge is se-
lected and combined based upon a new perspective (Ejermo and Karlsson 
2006). Consequently the creation of innovation requires knowledge spillover-
producing interaction. These knowledge spillovers can happen deliberately, for 
example in the context of research collaborations, or involuntary and unintend-
ed.  
In this research paper, we use the approach of the innovator network (IN) in 
order to explain if knowledge spillovers that are distributed via connections 
among inventors influence the success of a new venture if this venture has been 
founded by a person which is connected to this network. INs can be defined as 
networks that are built up by actors which cooperatively engage in the creation 
of new ideas and then economize the results (Cantner and Graf 2007). This 
economization can be realized within an existing firm or by the formation of a 
new venture. It is assumed that if a new venture is connected to a well-
functioning IN, knowledge spillovers may result in new ideas, promoting 
firm’s success.  
Two data bases are used. First, patent data delivers the innovator network for 
Thuringia. The second data base we use contains information on innovative 
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ventures founded in the period between 1990 and 2006, drawn from the regis-
ter for commercial and private companies in Thuringia. Both data sources were 
merged by the names of inventors and founders. 
We conduct our analysis in three steps. First we use survival analysis in order 
to explain the relation between a firm’s innovativeness and its survival. In a 
second step, we look at the connection to the innovator network and its influ-
ence on a firm’s innovativeness. In the third and last step, we analyse in how 
far the combination of innovative and connected to the network influences sur-
vival. 
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In Section 4.2 we will pro-
vide an overview on the mechanisms that are connecting innovator networks 
with entrepreneurial success and we will formulate hypotheses based on these 
considerations. Section 4.3 is devoted to the description of the database and 
methods used. In section 4.4, we present the results and provide conclusions. 
Section 4.5 discusses the contribution of our paper. 
 
4.2 Innovation, new ventures and the innovator network 
In evolutionary economics the emergence and diffusion of innovation is seen 
as the most important driver of economic change (Pyka 1999). Economic 
change in this context means a selection process where firms having competi-
tive advantages as compared to the rest of the industry over time gain market 
shares while the other firms lose. The resource based view of the firm sees the 
individual characteristics of a firm as most important resources to gain compet-
itive advantages (Penrose 1959). One kind of individual characteristic is a 
firm’s knowledge base which is an important prerequisite for innovation. 
Therefore, in general the ability of a firm to generate innovation is generally 
seen as a key driver for economic success of firms. This relation has been em-
pirically proven by several authors. Jaffe (1986) was one of the first to empiri-
cally show that there is a systematic relationship between firms' patents, profits 
and market value to the technological position of firms' research programs. In a 
more recent study, Hall and Bagchi-Sen (2002) show for firms in the Canadian 
biotech industry that R&D intensity correlates with patent measures, while 
innovation measured in terms of new product introductions is associated with 
business performance. To mention one more, Steward Thornhill (2006) has 
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shown that innovative firms are likely to enjoy revenue growth, irrespective of 
the industry in which they operate and that firm knowledge, industry dynamism 
and innovation interact in the way they influence firm performance. Based on 
this reasoning, we formulate a first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4-1 – Innovation and survival:  
Innovative firms have better chances to survive the selection process of the 
market than non-innovative ones. 
 
As it has been pointed out in the introduction, innovation requires a recombina-
tion of different pieces of already existing knowledge (Cantner and Meder 
2007) which creates new knowledge. Since these pieces may not be in the im-
mediate reach of a firm (Cowan et al. 2006), access to external knowledge may 
be an important prerequisite for innovative success. Therefore, the creation of 
innovation requires knowledge spillover-producing interaction. 
Cassia et al. (2009), as well as Audretsch and Lehmann (2005), see university-
based knowledge spillovers as the most important form of knowledge spillo-
vers. They argue that knowledge from universities flows in the economic sys-
tem and affects firms’ propensity to create new market opportunities and intro-
duce new ideas in the market. Cassia et al. (2009) as well as Audretsch and 
Lehmann (2005) have shown that a university’s knowledge spillovers have a 
positive influence on firm’s growth (measured as sales respectively as number 
of employees). Besides university-based knowledge spillovers, also spillovers 
from firm-researchers and employees of research institutes may play an im-
portant role since this knowledge may be more applied and ready for the mar-
ket. 
As stated above, knowledge spillovers are an important device for the genera-
tion of innovations and they are mainly transferred via personal contacts. In 
their seminal works, Breschi and Lissoni (2006) comprehensively elaborated 
this process. They argue that pure spillovers can only take place by trade-
unrelated personal communication or through reverse engineering (Breschi and 
Lissoni 2006). However, when tacitness of knowledge plays a role, knowledge 
spillovers are not possible anymore without active participation of the inventor. 
As to the question why inventors should accept to pass information deliberate-
ly, Breschi and Lissoni (2006) find the answer in ‘social obligations’. Universi-
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ty researchers for example obey to the principles of open science and dedicate 
themselves to the production of public goods. Also corporate researchers may 
be willing to provide their colleagues with free advice as long as it happens 
reciprocally. Regarding tacitness as an important characteristic of newly gener-
ated knowledge, one could think of knowledge as a club good. Outsiders, de-
fined as actors that are not connected to the social network of innovators, can 
be excluded from consuming the knowledge while insiders, defined as actors 
that are connected to the social network of innovators, profit from non-rivalry 
in the consumption of the shared knowledge.  
Such a social network can be defined as innovator network (IN) that is built up 
by actors which cooperatively engage in the creation of new ideas and then 
economize the results in the market - either within an existing firm or by the 
formation of a new venture (Cantner and Graf 2007, Balconi et al. 2004). Inno-
vative actors building the IN are employees of firms, of research institutes or of 
universities, students or self-employed persons who actively conduct research. 
These research oriented relationships indicate knowledge transfers and ex-
changes respectively knowledge spillovers which forms the basis for new ideas 
facilitated by the recombination of existing knowledge (Edwards and Gordon 
1984). However, its not just their innovative effort which brings them together. 
Moreover, they get into contact by different means. They may of cause be 
partners in formal research cooperations between several firms. Additionally, 
they may be former colleagues, thus innovator mobility may play a role. It can 
also not be excluded that they may know each other from playing tennis in the 
same sports club, eating in the same restaurant or from bringing their little ones 
to the same nursery.  
For a firm that employs an actor who is socially connected to the innovator 
network, the connection to the IN promotes the expansion of its knowledge 
base and its potential to innovate. Consequently an actor who is connected to 
the IN can provide an important prerequisite for the generation of innovations 
and therefore it may serve as an important facilitating device for long term firm 
survival of a firm (Thornhill 2006). 
Summing up these considerations, we formulate Hypotheses 4-2 and 4-3 as 
follows:  
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Hypothesis 4-2 – Innovator network and innovative output: 
Firms that are connected to the innovator network are more innovative than 
non-connected ones. 
 
Hypothesis 4-3 - Innovator network and survival:  
Innovative firms survive longer than non-innovative firms and this effect is 
driven by the connection to the innovator network. 
 
In order to test hypotheses 4-1 to 4-3, we have created a biographical firm da-
tabase which will be presented in the following section. 
 
4.3 Database and variables 
Database 
In this paper we try to find out whether the social connection to the innovator 
network influences firms’ survival. To answer this question we have construct-
ed a biographical firm dataset, based upon two data bases. First, we use data on 
incorporations of enterprises in Thuringia which is based on the commercial 
register and second, we use patent data comprising all German patents applied 
for at the German Patent Office in the time period between 1993 and 2004. 
 
Incorporations 
Information on new ventures was collected by the Thuringian Founder 
Study
7
. The data base was drawn from the commercial register for commercial 
and private companies in Thuringia and contains information on the founders 
(date of birth, name, surname, academic title, address, gender) and on the firms 
(date of founding, date of closing, trade name, location, legal form, spin-off or 
not, industry). The survey population consists of 12,505 founders whose 7,016 
companies were founded between 1990 and 2006 and are either active or have 
failed meanwhile. After we have cleaned the data (exclusion of firms founded 
before 1993 since the German reunification came with a phase of many man-
                                                          
7
 Note that this data base was just the starting point for the Thuringian Founder Study Ques-
tionnaire. It is therefore not identical to the questionnaire data collected by the Thuringian 
Founder Study. 
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agement buyouts of former state combines, exclusion of firms where the found-
ing date was missing, extraction of only those firms that are active in innova-
tive industries following the classification of Grupp et al. (2000) a population 
of 4568 companies left for our investigation. 
 
Innovator Network 
Per definition, the innovator network comprises persons who coopera-
tively engage in the creation of new ideas and then economize the results 
(Cantner and Graf 2007). Both aspects have to be elaborated further. First, to 
be cooperatively engaged in the creation of new ideas does not necessarily 
mean being involved in active research cooperation. Rather it means that peo-
ple may also be in the same sports club, meet each other in the same bars or 
restaurants, are former colleagues, have met on a conference/trade fair or take 
their little ones to the same nursery. The pivotal role in this respect comes to 
the fact that people are in contact. Also in a bar or in a sports club people talk 
about their jobs. Besides private information, they exchange information on 
what they are working on, what some colleagues of them are doing, what they 
have read about or what projects they are working on. This information must 
not be specifically related to innovative activities but at least these contacts 
lead to know-who respectively knowledge of who may be able to help you 
solving a certain problem. The underlying assumption of our approach is that a 
firm which is founded by one or more persons has access to the social capital 
of exactly these contacts they bring with. If it’s not new influences for innova-
tive activities, then this social capital at least helps to find an appropriate con-
tact person for solving (also technical) problems. Of cause, it would also be 
possible to find appropriate contact persons at the internet but face-to-face con-
tacts and personal acquaintances are an important feature since members of 
social networks who personally know each other tend to exchange more infor-
mation, help or advice (Breschi and Lissoni 2006). Measuring these kinds of 
relationships of cause is impossible. In order to picture the innovator network, 
at least in the form of linkages that arise from the participation in a common 
team of inventors, we use patent data. In the same line of thinking as Breschi 
and Lissoni (2006), we assume that inventors who worked together on the 
same patent know each other well enough to be willing to exchange infor-
mation and to tolerate that this information may be passed on to somebody else 
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than the receiver. Since those networks include members of various companies, 
circulation of knowledge across companies can be expected. 
Second, there is the aspect of economization. This aspect restricts the network 
to those persons who develop new products or processes for their own firm or 
for their employer.  They may be researchers, technologists or engineers whose 
aim is to create marketable ideas respectively innovations. Of cause, if we 
measure patent networks, we do not know whether these patents will end in a 
new product or process and there is no information available about how the 
invention has been pursued. However, since a patent application protects the 
knowledge from usage by other actors, it signals an intention to further use it 
for example in order to generate an innovation which per definition is the 
economization new ideas.  
 
For this study, we constructed the inventor network of Thuringia by including 
all patent applications to the German Patent Office between 1993 and 2004 on 
which at least one Thuringian inventor (the assignment was made by postal 
codes of inventors’ address) was listed. The resulting data base contains infor-
mation on 6,969 inventors (name, surname, address) and 5,381 patent applica-
tions (IPC-Code, name and address of the applicant, application date and year). 
The number of inventors results after checking raw data for misspelling of per-
sonal names. Using this data set, we have constructed the one-mode affiliation 
network of inventors, where the connection is based upon co-inventions. The 
information resulting from an analysis of the network of inventors can be effec-
tively combined with other sources of information (Balconi et al. 2004) - in our 
case with the firm database. 
 
Combination of both 
The combination of information gained from the innovator network 
with our firm database has been conducted by matching names of firm found-
ers with names of inventors in our innovator network. It must be pointed out 
that this approach does not come without bias. However, we tried to check for 
addresses and birth dates in order to make the matches more accurate. If one or 
more founders of a firm are listed as inventor on a patent with an application 
date later than the date of firm founding, then in a first step, we counted this 
firm to be innovative. Sure, we here assume what we cannot observe, namely 
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that the founder intends to economically exploit his invention within his own 
firm rather than selling licences or leaving the exploitation to the applicant. 
If a firm is identified as being innovative in the sense of having patents, it must 
not necessarily be connected to the (regional) innovator network. In a second 
step, we therefore created an attribute dataset, identifying inventors which at 
the same time have incorporated a firm. We then applied network analysis in 
order to distinguish between connected and isolated inventor-founders. Of 
cause, if a firm was founded by more than one inventor-founder it is counted to 
be connected as soon as at least one founder is not isolated. 
 
The information we received from the analysis of the innovator network is used 
in order to create the core variables of our analysis. The variables will be pre-
sented in more detail in the following section. 
 
Variables 
Table 4-1 reports descriptive statistics for the data base we’ve created. Tables 
4-2 and 4-3 show the correlations of the variables on a significance level of 
5%. 
Dependent variables 
 The Survival of a firm is its life span from the year of founding on up to 
the year of closing in the case the firm failed. Since we can only observe firms 
until the year 2006 for those firms that lived longer, we do not observe whether 
they failed or not after 2006. The Cox-proportional hazards model which will 
be described in more detail in chapter 4.4, accounts for this truncation problem 
of survival data. 
 
The variable No.Patents counts the number of patents the firm’s found-
er(s) applied for during the life span of the firm. This number ranges between 0 
and 47 while the majority of firms (4,267 out of 4,568) count a zero.  
 
InnoConn is a binary variable indicating whether the founders of inno-
vative firms are connected to the innovator network (InnoConn=1; 192 out of 
516 firms with innovative founders either before or after founding the firm) or 
whether they are isolated notes of the net (InnoConn=0; 324 out of 516 firms 
with innovative founders either before or after founding the firm). As we have 
  102 
argued above, we assume for young and small firms, that social scientific capi-
tal of the founders can be directly translated into social scientific capital of the 
firm. Since social relations usually do not break up from one year to the other, 
we also encounter the connection of the founder(s) to the network in the years 
before firm founding as part of the scientific social capital of the firm. 
 
Independent variables 
The variable Innovative is a binary variable, which measures whether 
the founders of the firm have applied for patents (Innovative=1; 516 out of 
4568) or not (Innovative=0; 4,052 out of 4,568) before and after the firm has 
been founded. This indicated whether we can consider the firm to be innova-
tive or not.  
 
Connected is a binary variable indicating whether the founders of a firm 
are connected to the innovator network (Connected=1; 192 out of 516 innova-
tive firms) or whether they are isolated notes of the net (Connected =0; 324 out 
of  516 innovative firms). As we have argued above, we assume for young and 
small firms, that social scientific capital of the founders can be directly trans-
lated into social scientific capital of the firm. Since social relations usually do 
not break up from one year to the other, we also encounter the connection of 
the founder(s) to the network in the years before firm founding as part of the 
scientific social capital of the firm. 
 
PatExperience is a count variable, indicating how many patents the 
founders of a respective firm have applied for before founding it. For the 516 
innovative firms in the sample, this variable ranges between 0 and 26. For 213 
firms, we find a 0 which means that for them, we find no patenting experience. 
The founder(s) of the other 303 firms bring along experience in patenting. 
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Table 4-1 Variables used for analyzing the relationship between innovator networks and new ventures’ success 
  Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
H4-1 Innovative Binary variable, indicating whether the founders of the respective 
firm have applied for patents (1) or not (0). 
4,568 0.11 0.32 0 1 
H4-2 No.Patents Count variable, indicating the number of patents the founders of the 
respective firm have applied for. 
4,568 0.21 1.48 0 47 
Connected Binary variable, measuring for those firms of founders who have 
applied for patents, whether they are connected to the innovator 
network or isolated from it. 
516 0.37 0.48 0 1 
PatExperience Count variable, indicating the number of patents the founders of the 
respective firm have applied for before the firm has been founded. 
516 1.83 3.24 0 26 
H4-3 InnoConn Binary variable indicating that an innovative firm is connected to the 
network (1) or isolated from it (0). 
516 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Prob(InnoConn) Probability for a firm to be innovative and connected to the network 
at the same time, dependent on certain individual characteristics. 
4,494 0.04 0.12 0 0.97 
Controls ABG Dummy for Altenburg. 3,508 0.03 0.18 0 1 
GGrz Dummy for Gera/Greiz. 3,508 0.07 0.26 0 1 
JShk Dummy for Jena/Saale-Holzland-Kreis. 3,508 0.12 0.33 0 1 
 SOK Dummy for Saale-Orla-Kreis. 3,508 0.02 0.15 0 1 
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Table 4-1 continued 
 
Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Controls SaalRud Dummy for Saalfeld/Rudolstadt. 3,508 0.04 0.21 0 1 
 Central Dummy for Central Thuringia (Sömmerda, Erfurt, Weimar,  
Weimarer Land, Ilm-Kreis, Gotha). 
3,508 0.33 0.47 0 1 
 Sonne Dummy for Sonneberg. 3,508 0.03 0.18 0 1 
 Schmalle Dummy for Schmalkalden/Meiningen. 3,508 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 EAWak Dummy for Eisenach/Wartburgkreis. 3,508 0.08 0.26 0 1 
 UHK Dummy for Unstrut-Hainich-Kreis. 3,508 0.03 0.17 0 1 
 Eichs Dummy for Eichsfeld. 3,508 0.04 0.19 0 1 
 ShareStudents Share of students in the whole population of the region the firm is 
located at. 
3,508 0.02 0.04 0 0.12 
 Meanturb Mean of industry turbulence in the time span of three years before 
the firm has been founded and the three years afterwards. 
2,900 3.96 6.64 -4.87 23.24 
 Capcomp Binary variable indicating whether the firm is a capital company 
(1) or a private company (0). 
4,568 0.93 0.26 0 1 
 Academics Number of founding-team members that is holding an academic 
degree. 
4,560 0.12 0.39 0 9 
 Spinoff Binary variable identifying academin spin-offs (1). 4,568 0.02 0.15 0 1 
 No.Founders Team size. Number of persons that have founded the firm. 4,560 1.39 0.77 0 16 
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Table 4-2 Correlations used for analyzing the relationship between innovator networks and new ventures’ success – full sample 
(2,199 Observations; Estimations in Table 4-4 and 4-7) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Innovative 1         
2 Prob(InnoConn) 0.9094* 1        
3 ABG -0,0097 -0,0158 1       
4 GGrz -0,0225 -0,0188 -0.0503* 1      
5 JShk 0.1256* 0.0457* -0.0680* -0.1047* 1     
6 SOK -0,0263 -0,0288 -0,0285 -0.0438* -0.0593* 1    
7 SaalRud 0.0348* 0.0350* -0.0390* -0.0600* -0.0812* -0.0340* 1   
8 Central -0,0069 0.0387* -0.1268* -0.1952* -0.2639* -0.1105* -0.1513* 1  
9 Sonne 0,0025 0,0050 -0.0333* -0.0512* -0.0693* -0,0290 -0.0397* -0.1292* 1 
10 Schmalle -0.0332* -0,0283 -0.0726* -0.1117* -0.1511* -0.0633* -0.0866* -0.2817* -0.0739* 
11 EAWak -0,0309 -0.0380* -0.0518* -0.0797* -0.1078* -0.0451* -0.0618* -0.2009* -0.0527* 
12 UHK -0,0229 -0,0206 -0,0322 -0.0496* -0.0671* -0,0281 -0.0384* -0.1250* -0,0328 
13 Eichs -0.0372* -0,0260 -0.0352* -0.0541* -0.0732* -0,0307 -0.0420* -0.1365* -0.0358* 
14 ShareStudents 0.1250* 0.0457* -0.0813* -0.0748* 0.9978* -0.0709* -0.0971* -0.2613* -0.0828* 
15 Meanturb -0.0645* -0.0732* 0.0432* 0.0566* -0,0056 0,0022 -0,0385 0.0728* 0,0193 
16 Capcomp 0,0195 0,0129 0,0027 0,0058 0,0281 -0,0050 -0,0183 0,0122 -0,0183 
    *p<=.05 
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Table 4-2 continued 
  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
10 Schmalle 1       
11 EAWak -0.1150* 1      
12 UHK -0.0716* -0.0511* 1     
13 Eichs -0.0781* -0.0557* -0.0347* 1    
14 ShareStudents -0.1703* -0.0993* -0.0802* -0.0876* 1   
15 Meanturb -0.0504* -0.0691* -0.0431* -0.0478* -0,0024 1  
16 Capcomp -0,0074 -0,0051 0,0130 -0.0386* 0,0292 0.0454* 1 
*p<=.05 
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Table 4-3 Correlations used for analyzing the relationship between innovator networks and new ventures’ success - Sub sample 
(442 Observations; Estimations in Table 4-5 and 4-6)) 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 No.Patents 1         
2 Connected 0.1920* 1        
3 PatExperience 0.1457* 0.2275* 1       
4 InnoConn 0.1920* 1.0000* 0.2275* 1      
5 ABG -0,0096 0,0174 -0,0465 0,0174 1     
6 GGrz -0,0193 0,0780 -0,0208 0,0780 -0.0503* 1    
7 JShk 0.0540* -0.1194* -0,0240 -0.1194* -0.0680* -0.1047* 1   
8 SOK -0,0187 -0,0892 -0,0386 -0,0892 -0,0285 -0.0438* -0.0593* 1  
9 SaalRud 0,0059 -0,0629 0,0034 -0,0629 -0.0390* -0.0600* -0.0812* -0.0340* 1 
10 Central 0,0220 0.3816* 0,0854 0.3816* -0.1268* -0.1952* -0.2639* -0.1105* -0.1513* 
11 Sonne -0,0024 -0,0648 0,0347 -0,0648 -0.0333* -0.0512* -0.0693* -0,0290 -0.0397* 
12 Schmalle 0,0000 -0.1599* -0,0510 -0.1599* -0.0726* -0.1117* -0.1511* -0.0633* -0.0866* 
13 EAWak -0,0250 -0,0579 -0,0517 -0,0579 -0.0518* -0.0797* -0.1078* -0.0451* -0.0618* 
14 UHK -0,0192 -0.1097* -0,0208 -0.1097* -0,0322 -0.0496* -0.0671* -0,0281 -0.0384* 
15 Eichs -0,0279 -0,0328 0,0751 -0,0328 -0.0352* -0.0541* -0.0732* -0,0307 -0.0420* 
16 ShareStudents 0.0533* -0.1166* -0,0240 -0.1166* -0.0813* -0.0748* 0.9978* -0.0709* -0.0971* 
17 Academics 0.1793* 0.1290* 0.1008* 0.1290* -0.0350* -0,0174 0.1590* -0.0432* -0.0433* 
18 Spinoff 0.0559* 0.1000* 0,0575 0.1000* -0,0106 -0.0402* 0.0842* -0,0266 -0.0364* 
19 No.Founders 0.0841* 0,0620 0,0427 0,0620 0,0141 -0,0086 0.1168* -0,0078 -0,0254 
       *p<=.05 
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Table 4-3 continued 
  
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
10 Central 1          
11 Sonne -0.1292* 1         
12 Schmalle -0.2817* -0.0739* 1        
13 EAWak -0.2009* -0.0527* -0.1150* 1       
14 UHK -0.1250* -0,0328 -0.0716* -0.0511* 1      
15 Eichs -0.1365* -0.0358* -0.0781* -0.0557* -0.0347* 1     
16 ShareStudents -0.2613* -0.0828* -0.1703* -0.0993* -0.0802* -0.0876* 1    
17 Academics 0.0451* -0,0154 -0.0522* -0.0593* -0,0207 -0,0172 0.1603* 1   
18 Spinoff 0.0814* -0,0310 -0,0174 -0.0483* -0,0301 -0,0328 0.0841* 0.0722* 1  
19 No.Founders 0,0209 -0,0305 -0.0339* -0.0345* -0.0408* -0,0274 0.1175* 0.3006* 0.0934* 1 
*p<=.05 
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Prob(InnoConn) measures the probability of a firm to be connected to 
the innovator network and at the same time to be innovative (which means that 
the founders have applied for patents before or after the firms has been found-
ed). This variable becomes zero for all firms that have no connection to innova-
tive activities that might be measurable through patent information. For all the 
other firms where the founders have shown patenting activities, even before the 
firm has been founded, it takes a value between 0 and 1. 
 
Control Variables 
In order to control for regional differences, we created dummies for the 
12 Thuringian travel-to-work areas as defined by Granato and Farhauer (2007). 
Figure 1-1 illustrates these areas. 
 
The probability to be an innovative firm might differ dependent on 
whether a region is a so called student-region or not. Therefore, the variable 
ShareStudents measures the share of students in a travel-to-work area com-
pared to the whole population in this area. 
 
The firms in the sample are active in different industrial sectors and of 
cause the sector plays an important role to for the survivability of a firm. Since 
we are analyzing young firms, we decided to not only control for sectors but to 
also consider the economic environment/stage of the sector they are active in. 
For this purpose, we used data from the IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung) which contains the number of firm founding and closing for 
each industry (Nace 2-digit level) for the years 1976 to 2010. Based on this 
data, we created a variable named Meanturb, which is measuring the turbu-
lence in the sector the firm is active in for a time span of six years, three years 
before the firm has been founded and three years afterwards. The turbulence is 
measured as number of firm founding in a certain sector in the specific years 
minus the number of firm close downs in the same sector in the same years. 
From this value, we take the mean over the six years around the firm founding. 
 
In order to control whether the firm is a private company, we use the 
variable Capcomp (1 of it is a capital company, 0 otherwise). 
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Academics measures the number of team member that is holding an ac-
ademic degree. 
 
Spinoff measures whether the firm is an academic spin-off, which 
means a spin-off from a university or research institute (Spinoff=1) or not. 
 
No.Founders measures the founding team’s size. 
 
4.4 Method 
Innovation and survival 
In order to analyze the role an innovator network plays for the survivability of 
a young and innovative firm, we proceed in three steps. The first step is to 
identify the relation between innovativeness and survival of a firm. Since in 
this first step success is measured in terms of survival, we apply Cox’s propor-
tional hazards model (1972). It has been widely recognized that survival as an 
outcome variable does not come without bias. The problem arises due to non-
complete measurements on all ‘members’ or entities of a random sample 
(Kaplan and Meier 1958). For example in medical follow-up studies, contact to 
some of the individuals will be lost before their death and others will die due to 
other reasons. Similarly the observation of the lifetime may be ended at a cer-
tain point in time, due to the need to get out a report within a reasonable time. 
In many applications, and this holds also for our investigation, survival may be 
a subject to right censoring and left truncation (Tsai et al. 1987). Right-
censored cases are study objects whose failure event is not observed. The term 
"right-censored" implies that the event of interest is to the right of our data 
point (Kaplan and Meier 1958). In other words, if the units were to keep on 
operating, the failure would occur at some time after our data point. Truncation 
is a source of bias in survival analysis, in which certain objects are ignored and 
not sampled (Tsai et al. 1987). Left-truncation occurs when some subjects are 
registered at a delayed time. Our database contains firms founded at several 
points in time. Thus, we have a problem with left-truncation. We also cannot 
observe the event of interest (closure) for some of our observations, thus we 
also have right-censored data. We use the Cox proportional hazards model 
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(1972) since it gives a valid estimate of the survival rate for data sets including 
right-censored and left truncated cases. 
 
Innovator network and innovative output 
After having identified the relation between innovativeness and survival, we 
are devoted to analyse in a second step the relation between the connection to 
the innovator network and innovativeness. This means that we ask whether in 
the group of innovative firms those with connection to the innovator network 
are more successful in innovating than the isolated ones. Since the number of 
patents applied for as our outcome variable is highly skewed to the left with a 
high number of zeros, we apply negative binomial regression as proposed by 
Greene (2003) as well as Cameron and Trivedi (2013). 
 
Innovator network and survival 
The third step of the analysis aims on bringing together the first two steps. We 
want to see whether the combination of being innovative and connected to the 
network influences firm survival. In order to do this, we first analyse the fac-
tors that explain this aforementioned combination. This means that we regress 
special characteristics on the binary variable InnoConn. Since the outcome 
variable is binary, we use logistic regression for this. The individual coefficient 
of this regression (the fitted value), tells us for each firm that is at least innova-
tive, the probability to be innovative and connected at the same time based on 
certain characteristics. This value is stored and in the next step, we use it as 
explanatory variable for the survivability of the firm in a cox regression. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
Innovation and survival 
Table 4-4 shows the results for the first step of analysis which is devot-
ed to hypothesis 4-1 stating that innovative firms have better chances to survive 
the selection process of the market than non-innovative ones. 
Models 1-3 differ in the inclusion of regional control variables. Considering all 
three models, we find that the coefficient for the dummy variable Innovative 
ranges between 0.64 and 0.76 on a 1-10% significance level. This means that 
innovative firms have a risk to die in the upcoming period which is only about 
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70% of the risk for non-innovative firms. Therefore, hypothesis 4-1 cannot be 
rejected. 
 
Innovator Network and innovative output 
The second step of analysis is devoted to the second hypothesis which is as-
suming that innovative firms that are connected to the innovator network show 
a higher innovation output than isolated ones. The causality however, appears 
to stay unclear. It might be that case that firms apply for more patents since 
they are connected to the innovator network. But it might as well be true that 
the highly innovative firms are connected since they have more patents. We do 
not claim to have an answer to this point here. The models just aim at revealing 
the connection in our data. The question which direction is the true one remains 
unsolved. Table 4-5 shows the results of our negative binomial regression on 
the number of patents a firm applied for in four models which differ with re-
spect to the inclusion of control variables. 
 
Over all models, the relationship between the connection to the innovator net-
work and the number of patents a firm applies for is significant and positive. 
Interpreting model 4, we find that, all the other variables considered being con-
stant, the connection to the innovator network increases the differences in the 
logs of the patent count by 0.59 units. Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 
4-2 and assume that the innovator network has a positive influence on the de-
gree of innovativeness in the group of innovative firms. 
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Table 4-4 The influence of innovativeness on the hazard ratio 
Method Cox regression - Breslow Method for ties   
Dep. Var. survival 
     Population all firms      
  model 1   model 2   model 3   
Innovative 0.7568 * 0.7015 ** 0.6433 *** 
 
(-1.66) 
 
(-2.09) 
 
(-2.59) 
 ABG 
    
6.0795 *** 
     
(4.53) 
 GGrz 
    
5.3627 *** 
     
(4.59) 
 JShk 
  
1.4725 *** 4.7279 *** 
   
(2.85) 
 
(4.39) 
 SOK 
    
4.7730 *** 
     
(3.60) 
 SaalRud 
    
6.2421 *** 
     
(4.79) 
 Central 
  
0.4627 *** 1.4790 
 
   
(-5.61) 
 
(1.10) 
 Sonne 
    
3.1264 *** 
     
(2.76) 
 Schmalle 
    
4.1954 *** 
     
(4.06) 
 EAWak 
    
0.5847 
 
     
(-1.02) 
 UHK 
    
1.3157 
 
     
(0.49) 
 Eichs 
    
1.0088 
 
     
(0.02) 
 Capcomp 0.7404 * 0.7105 ** 0.7113 ** 
 
(-1.75) 
 
(-1.98) 
 
(-1.97) 
 Meanturb 1.0351 *** 1.0387 *** 1.0340 *** 
 
(5.00) 
 
(5.52) 
 
(4.77) 
 No. of Obs. 2,199   2,199  2,199  
No. Of Failures 367 
 
367 
 
367 
 Prob>Chi2 0.000   0.000  0.000  
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
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Table 4-5 The influence of being connected to the innovator network on the 
number of patents an innovative firm applies for 
Method Negative binomial regression 
Dep. Var. No.Patents 
      Population all firms  
 
model 1 
 
model 2 
 
model 3 
 
model 4 
 Connected 0.5164 *** 0.5013 *** 0.5543 *** 0.5955 *** 
 
(3.23) 
 
(3.16) 
 
(3.15) 
 
(3.31) 
 PatExperience 
  
0.0434 ** 0.0377 * 0.0302 
 
   
(2.09) 
 
(1.81) 
 
(1.45) 
 ABG 
      
2.6978 ** 
       
(2.25) 
 GGrz 
      
0.8015 
 
       
(1.52) 
 JShk 
    
6.2492 
 
-24.3060 * 
     
(1.55) 
 
(-1.89) 
 SOK 
      
2.1660 
 
       
(1.63) 
 SaalRud 
      
2.6545 ** 
       
(2.32) 
 Central 
    
-0.1042 
 
1.7021 ** 
     
(-0.53) 
 
(2.13) 
 Sonne 
      
2.8368 ** 
       
(2.41) 
 Schmalle 
      
2.9570 *** 
       
(2.90) 
 EAWak 
      
1.5311 ** 
       
(2.01) 
 UHK 
      
2.2234 * 
       
(1.78) 
 Eichs 
      
omitted 
 Academics 0.4409 *** 0.4130 *** 0.4576 *** 0.4617 *** 
 
(3.48) 
 
(3.27) 
 
(3.54) 
 
(3.54) 
 Spinoff -0.1214 
 
-0.2315 
 
-0.1827 
 
-0.1730 
 
 
(-0.47) 
 
(-0.88) 
 
(-0.68) 
 
(-0.66) 
 No.Founders 0.1024 
 
0.1115 
 
0.0978 
 
0.0900 
 
 
(1.05) 
 
(1.15) 
 
(1.01) 
 
(0.93) 
 ShareStudents 1.0681 
 
1.6061 
 
-51.9694 
 
225.9738 * 
 
(0.71) 
 
(1.06) 
 
(-1.51) 
 
(1.94) 
 Constant -0.0089 
 
-0.1106 
 
0.0695 
 
-2.7225 ** 
 
(-0.05) 
 
(-0.59) 
 
(0.32) 
 
(-2.43) 
 No. of Obs. 442  442  442  442   
Pseudo R2 0.0266   0.0295   0.0312   0.0412   
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
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Innovator network and survival 
In order to test hypothesis 4-3, we start by calculating the individual probabil-
ity of a firm to be innovative and connected to the innovator network at the 
same time (Prob(InnoConn)). Table 4-6 shows the logistic regression for this.  
 
Table 4-6 Variables that are determining the probability for a firm to be inno-
vative and connected to the innovator network at the same time 
Method Logistic regression 
Dep. Var. InnoConn 
 Population all firms  
 
model 1 
 PatExperience 0.1560 *** 
 
(4.19) 
 Academics 0.5708 *** 
 
(3.04) 
 Spinoff 0.8551 ** 
 
(2.42) 
 No.Founders 0.1113 
 
 
(0.8) 
 ShareStudents -7.2862 *** 
 
(-3.11) 
 Constant -1.1191 *** 
 
(-4.20) 
 No. of Obs. 442  
Pseudo R2 0.0851   
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%,**significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1% 
 
The probability to be connected and innovative, which can only be calculated if 
the firm is indeed innovative and connected, depends on the firm’s experience 
in patenting (PatExperience), the number of academics in the team (Academ-
ics) , whether the firm is a spin-off (Spinoff) and the share of students among 
the whole population in the region (ShareStudents). For all firms where, Inno-
Conn is 0, we set 
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Table 4-7 Influence of the probability to be innovative and connected to the 
innovator network on the hazard ratio 
Method Cox regression - Breslow Method for ties 
Dep. Var. survival 
     Population all firms      
 
model 1 
 
model 2 
 
model 3 
 Prob(InnoConn) 0.4851 * 0.4784 * 0.3796 ** 
 
(-1.68) 
 
(-1.65) 
 
(-2.14) 
 ABG 
    
6.0375 *** 
     
(4.51) 
 GGrz 
    
5.3268 *** 
     
(4.57) 
 JShk 
  
1.4329 *** 4.5649 *** 
   
(2.67) 
 
(4.30) 
 SOK 
    
4.7659 *** 
     
(3.60) 
 SaalRud 
    
6.1765 *** 
     
(4.76) 
 Central 
  
0.4646 *** 1.4817 
 
   
(-5.58) 
 
(1.11) 
 Sonne 
    
3.1189 *** 
     
(2.76) 
 Schmalle 
    
4.1853 *** 
     
(4.05) 
 EAWak 
    
0.5820 
 
     
(-1.03) 
 UHK 
    
1.3085 
 
     
(0.48) 
 Eichs 
    
1.0124 
 
     
(0.02) 
 Capcomp 0.7402 * 0.7098 ** 0.7105 ** 
 
(-1.75) 
 
(-1.99) 
 
(-1.98) 
 Meanturb 1.0351 *** 1.0390 *** 1.0343 *** 
 
(5.00) 
 
(5.56) 
 
(4.81) 
 No. of Obs. 2,199  2,199  2,199  
No. Of Failures 367 
 
367 
 
367 
 Prob>Chi2 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%,**significant at 5%, 
***significant at 1% 
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Prob(InnoConn) to 0 which means that we here do not use the fitted but the 
real value in order to explain whether the connection to the innovator network 
is positively linked to the survivability of firms. In order to do this, we use Cox 
proportional hazards model and explain survival with the probability to be 
connected to the innovator network and innovative as well as some control 
variables. Table 4-7 shows the results. 
 
Again, models 1-3 differ simply in the inclusion of control variables. If we 
look at our main variable of interest, Prob(InnoConn), we can see that a high 
probability to be innovative and connected to the innovator network reduces 
the hazard ratio to about 48%. 
Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 4-3 and assume that the connection to 
the innovator network plays an important role in the explanation of differences 
in the survival of firms. 
 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to show for young firms in innovative industries in 
how far the connection to the innovator network or in other words, the amount 
of scientific social capital the firm can make use of, is a hub for its chances to 
survive the economic selection process.  
In a first step, we looked at the factors that influence innovativeness and find 
the connection to the innovator network to be one of the main ones. However 
also experience in patenting positively influences whether the founders of the 
respective firm go on with their patenting activities. Additionally the number of 
founders with academic background positively influence tendency of a firm to 
apply for patents. 
In the next step, we looked at the connection between innovativeness, the inno-
vator network and the survivability of firms. The theoretical framework sug-
gested that this relation is positive and that an innovative firm which is con-
nected to the innovator network has more success in gaining competitive ad-
vantages through innovation and therefore has better chances to survive. An 
analysis of 4,568 companies in the German state Thuringia indicates that the 
probability of a firm to be innovative and connected to the innovator network 
at the same time is positively related to its probability to survive. 
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Besides the connection to the innovator network, three other factors turn out to 
be influential for the viability of a young company. We find that capital com-
panies have a reduced hazard ratio as compared to private companies.  
The mean turbulence of the industry the firm is active in for the time span three 
years before and three years after firm founding is negatively related to the 
hazard ratio. A high value of turbulence indicates a recently growing sector 
where there are more company founding’s than closings. According to Gort 
and Klepper’s (1982) theory on the diffusion of product innovations (Industry 
Life Cycle), this industry is in phase II which is the interval from the take-off 
point of the net entry until the net entry starts to decline drastically. This ex-
plains the negative connection which we find for the survival of firms. If a firm 
is founded in phase II it has to go through phase IV which is a phase of shake 
out where the net entry becomes negative and where many firms are closed 
until the market stabilizes. The probability that a firm does not survive this 
stage is quite high which goes in line with what we find in our data. 
We also find that survival differs regionally. With respect to firm’s survival 
and success, location has been identified as one among many critical factors 
(Heckmann and Schnabel 2005, Storey 1994). However, locations differ with 
respect to their organizations like universities, research institutes, firms or pub-
lic agencies, as well as with respect to institutional factors like norms and regu-
lations, a qualified labour force or business taxes. Besides these, but related, an 
important locational factor is the regional innovation system as defined by 
Cooke et al. (1997). The network of innovators can be seen as one core element 
of such an innovation system. However, it may not be irrelevant to which IN a 
firm is connected. Various researches have shown that, first, innovative activi-
ties are spatially not evenly spread but a rather regionally bounded phenome-
non (Asheim and Isaksen 2002). Thus, innovative performance differs among 
different regional innovation systems (e.g. Porter 1990, Jaffe et al. 1993). Sec-
ond, regions differ with respect to the success of their respective firms or with 
respect to founding rates (e.g. Storey 1994). The success of incumbent firms as 
well as their founding rate is driven by innovation (Nijkamp 2011, Audretsch 
and Lehmann 2005, Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, Lumpkin and Dess 1996) 
which in turn is driven by the IN. If regions differ with respect to innovative 
and firm performance, this may be due to different characteristics of the re-
spective regional innovator networks (RINs). Among those characteristics may 
 119 
 
be network properties like a high degree of connectedness, a high centrality of 
single actors or the existence of structural holes. Additionally, one might ex-
pect differences occurring due to the characteristics of the knowledge that is 
flowing in the network. Some regions are highly specialized, thus concentrated 
on a small number of industries. In these regions, the knowledge flowing 
through the RIN will also be very specialized and therefore the knowledge ba-
ses of the network-actors will have a high degree of overlap. Other regions are 
more diverse with respect to industries. Consequently, the knowledge flowing 
through the network is rather diverse and the actors’ knowledge bases show a 
low degree of overlap. These considerations leave lots of space for further re-
search on the connection between network characteristics and firm’s success. 
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5. The selective nature of innovator networks: from the nascent to the 
early growth phase of the organizational life cycle 
5.1 Introduction 
Over the 1990s, scholars have come to the consensus that networks play an 
important role for the emergence and survival of new ventures (Aldrich and 
Reese 1993, Larson and Starr 1993, Stuart et al. 1999). However, with regards 
to the evolutionary process behind firm growth and survival at different stages 
of the organizational life cycle (Hite and Hesterly 2001), recent interest has 
been devoted to the variable ‘location’ as a critical factor, shaping firm perfor-
mance.  
 
We elaborate the approach of regional innovator networks (RIN) which can be 
defined as networks that are built up by actors who cooperatively engage in the 
creation of new ideas and then economize the results (Cantner and Graf 2007), 
where the economization can be realized within an existing firm or by the for-
mation of a new venture. In a previous study (Cantner and Wolf 2016) we 
found that for a new venture being simply connected to the innovator network 
increases the survival probability. The further step in this paper is to look at the 
“quality” of the network and of how a new venture is connected to the network 
(position in the network, relation to other actors, bridging functions). Examin-
ing the relationship between network position of the founder and survival of 
firms can provide both, an estimation of the role of different elements of net-
work structure in firms’ success and an empirical indicator for the effectiveness 
of knowledge flows through networks. 
 
According to the propositions by Hite and Hesterly (2001), an analysis of the 
relationship between the selectivity of the innovator network and start-ups’ 
survival cannot be conducted independently of the organizational life cycle 
status of the individual firm. Therefore, we consider three early stages in the 
life cycle, namely, the nascent stage, the founding stage and the post founding 
stage, and ask the following research question: What role does the structure of 
the innovator network, the position of the founder(s) in the network and the 
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structure of the founder’s ego-network play for the survival of firms in the ear-
ly stages of the organizational life cycle? 
 
To address this overarching research question, we have constructed a biograph-
ical firm dataset, based upon data on incorporations of enterprises in Thuringia 
as well as on patent data comprising all German patents applied for at the Ger-
man Patent Office. 
 
5.2 Organizational life cycle 
In strategy and entrepreneurship research, organizational life cycles are used to 
explain how firms evolve through the following (mostly five) progressive stag-
es: emergence, early growth, later growth, maturity and death (Churchill and 
Levis 1983, Gartner et al. 1992). These studies expect that the emergence stage 
of the firm, and with this it’s life, begins when the organization is legally creat-
ed (Gartner et al. 1992). However, as Reynolds (2000) argues, there is also an 
important phase before the legal founding which is the conception or nascent 
stage of the firm life. 
In this paper, we will concentrate on the phases between nascent entrepreneur-
ship and early growth of the firm. Throughout all the phases of a firm’s life, the 
strategic goals, natural resource needs and acquisition challenges are changing 
several times (Hite and Hesterly 2001). 
A nascent entrepreneur can be defined as ‘someone who initiates serious activi-
ties that are intended to culminate in a viable business startup’ (Aldrich 1999, 
p. 77). This means that in this phase, the nascent entrepreneur is experimenting 
with different business ideas, starts to take care of the first stages in the found-
ing process (like writing a business plan) and starts to collect resources along 
with applying for financial funds. Depending on the industry/technology the 
start-up will be active in, the founder(s) might also start to produce first proto-
types. In this phase there seems to be no real strategic orientation but the four 
factors entrepreneurial personality, environment, resources, and founding pro-
cess comprehensively influence founding success (Kessler and Frank 2009, 
Cantner and Stuetzer 2013). 
After the legal founding of the firm, the emergence stage begins (Gartner et al. 
1992). In the emergence stage, the firm starts to act on the real market such that 
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one could say that after the legal founding the start-up enters in to the selective 
process of competition. In this phase the only strategic goal of the firm is not to 
die, thus to survive the selection process (Hite and Hesterly 2001). With re-
spect to resources, these newborn firms usually lack internal resources and ca-
pabilities to reach this goal (Baum 1996). Additionally the operations of 
emerging firms are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and equivo-
cality (Gartner et al. 1992) as well as by a lower degree of legitimacy and repu-
tation (Hite and Hesterly 2001).  
If the firm enters the early growth stage, it has survived already the toughest 
part of the competition process, usually due to a competitive advantage. Now 
the firm is settled in the market and might be for the first time able to set its 
own conditions. Thus, when the firm enters the early growth stage it starts to 
make real strategic decisions and therefore requires a broader scope of re-
sources but, however, could already gain legitimacy and reputation which re-
duces uncertainty (Hite and Hesterly 2001). 
 
Organizational life cycle theory does not describe the exact time span or dura-
tion for the single phases of the life cycle. This is not surprising since the de-
velopment of a firm is an individual process which differs from firm to firm. 
The nascent stage is usually considered to take around three years (Kessler and 
Frank 2009). After the legal firm founding, it is well known that survival rates 
are very low in the beginning due to the liabilities of newness and smallness 
(Parker 2009). After an initial honeymoon phase (which is the emergence stage 
according to the organizational life cycle theory), many small and young firms 
suffer from these liabilities and exit while others enter the early growth stage. 
Studies on the distribution of survival rates see the length of the emergence 
stage somewhere between five and seven years (Phillips and Kirchhoff 1989, 
Bartelsman et al. 2005). 
 
Of cause along with the changes in needs for the young firms, the influence of 
the social (scientific) network around the founders changes. Before elaborating 
this, we start by describing the role of innovative networks per se. 
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5.3 Knowledge diffusion in regional innovator networks 
We define the RIN as a network that is built up by actors, living in a certain 
region, which cooperatively engage in the creation of new ideas and then econ-
omize on the results in the market - either within an existing firm or by the 
formation of a new venture (Cantner and Graf 2007, Balconi et al. 2004). Inno-
vative actors building the RIN are employees of firms, of research institutes or 
of universities, students or self-employed persons who actively engage in re-
search (Cantner and Wolf 2016).  
After we have defined the innovator network, the following question arises: 
How can the connection of single actors to the RIN contribute to firms’ innova-
tion? As mentioned in the definition, the RIN inherits connections among ac-
tors that are engaged in research, no matter if it is basic or applied (Cantner and 
Graf 2007, Balconi et al. 2004). These actors usually are experienced experts 
and they have current knowledge in their field. Since knowledge can be codi-
fied or tacit, acquiring new knowledge pieces may require personal contacts to 
other actors which possess this new knowledge (Howells 2002). Breschi and 
Lissoni (2006) argue that pure knowledge spillovers can only take place by 
trade-unrelated personal communication or through reverse engineering. How-
ever, when tacitness of knowledge plays a role, knowledge spillovers are not 
possible anymore without active participation of the inventor. Thus, actors that 
are connected to the social network of innovators will receive more new 
knowledge pieces than an isolated actor and they will therefore have a higher 
probability to find new combinations. 
As pointed out: Knowledge, which is possessed by actors and transferred via 
the RIN, is an important prerequisite for the generation of innovations within a 
firm. By definition, actors connected to the RIN intend to economize their re-
search’s results (Cantner and Graf 2007). This can happen within an existing 
firm or by founding a new one. Thus, a firm whose employees or founders are 
connected to the innovator network will be more likely to be innovative than 
firms whose employees or founders are isolated from this network (Cantner 
and Wolf 2016). With respect to the creation of a new firm, the interpretation 
of the contribution of an entrepreneur’s network to the firms’ scientific 
knowledge base is similar to the notion by Murray (2004) but we adapt it to 
entrepreneurship theory. Murray (2004) investigates in how far academic sci-
entists contribute to the firm’s own scientific network by providing their scien-
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tific social capital. Our notion of the regional innovator network points to the 
importance of the whole research community within a region. Furthermore, we 
expect an entrepreneur who is connected to this regional research community 
(from now on, we call him networked-founder), not an academic inventor as 
Murray (2004) does, to bring his scientific social capital to the firm and to also 
intent to translate it to the firms’ scientific network. This so called scientific 
social capital of the firm is even increased if there is more than one networked-
founder (team founding). Thus, the scientific human capital of the founder(s) 
leads a firm to become embedded within the scientific community of the re-
gion. Scholars have argued that linkages and the resulting networks are key 
vehicles through which firms obtain access to external knowledge (Powell et 
al. 1996). The connection to such a network delivers information and it is a 
vehicle for the rapid communication of news about opportunities and obstacles. 
Thus, the generation of innovation and the recognition of new market opportu-
nities are eased, which both are drivers of growth and survival (Audretsch 
1995). 
 
5.4 Early stages in the organizational life cycle and the evolution of 
firm networks 
As argued above, the needs of a firm change along its life cycle and conse-
quently the exigence to the innovator network changes over time. At the same 
time, the network itself evolves and changes. This is due to the process of dy-
namic network evolution where firms strategically adapt and align their net-
works to serve their needs (Golden and Dollinger 1993, Ostgaard and Birley 
1994, Balland et al. 2015). This means that the individual firm changes its ego-
network but, if all firms do this, naturally the whole network changes. There-
fore, in contrast to Hite and Hesterly (2001) who specifically focus on the ego-
centric network of the firm, we will additionally consider the structure of the 
whole regional innovator network as influential factor on firm success. 
 
5.4.1 Structural issues on the diffusion of knowledge in RINs 
It has been pointed out in chapter 5.3 that the connection to a regional innova-
tor network can influence firm’s innovative success and in line with this, firms’ 
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growth and survival. If we consider start-ups, connected to the RIN, specific 
effects of network structures on the organizational performance may play a 
role. These specific effects also depend on the stage in the organizational life 
cycle and the related strategic needs of the firms.  
Considering the nascent stage of the firm’s live, Cantner and Stuetzer (2013) 
show that factors like start-up capital, the functional background and entrepre-
neurial experience of the founders seem to overweight the importance of social 
capital for the success of the new venture. The founders are too busy in writing 
the business plan, getting funds and find a niche to put their business idea in 
that the scientific social capital plays a less relevant role in this stage of the 
organizational life cycle. Therefore, we expect that the structural form of the 
innovator network does not influence the firm in this very early stage: 
 
Hypothesis 5-1a: 
The connectivity of the innovator network in the nascent stage of the organiza-
tional life cycle does not influence the firms’ chances to survive. 
 
In the emergent stage, the firm already entered into the market and started to 
compete with other actors in this market. In this phase, the founders need to 
know everything that is going on in the technological field. In highly connected 
networks where one finds connections between many of the actors, knowledge 
can flow quite fluently from one actor to the other. Gilsing et al. (2008) addi-
tionally argue that highly connected networks help to understand new 
knowledge adequately since partners may complement actors’ absorptive ca-
pacities and they help building up trust by reputation. For example Fershtman 
and Gandal (2011) find for open source software projects that the success of 
the projects there is a positive connection to the closeness centrality of the pro-
ject network. Also Meagher and Rogers (2004) prove formally that there exists 
a feedback between spillovers and innovation and that those industries with a 
greater network density have a higher proportion of innovators. Cohesive net-
works are characterized by high density, high mutuality among ties and a rela-
tive high frequency of ties among group members, while in sparsely connected 
networks, where fragmentation is quite high, only a small number of 
knowledge spillovers may occur (Wasserman and Faust 1994). During the 
emergence stage, young firms profit from better access to resources and a mu-
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tual understanding which is driven by a high degree of trust and expected fu-
ture reciprocity (Hite and Hesterly 2001). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5-1b: 
Firms have higher chances to survive if the connectivity of the net their founder 
is connected to is high in the emergent stage. 
 
When the firm develops and enters into the early growth stage, the advantages 
of a very cohesive network may turn into disadvantages. First, the costs associ-
ated with maintaining contacts to many actors are quite high (Burt 1992). Sec-
ond, if there are many direct and indirect ties in the net, every actor knows 
what the other actors know and therefore it is less likely to gain new 
knowledge inflows from the net (Gilsing et al. 2008). Third, there is the risk of 
undesired knowledge spillovers in a way that the partners of actor A’s partners 
may receive parts of A’s knowledge although A doesn’t want it (Gilsing and 
Nooteboom 2005). Therefore, in the early growth stage, the fragmented net-
work becomes more appropriate (Hite and Hesterly 2001). Thus, we hypothe-
size the following: 
 
Hypothesis 5-1c: 
Firms have higher chances to survive if the connectivity of the net their founder 
is connected to is low in the early growth stage of the organizational life cycle. 
 
5.4.2 Entrepreneurs position in the RIN and knowledge flows to the 
firm 
After we have defined in chapter 5.4.1 how the net as a whole should look like 
to positively contribute to the survival of the nascent and young firm, we now 
have a look at the founder’s position in the net. Which position of a single node 
(networked-founder) is favourable to profit as much as possible from 
knowledge flows in the net? And how does this depend on the stage in the or-
ganizational life cycle? 
 
If we look at the entrepreneurs’ position in the network, we basically look at 
how important he is. In graph theory, centrality is a measure of how well con-
nected or active an actor is in the overall network. Thus centrality helps meas-
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uring how prominent or important single actors are in the net (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994). The actor with the highest centrality, is the one “where the action 
is” as he is the most visible actor in the network (Gilsing et al. 2008).  
As argued above, in the nascent stage, factors like start-up capital, the func-
tional background and entrepreneurial experience of the founders are the main 
factors, influencing firm survival (Cantner and Stuetzer 2013). Therefore, we 
again expect that the entrepreneurs’ position in the network does not influence 
the chances of his chances to survive. Therefore, hypothesis 5-2a goes as fol-
lows: 
 
Hypothesis 5-2a: 
A central position of the networked-founder’ in the RIN in the nascent stage of 
the organizational life cycle does not influence firm survival. 
 
After the firm entered the market, it needs to know everything that is going on 
in the technological field. A networked-founder, with a high degree centrality 
is in direct contact or adjacent to many other actors (networked-founders or 
inventors) such that this founder should be recognized by others as a major 
channel of information. This makes it more likely for him to receive 
knowledge spillovers, thus information about opportunities or obstacles. Con-
sequently, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 5-2b: 
The more central the position of the networked-founder’ in the RIN in the 
emergent stage of the organizational life cycle the higher are the firms’ chanc-
es to survive. 
 
We argued above that the firms’ need for a cohesive network decreases over 
the life cycle, due to a better control of the resource and knowledge flows be-
tween the other actors (Hite and Hesterly 2001). If we now consider the posi-
tion of the founder in the network, we might expect that central actors may be 
comparably able to control knowledge flows and even use this position for his 
own purposes (Burt 1992). This then makes it more likely for the networked 
founder to receive and control knowledge spillovers. Therefore, we hypothe-
size for the early growth stage that: 
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Hypothesis 5-2c: 
The more central the position of the networked-founder’ in the RIN in the early 
growth stage of the organizational life cycle the higher are the firms’ chances 
to survive. 
 
5.4.3 Entrepreneurs’ ego-network and knowledge flows to the firm 
In social networks theory, a debate has arisen over the form of egocentric net-
work structures that can appropriately be regarded as beneficial for connected 
firms (Walker at al. 1997). Coleman (1988) sees the optimal social structure of 
an ego network in dense and interconnected networks, while Burt (1992) sees a 
network consisting of disconnected alters as optimal. Also the number of direct 
and indirect ties may play a role for the advantageousness of a network struc-
ture (Ahuja 2000). As Hite and Hesterly (2011), we consider the optimal struc-
ture of the ego-network to change over the firm’s life. 
 
Again, the nascent stage is characterized by factors like start-up capital, the 
functional background and entrepreneurial experience rather than the social 
networks (Cantner and Stuetzer 2013). Therefore, we expect no connection 
between the shapes of the ego-networks within the innovator network and the 
success of the new ventures: 
 
Hypothesis 5-3a: 
The shape of the egocentric networks within the innovator network does not 
influence survival of the firm in the nascent stage. 
 
In the emergent stage, the firm needs to be informed about everything that is 
going on in the technology and the related market. Therefore, an ego-network 
that is allowing for the highest possible amount of knowledge inflow is favour-
able (Hite and Hesterly 2011). According to Coleman, densely embedded net-
works (closed networks) with many connections and thus no or less structural 
holes is associated with a higher innovative output. Ahuja (2000), among other 
factors, investigates the relationship between the number of structural holes in 
the ego network of a firm and innovative outputs and finds that having many 
structural holes is associated with reduced innovation. Since this kind of ego-
network structure is exactly what a start-up in the emergent stage needs, we 
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hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 5-3b: 
The more closed the ego-network of a networked-founder is, the higher is the 
survival probability of this founder’s firm in the emergence stage. 
 
However, if the firm moves to the early growth stage, it rather needs an ego-
network that allows a strategical use of the own position (Hite and Hesterly 
2011). One characteristic of the ego-network is brokerage/structural holes (Burt 
1992). Networks usually consist of one or more components. Burt defines a 
‘hole’ / non connection between those components as structural hole. As we 
see nodes as actors, one could say that “people on either side of a structural 
hole circulate in different flows of information. Structural holes are thus an 
opportunity to broker the flow of information between people, and control the 
projects that bring together people from opposite sides of the hole.” (Burt 
1992). One could also say that structural holes guarantee that partners on both 
sides of the whole have access to different information flows (Hargadon and 
Sutton 1997) and the information coming from this connection is non-
redundant (Gilsing et al. 2008). However, not every firm or actor has the same 
chance to be in a bridging position. Central firms tend to become better in-
formed about the things happening in the network what increases their ability 
to form new and valuable ties (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001, Gilsing et al. 
2008). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5-3c: 
The more structural holes the ego-network of the founder has, the higher are 
the chances to survive when the firm moves to the early growth stage. 
  
 
5.5 Compounding the database 
To address the hypotheses introduced above, we have constructed a biograph-
ical firm dataset, based upon two data bases. First, we use data on incorpora-
tions of enterprises in Thuringia which is based on the commercial register. 
Second, we rely on patent data comprising all German patents applied for at the 
German Patent Office in the time period between 1993 and 2004. 
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Incorporations 
Information on new ventures was collected by the Thuringian Founder Study
8
. 
The data base was drawn from the commercial register for commercial and 
private companies in Thuringia and contains information on the founders (date 
of birth, name, surname, academic title, address, gender) and on the firms (date 
of founding, date of closing, trade name, location, legal form, spin-off or not, 
industry). The survey population consists of 12,505 founders whose 7,016 
companies were founded between 1990 and 2006 and are either active or have 
failed meanwhile. After we have cleaned the data (exclusion of firms founded 
before 1993 since the German reunification came with a phase of many man-
agement buyouts of former state combines; exclusion of firms where the 
founding date was missing; extraction of only those firms that are active in 
innovative industries following the classification of Grupp et al. (2000) which 
is classifying innovative industries by means of R&D-intensity) a population of 
4,566 companies was left. 
 
Innovator Network 
As mentioned in the introduction, we use patent data in order to measure the 
innovator network. Per definition, this network comprises persons who cooper-
atively engage in the creation of new ideas and then economize the results 
(Cantner and Graf 2007). How these two aspects of creating and economizing 
new ideas can be combined into the innovator network and what this means for 
new ventures has been elaborated in more detail by the authors’ earlier paper 
Cantner and Wolf (2016) and shall not be repeated here. To summarize the 
arguments of the paper mentioned one can say that patent data, which basically 
just contains information on inventions, is a sufficient measure of innovator 
networks since the aim of commercialization can be expected behind the legal 
protection of the invention. 
We used data from the German Patent Office where we have in Thuringia 
6,969 inventors (name, surname, address) and 5,381 patent applications (IPC-
                                                          
8
 Note that this data base was just the starting point for the Thuringian Founder Study Ques-
tionnaire. It is therefore not identical to the questionnaire data collected by the Thuringian 
Founder Study. 
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Code, name and address of the applicant, application date and year), resulting 
after checking raw data for misspelling of personal names
9
. 
It has been found that regions differ with respect to firms’ success due to dif-
ferent infrastructural conditions (Heckmann and Schnabel 2005, Storey 1994). 
Additionally, the conditions for bringing competencies into innovator networks 
may differ between functional regions since an innovator may find the compe-
tencies he needs easier in large and dense networks compared to smaller ones 
(Ejermo and Karlsson 2006). This holds especially true for large regions with a 
university and several research institutes. Not just that universities and research 
institutes are responsible for knowledge spillovers which have a positive influ-
ence on innovations (Audretsch and Lehmann 2005), it can also be expected 
that actors in these networks are better connected and thus better informed than 
those in regions without research facilities and with less dense networks (Ejer-
mo and Karlsson 2006). On the basis of these considerations, we have created 
12 one-mode-affiliation networks of innovators (RINs) according to the Thu-
ringian travel-to-work areas
10
 (ttwa) as defined by Granato and Farhauer 
(2007) who applied factor analysis for commuter streams. 
 
Combination of both 
The combination of the information from the regional innovator network with 
our firm database was done by matching names of firm founders with names of 
inventors in our innovator network. It must be pointed out that this approach 
does not come without bias. However, we tried to check for addresses and birth 
dates in order to make the matches more accurate. If one or more founders of a 
firm are listed as inventor on a patent, then in a first step, we counted this firm 
to be innovative. Sure, we here assume what we cannot observe, namely that 
the founder intends to economically exploit his invention within his own firm 
rather than selling licences or leaving the exploitation to the applicant. Howev-
er, since a patent application protects the knowledge from usage by other ac-
tors, it signals an intention to further use it for example to generate an innova-
                                                          
9 
For consistency, we used a routine which was applied to all data sets.  
10 
Figure 1-1 shows a card of Thuringia and its ttwas. Sonneberg, Saale-Orla-Kreis, Alten-
burger Land and Eichsfeld are connected to regions outside Thuringia by means of commuter 
streams. For the creation of the regional innovator networks, we also included patents and 
inventors from these regions. 
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tion, which per definition is the economization of new ideas. Furthermore, eve-
ry granted patent inherits a test with respect to the commercial usability of the 
invention. By combining both databases, we were able to identify networked-
founders in the RINs and relate their network positions, properties to their 
firms. They are connected to the regional innovator network of the ttwa their 
firm is located at. As patenting is a quite rare event, we come up with a data-
base of 149 innovative firms out of the sample population we have from the 
commercial register, which was 4,566 founded firms in Thuringia. 
 
5.6 Variables and methodology 
The next section is dedicated to present the variables used and the methodology 
applied. Table 5-1 gives a detailed overview on all variables used in the estima-
tions; table 5-2 presents the correlations between these variables. 
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Table 5-1 Description of variables used in order to investigate the selective nature of innovator networks 
  Variable Description 
Obs Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Min Max 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
 o
f 
th
e 
n
et
w
o
rk
 
(H
1
a-
c)
 
Net-3 Variable describing the density of the network three 
years before the firm founding. 149 0.007 1.000 -1.063 3.308 
Net-3SQ Net-3 Squared 149 0.992 2.035 0.000 10.942 
Net0 Variable describing the density of the network in the 
year of founding. 149 0.001 1.003 -0.821 2.915 
Net0SQ Net0 Squared 149 1.000 2.334 0.001 8.495 
Net+5 Variable describing the density of the network five 
years after firm founding. 149 0.000 1.003 -1.043 1.622 
Net+5SQ Net+5 Squared 149 1.000 0.931 0.000 2.631 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
u
n
d
er
 
(H
2
a-
c)
 
EV-3 Founders' eigenvector centrality three years before the 
firm founding. 37 -0.777 17.315 -86.497 57.735 
EV0 Founders' eigenvector centrality in the year of founding. 149 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.009 
EV+5 Founders' eigenvector centrality five years after firm 
founding. 149 0.019 3.276 -29.564 26.400 
MC-3 Binary variable, indicating whether the firm has been 
connected to the main component three years before the 
firm founding. 149 0.007 0.082 0.000 1.000 
MC0 Binary variable, indicating whether the firm has been 
connected to the main component in the year of its 
founding. 149 0.040 0.197 0.000 1.000 
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Table 5-1 continued 
  Variable Description 
Obs Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Min Max 
 
MC0 Binary variable, indicating whether the firm has been 
connected to the main component in the year of its 
founding. 149 0.040 0.197 0.000 1.000 
E
g
o
-N
et
 
(H
3
a-
c)
 
Constr-3 Constraint of the ego-network three years before the firm 
founding. 149 0.223 0.396 0.000 1.125 
Constr0 Constraint of the ego-network in the year of its founding. 149 0.445 0.454 0.000 1.125 
Constr+5 Constraint of the ego-network five years after firm 
founding. 149 0.677 0.381 0.000 1.125 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
PatExperience Number of patents the firm founders applied for before 
the firm has been founded. 149 1.309 2.205 0.000 11.000 
#Patents Number of patents the firm applied for from the year of 
founding on. 149 2.268 4.132 0.000 28.000 
#Founders Number of founders in the team. 149 1.638 0.816 1.000 6.000 
Spinoff Binary variable, indicating whether the firm is an aca-
demic spin-off or not. 149 0.195 0.397 0.000 1.000 
CapComp Binary variable, indicating whether the firm has the legal 
form of a capital company (1) or a private company (0). 149 0.960 0.197 0.000 1.000 
Acad Variable counting the number of founders in the team 
heaving an academic title. 149 0.383 0.643 0.000 4.000 
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Table 5-1 continued 
  Variable Description 
Obs Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Min Max 
 
OutsideConn Binary variable, indicating whether the respective 
company has also connections to other networks than 
the one it is located in. 149 0.295 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Meanturb Mean of industry turbulence in the time span of three 
years before the firm has been founded and the three 
years afterwards. 149 3.235 6.466 -0.394 23.241 
N
et
-3
 
Innovators-3 Size of the innovator network the founders are con-
nected to three years before the firm has been founded. 149 301.691 258.600 11.000 868.000 
Aggregation-3 
Level of aggregation of the network the founders are 
connected to three years before the firm founding. 149 0.054 0.055 0.013 0.273 
LC-3 
Size of the largest component of the network the 
founders are connected to three years before the firm 
founding. 149 0.117 0.076 0.045 0.364 
N
et
0
 Innovators0 
Size of the innovator network the firm is connected to 
in the year of founding. 149 780.134 560.084 32.000 1836.000 
Aggregation0 
Level of aggregation of the network the firm is con-
nected in the year firm founding. 149 0.055 0.066 0.011 0.246 
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Table 5-1 continued 
  Variable Description 
Obs Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Min Max 
 
LC0 
Size of the largest component of the network the firm 
is connected to in the year of firm founding. 149 0.142 0.129 0.043 0.493 
N
et
+
5
 
Innovators+5 
Size of the innovator network the firm is connected to 
five years after the firm has been founded. 149 1531.617 991.999 75.000 2875.000 
Aggregation+5 
Level of aggregation of the network the firm is con-
nected to five years after the firm founding. 149 0.149 0.170 0.012 0.428 
LC+5 
Size of the largest component of the network the firm 
is connected to five years after the firm founding. 149 0.286 0.243 0.032 0.654 
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Table 5-2 Correlations of the variables used in order to assess the influence of the selective nature of the innovator network 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Net-3 1           
2 Net-3SQ 0.6745* 1          
3 Net0 -0.3059* 0.0296 1         
4 Net0SQ -0.3157* 0.0016 0.8817* 1        
5 Net+5 -0.4452* -0.1395 0.7009* 0.4648* 1       
6 Net+5SQ -0.2098* 0.0133 0.5609* 0.5455* 0.7212* 1      
7 EV-3 -0.3759* -0.5851* 0.0283 0.0161 0.0537 -0.0208 1     
8 EV0 -0.0854 0.0033 0.2395* 0.2649* 0.1329 0.1431 0.0076 1    
9 EV+5 0.0475 0.0065 0.0586 -0.0095 0.0422 -0.0516 0.0111 0.0259 1   
10 MC-3 0.2724* 0.4032* -0.0509 -0.0218 -0.0858 0.0079 -0.8365* -0.0068 -0.0005 1  
11 MC0 0.0955 0.3298* 0.2229* 0.1793* 0.1522 0.2403* -0.4250* 0.4013* 0.0098 0.4013* 1 
12 MC+5 -0.2021* -0.0479 0.2680* 0.0815 0.4747* 0.2932* 0.0296 0.1709* 0.1678* -0.0395 0.2510* 
13 Constr-3 -0.0084 0.0512 0.0536 0.0099 -0.0471 -0.0346 0.0751 0.0885 0.0057 0.0808 0.1661* 
14 Constr0 -0.0875 0.0227 0.1167 0.1329 0.0499 0.121 0.1641 -0.0381 -0.0021 -0.0173 0.0862 
15 Constr+5 0.0629 0.0023 -0.1083 -0.0477 -0.007 0.1129 0.1516 -0.1171 -0.0557 -0.0789 -0.0678 
16 #Patents -0.1708* 0.0554 0.0835 0.0061 0.078 -0.0457 -0.1137 0.2502* 0.0046 0.1007 0.1266 
17 PatExperience -0.1258 0.0225 -0.0487 -0.1093 0.0437 -0.1257 -0.0827 -0.0054 0.1034 0.0545 0.0281 
18 #Founders -0.1939* -0.0675 0.0017 0.009 0.0191 -0.0797 -0.1158 0.1378 -0.0541 0.0367 0.0073 
*p<=.05 
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Table 5-2 continued 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
19 Spinoff -0.3358* -0.0649 0.3469* 0.3149* 0.3528* 0.2482* 0.022 0.1672* 0.0029 -0.0404 0.0718 
20 CapComp -0.0672 -0.1276 -0.1712* -0.1779* -0.0255 -0.0353 -0.0076 0.0168 0.0012 0.0168 0.042 
21 Acad -0.2506* -0.0517 0.1121 0.0949 0.1685* 0.0292 0.0244 0.0792 0.0846 -0.0491 -0.069 
22 OutsideConn -0.0997 0.0155 -0.0789 -0.0506 -0.0083 -0.0661 -0.2532 0.127 0.12 0.127 0.1668* 
23 Meanturb -0.0588 -0.1453 -0.1335 -0.1072 -0.1148 -0.1339 0.2242 -0.0369 -0.0019 -0.0248 -0.089 
*p<=.05 
Table 5-2 continued 
    12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
12 MC+5 1            
13 Constr-3 0.1089 1           
14 Constr0 0.0038 0.4045* 1          
15 Constr+5 -0.0981 -0.001 0.3861* 1         
16 #Patents 0.2764* 0.3987* 0.2121* -0.2157* 1        
17 PatExperience 0.1605 0.1245 0.0419 -0.2320* 0.4394* 1       
18 #Founders 0.0243 0.1345 0.0286 -0.1307 0.2655* 0.2095* 1      
19 Spinoff 0.1541 0.003 0.2514* 0.0695 0.0852 0.1079 0.1149 1     
20 CapComp 0.0985 0.0293 0.0413 0.0912 0.0754 0.0714 0.0767 0.0145 1    
21 Acad 0.0345 0.0589 0.0971 -0.0981 0.2544* 0.5281* 0.3177* 0.1827* -0.0375 1   
22 OutsideConn 0.2159* 0.051 0.0274 -0.1107 0.2906* 0.4151* 0.1800* 0.2020* 0.1326 0.3712* 1  
23 Meanturb -0.1551 0.0528 0.0174 0.1965* -0.1285 -0.139 -0.03 -0.0603 0.0766 -0.1476 -0.1154 1 
*p<=.05 
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Table 5-3 Correlation table for variables describing the network structure 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Innovators-3 1         
2 Aggregation-3 -0.5482* 1        
3 LC-3 -0.4579* 0.9178* 1       
4 Innovators0 0.9518* -0.5870* -0.4813* 1      
5 Aggregation0 0.5725* 0.0463 0.1928* 0.4457* 1     
6 LC0 0.5993* -0.0202 0.1792* 0.4873* 0.9734* 1    
7 Innovators+5 0.8106* -0.5923* -0.4853* 0.9477* 0.2551* 0.3049* 1   
8 Aggregation+5 0.6004* -0.2265* -0.0093 0.7018* 0.5638* 0.6370* 0.6901* 1  
9 LC+5 0.6208* -0.2393* 0.0033 0.7103* 0.5554* 0.6568* 0.6873* 0.9805* 1 
*p<=.05 
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5.6.1 Estimation framework 
Since success is measured in terms of survival, we apply Cox’s proportional 
hazards model (1972) which gives a valid estimate of the survival rate for data 
sets including right-censored and left truncated cases. In survival analysis typi-
cally the relationship of the survival distribution to several covariates is exam-
ined. In our model, the firms’ hazard to die in the next period is dependent on 
covariates as the networks’ structure, the founder’s position in the network and 
the structure of his ego-network.  
Since a (scientific) social network is not a static but a dynamic construct which 
is developing gradually (Gay and Dusset 2005), we have to take time depend-
ent effects into account. The connectedness of the innovator network and also 
the founders’ position in the net are changing over the organizational life cycle 
and it is also path dependent (Hite and Hesterly 2001). This would mean that 
the structure of the network and the position of the founder in this network is 
dependent on the past structure and position respectively. To cover the early 
three stages in the organizational life cycle, we decided to measure our de-
pendent variables at three points in time: first three years before they found the 
firm (t=-3) is representing the nascent stage, exactly in the year of firm found-
ing (t=0) is representing the beginning of the emergent stage and five years 
afterwards (t=+5) is representing the beginning of the early growth stage. This 
allows us to control for gradual effects with respect to the development of the 
networks’ structure and to observe the coevolution of the network structure and 
the organizational life.  
 
5.6.2 Variables 
5.6.2.1 Measuring the structure of the regional innovator network 
In order to measure the structure of the RIN, we use several graph-theoretic 
concepts. Regarding size, the straightforward way to measure is to count the 
number of nodes, which is the total number of inventors in the travel-to-work 
area (Lobo and Strumsky 2008). The variable Innovatorst thus measures the 
total number of inventors based in a respective TTWA in the certain stage of 
the organizational life cycle. 
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We use two variables to capture the structural features of a regional innovator 
network. The first one is a concept we adopt from Lobo and Strumsky (2008) 
which is basically a Herfindahl index based on the distribution of component 
sizes. This variable Aggregationt measures the proportion of inventors in a RIN 
who are grouped into larger components
11
 and variable ranges between zero 
and one, whereupon a value close to one indicates that most inventors in the 
TTWA are grouped into few components. In order to measure the extent to 
which inventors in a TTWA are intensely linked to one another we use as sec-
ond variable the size of the largest component (LCt), which captures the share 
of inventors within the TTWA that had a collaborative relationship within the 
largest component. 
 
Having a look at the correlation table for variables describing the regional net-
work structure (Table 5-3), it is conspicuous that the three variables describing 
the structure of the network (Innovatorst, Aggregationt and LCt) are highly and 
significantly correlated. Hence, we decided to apply factor analysis and to con-
centrate those variables to one factor “Nett”. Table 5-4 shows the results of this 
analysis for the three points in time nascent stage, emergence stage and early 
growth stage. The higher the value of this variable the larger, more cohesive 
and more connected is the network of the respective ttwa. 
 
Table 5-4 Factor Analysis Network Structure 
Variable Nett Uniqueness 
Innovators-3 -0.7271 0.4713 
Aggregation-3 0.9573 0.0836 
LC-3 0.9278 0.1393 
Innovators0 0.6847 0.5312 
Aggregation0 0.9523 0.093 
LC0 0.9648 0.0691 
Innovators+5 0.8427 0.2898 
Aggregation+5 0.9675 0.0639 
LC+5 0.9666 0.0657 
 
                                                          
11
 For details see Lobo and Strumsky (2008), p.876. 
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In order to test hypotheses 5-1a-c and to find out more on the relationship be-
tween the structure of the regional innovator network and the success (survival 
probability) of the firm, we regress the variable Nett together with different 
firm-specific control variables on the hazard ratio of the firm (this is the basic 
principle of the Cox regression model). 
When we assess the relationship between the founders position in the net and 
the structure of the ego-net on the survival probability of the firm (Hypotheses 
5-2a-c and 5-3a-c), we use Nett as regional control variable. We have argued 
above that the characteristics and structure of innovator networks differs re-
gionally. The networks, we have constructed for the analysis performed here, 
have been created for 12 ttwas in Thuringia such that the variable Nett basically 
reflects the regional endowment with respect to the innovator network. 
 
The variable Nett measures the overall structure of the network the firm is con-
nected to, irrespectively of the number of founders and the question of how 
many founders are connected to the network. In the next two steps of analysis, 
we distinguish between the position of the founder in the whole network and 
the structure of the ego-network. This is of cause estimated for single nodes. 
There is a small number of cases, where more than one founder is connected to 
the network. In these cases, we assumed a multiplicative effect and summed up 
the values for the nodes. 
 
5.6.2.2 Measuring entrepreneur’s position in the network 
When analysing the founders’ position in the network, we basically want to 
know how central he is in the network as such. In order to assess this, we use 
two concepts. First, centrality is measured here by means of eigenvector-
centrality and reveals how well connected an actor is in the overall network 
(EVt)
12
. The eigenvector approach identifies the most central actors in terms of 
the "global" or "overall" structure of the network (Hanneman and Riddle 
                                                          
12
 We measured centrality by means of Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972). There exist 
different measures for centrality like betweeness centrality (Anthonisse 1971, Freeman 1977), 
closeness centrality (Beauchamp 1965) or hub centrality (Kleinberg 1999). We decided for the 
Eigenvector centrality since it is a feedback centrality which is showing whether the actor is 
connected to the top connected other actors in the net which might be especially useful for 
young and small companies who are in need of good contacts. 
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2005). Thus, by taking into account direct as well as indirect ties of single ac-
tors it assumes that a node is central to the extent that the node is connected to 
others who are central (Bonacich 1972).  Higher scores indicate that actors are 
"more central" to the main pattern of distances among all of the actors, lower 
values indicate that actors are more peripheral. For the case that more than one 
founder is connected to the network, we summed up their individual values for 
EVt. 
The second concept we use is the membership in the main component. The 
main component of the network is the maximal connected sub graph. This 
measure thus captures the degree of fragmentation in a RIN’s structure. If the 
network has more than one component, different information flows pass each 
component. Since the main component connects the largest number of nodes, 
being connected to this component may induce most knowledge flows (Powell 
et al. 1996). With respect to the RIN, this means that a networked-founder 
which is a member of the main component is more central to the network and 
thus his firm profits comparably more from network’s knowledge flows. MCt 
takes a value of one if (one of) the entrepreneur(s) of the firm is connected to 
the main component and is zero otherwise. 
 
5.6.2.3 Measuring the ego-network of the entrepreneur 
In order to assess the influence of the closeness of the networked-founder’s 
ego-network, we use the variable Constrt which is a structural hole measure 
introduced by Burt (1992). This is a summary measure that taps the extent to 
which ego's connections are to others who are connected to one another (Han-
neman and Riddle 2005). A high value of this variable indicates that the entre-
preneur occupies a position in the net which is less constrained and where he 
can broker more extensively. In other words, the higher this measure, the less 
structural holes the ego-network has and the more closed it is. For the case that 
more than one founder is connected to the network, we summed up their indi-
vidual values for Constrt. 
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5.6.2.4 Control Variables 
In order to compare and contrast the effects of network structure as well as 
founders’ position in the net and firms’ characteristics on survival we, addi-
tionally to the dependent variables introduced in the above chapter, used a set 
of control variables which may influence firms’ survival. 
 
#Patents. This variable counts the number of patents the founders of the firm 
applied for after the firm has been founded. Founders with more patents might 
be more connected to the network such that in order to make statements on the 
main variables of interest in this paper, we need to control for the quantity of 
patent applications. 
 
PatExperience. This is a variable counting the number of patents the founders 
of the respective firms have applied for before the firm has been founded. 
Cantner and Wolf (2016) found that experience in patenting is a main driver of 
patenting in the future such that this influences the founders future network 
which we want to analyze. 
 
#Founders. This variable indicates the number of persons that has founded the 
respective firm. It has been argued earlier in this text that more founders may 
bring a broader range of scientific capital to the firm and thus also influence 
firms’ success. 
 
Spinoff.  This dummy variable measures whether the firm is an academic spin-
off or not. Academic spin-offs are usually founded on the basis of innovative 
products and additionally have the ‘mothers’ support, which makes them more 
successful (Utterback 1974). 
 
CapComp. This variable indicates weather a firm has the legal form of a capital 
company (Capcomp=1) or of a private company (Capcomp=0). It has been 
found that private companies may have higher chances to be successful, thus to 
survive, since the founders adhere with their private capital (Harhoff et al. 
1998). 
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Acad. This variable counts the number of founders with an academic title. It 
has been found that academics usually have a larger network of scientific con-
tacts (Breschi and Catalani 2010) and may therefore add more to the scientific 
network of the firm. 
 
OutsideConn. Being connected to more than on RIN may enlarge the scientific 
network of the firm. Thus, with this variable, we measure whether the firm has 
connections to more than the RIN where it is located at. 
 
Meanturb. The firms in the sample are active in different industrial sectors and 
of cause the sector plays an important role to for the survivability of a firm. 
Since this paper is analyzing young firms, it is not only controlled for sectors 
but to also for the economic environment/stage of the sector they are active in. 
For this purpose, data from the IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung) has been used, which contains the number of firm founding 
and closing for each industry (Nace 2-digit level) for the years 1976 to 2010. 
Based on this data, the variable named Meanturb has been constructed, which 
is measuring the turbulence in the sector the firm is active in for a time span of 
six years, three years before the firm has been founded and three years after-
wards. The turbulence is measured as number of firm founding in a certain 
sector in the specific years minus the number of firm close downs in the same 
sector in the same years. From this value, the mean over the six years around 
the firm founding is estimated and used for analysis. 
 
5.7 Empirical results 
Hypothesis 5-1a states that there is no connection between the structure of the 
network and the chances for a firm to survive in the nascent stage of the organ-
izational life cycle, while hypothesis 5-1b and 5-1c suggest a decreasing im-
portance of the connectedness of the network and firm survival. In order to 
measure how dense the whole network is, we applied factor analysis and creat-
ed the variable Nett which is the combination of three variables describing the 
network as such (size of the network, aggregation level of the network and size 
of the largest component). The larger the variable Nett the more connected the 
network in the sense that there are more actors which are highly aggregated 
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and which’s largest component is relatively big. Table 5-5, model 1 provides 
the results for all three stages in the early organizational life cycle. We do not 
find a significant relationship between the survival of the firm and the network 
structure in the nascent stage and year of firm founding/beginning of the emer-
gent stage and thus have to accept hypothesis 5-1a and to reject hypothesis 5-
1b. However, we find a significant relationship between the hazard ratio and 
the network structure five years after firm founding (Net+5), when the early 
growth stage develops. The coefficient of Net+5 is larger than one, which 
means that the risk to die in the next period is increased when the connected-
ness of the network is increased. This supports hypothesis 5-1c. The squared 
term of Net+5 (Net+5SQ) however is smaller than one which indicates that from 
a certain network size on, the hazard starts to become smaller again. This in-
verted u-shape relationship between network size and the survival of the firm 
indicates that there are two favorable situations for the firms. Either they are 
connected to a network which is quite fragmented or to a network which is 
extremely connected. This finding might be due to the fact that Hite and Hes-
terly (2001) are right in their assumption that the cohesiveness of the network 
decreases while the bridging of structural holes increases over time. Since we 
could not observe the exact date of movement between the two stages in the 
organizational life cycle but only narrowed this date by assuming that this 
might happen after roughly five years (Phillips and Kirchhoff 1989) it might 
just be that after five years some firms are still in the emergence firms (cohe-
siveness is important) and others already went to the early growth stage (struc-
tural holes are important). 
 
Hypotheses 5-2a-c relate to the overall centrality of the position of the founder 
in the network. While hypothesis 5-2a suggests no relationship between the 
survival in the nascent stage and a central position of the founder, hypothesis 5-
2b and 5-2c suggest a positive influence of a central position on the chances to 
survive, but for different reasons. In order to measure this relationship, we use 
Eigenvector centrality, as well as the membership in the main component. 
Model 2 in Table 5-5 analyzes the variables EV-3, EV0 and EV+5 as representa-
tives of the actors Eigenvector centrality. We find that only the coefficient for 
EV-3 becomes significant, a result that interestingly stands against our hypothe-
sis 5-2a stating no connection between survival and centrality in the nascent 
 147 
 
 
 
stage. Rather a central position seems to hinder survival. Looking at the mem-
bership in the main component, we find a significant result for the early growth 
stage. However, in contrast to hypothesis 5-2c, we find a negative relation. If 
we reinterpret this result in the light of Hite and Herstely’s (2001) proposition 
that in the later stages, firms do not need a very dense network anymore, we 
might say that also the connection to the main component becomes unfavoura-
ble at a certain point in the life cycle. Therefore, the power argument of being 
in a position to control knowledge might not be that strong for our database. 
Finally, although we find significant relationships, we have to reject hypothe-
ses 5-2a-c. 
 
Hypothesis 5-3a states that closed ego networks of a networked-founder in the 
nascent stage have no influence on its survival. In model 4 of table 5-5, we use 
the variable Constr-3 to measure this relationship and find no significant rela-
tionship such that we cannot accept hypothesis 5-3a.  Hypothesis 5-3b and 5-
3c, taken together, state that from the emergent to the early growth stage in the 
organizational life cycle, the favourable network moves from a closed one to a 
quite fragmented one. In table 5-5 we find no significant effects.  
 
Over all models in table 5-5, the variable measuring the connectivity of the 
whole network shows up to be significant at the beginning of the early growth 
stage. But this relation takes an inverted u-relationship. 
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Table 5-5 Influence of the network structure and the ego-network on the haz-
ard ratio 
 Cox regression – Breslow Method for ties 
Dep. Var. survival 
 model 1 
H1a-c 
 model 2 
H2 a-c 
 model 3  
H2 a-c 
 model 4  
H3 a-c 
 
EV-3   1.034 *     
   (1.721)      
EV0   0.000      
   (-0.000)      
EV+5   1.010      
   (0.168)      
MC-3     6.010    
     (0.000)    
MC0     0.000    
     (-0.000)    
MC+5     4.567 ***   
     (2.811)    
Constr-3       0.791  
       (-0.428)  
Constr0       1.332  
       (0.573)  
Constr+5       2.124  
       (1.376)  
Net-3 1.214  1.192  0.938  1.172  
 (0.640)  (0.579)  (-0.211)  (0.523)  
Net-3SQ 0.928  0.947  0.990  0.921  
 (-0.521)  (-0.379)  (-0.068)  (-0.550)  
Net0 0.715  0.701  0.731  0.810  
 (-0.577)  (-0.599)  (-0.551)  (-0.348)  
Net0 SQ 1.134  1.142  1.158  1.091  
 (0.523)  (0.542)  (0.607)  (0.350)  
Netplus+5 2.355 ** 2.512 ** 1.539  2.426 ** 
 (1.982)  (2.086)  (0.974)  (2.011)  
Netplus+5 SQ 0.509 * 0.484 * 0.575  0.444 ** 
 (-1.842)  (-1.940)  (-1.535)  (-2.140)  
Robust z-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 149 
 
 
 
Table 5-5 continued 
Method Cox regression – Breslow Method for ties 
Dep. Var. survival 
 model 1 
H1a-c 
 model 2 
H2 a-c 
 model 3 
H2 a-c 
 model 4 
H3 a-c 
 
Patthvor2 0.918  0.915  0.879  0.918  
 (-0.794)  (-0.819)  (-1.165)  (-0.714)  
Patth2 0.950  0.950  0.968  0.963  
 (-0.941)  (-0.934)  (-0.561)  (-0.660)  
Grnder 1.442 ** 1.473 ** 1.408 * 1.532 ** 
 (1.985)  (2.100)  (1.917)  (2.223)  
Spinoff 0.170 ** 0.172 ** 0.169 ** 0.122 ** 
 (-2.291)  (-2.283)  (-2.234)  (-2.565)  
Capcomp 0.435  0.421  0.386  0.339  
 (-1.234)  (-1.281)  (-1.390)  (-1.538)  
Acad 1.501  1.464  1.612  1.391  
 (1.249)  (1.168)  (1.375)  (0.994)  
Outsideconnection 0.558  0.569  0.360* * 0.605  
 (-1.158)  (-1.098)  (-1.825)  (-0.995)  
Meanturb 1.022  1.016  1.025  1.012  
 (0.916)  (0.644)  (1.031)  (0.455)  
Observations 149  149  149  149  
No. Of Failures  38  38  38  38  
Prob>Chi2  0.0185  0.0318  0.0042  0.0230  
Robust z-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
Over all analyses, we find that there is no influence of the networks’ structure 
in the nascent stage of the organizational life cycle. This supports the findings 
by Cantner and Stuetzer (2013) who show that factors like start-up capital, the 
functional background and entrepreneurial experience of the founders seem to 
overweight the importance of social (scientific) capital for the success of the 
new venture. However, for Eigenvector centrality, we find a small negative 
effect indicating that a central position in the innovator network is not too fa-
vourable in the nascent stage of the firm’ life. A reason might be the high in-
flow and redundancy of information, reaching a node in a central position. A 
person which has to concentrate on getting start-up capital and writing a busi-
ness plan might easily be overstrained by this. For sure, this point leaves open 
space for further research. 
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Having a look at the structure of the ‘home’ network of the firm, we find an 
inverted u-shaped relationship between the survival of firms and the connectiv-
ity of the network. Thus, very loose networks and very dense networks seem to 
be favorable for the survival of firms but nothing in between. Additionally, we 
find that it becomes unfavorable to be connected to the main component when 
the firm enters the early growth stage. In the theoretical part of this paper, we 
argued that Burt (1992) and Coleman (1988) have two opposite views on the 
interdependency between the structure of the ego-network and the related bene-
fits for the actor (Gilsing et al. 2008, Gilsing and Nooteboom 2005). While 
Burt says that a loose network is favorable since it brings possibilities to broker 
and control knowledge flows, Coleman says that dense networks are favorable 
since they allow for more knowledge spillovers. Hite and Hesterly (2001) 
translate these considerations to the organizational life cycle and argue that 
firms need a “Coleman-network” in the emergent stage but a “Burt-network” 
when they enter the early growth stage. The inverted u-shape we find might be 
due to the individuality of each firm’s history. Some firms might change to the 
early growth stage already after two years, while others need six. What the 
results show is that Burt and Coleman both have their eligibility. Additionally, 
Hite and Hesterly seem to be on the right track with their idea of changing re-
quirements on the network over the organizational life cycle. In a future re-
search, it would be recommendable to have survey data and identify the mo-
ment when a firm leaves one stage and enters the other individually. 
 
With respect to the influence of the founder’s position in the network on firms’ 
success, we looked at his centrality and on his membership to the main compo-
nent. We find that being a member of the network’s main component has a 
negative influence on the survivability of firms in the early growth stage. Thus, 
we disproved our theoretical argumentation, stating that the main component 
inherits most knowledge spillovers and thus increases the number of opportuni-
ties for innovation. However, also here, the arguments raised above may hold. 
In the largest component, the actors may all work in the same technology such 
that there is less variety of technologies which may be unfavorable for new 
combinations and thus firms’ performance, especially in the later stage of the 
early firm development. 
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With respect to control variables we find that firms have better chances to sur-
vive if they are a spin-off and if they have connections also to other networks 
than only to the one in the region where they have their headquarters. This pos-
itive effect of a mother institution for highly innovative firms has already been 
described and empirically analyzed by Cantner and Goethner (2011). However, 
the influence of various connections to different networks seems to be an inter-
esting issue. Is it important to which ones of the regional networks the firms 
are connected to? Is it possible for firms to be overconnected? Is there an opti-
mal rate of outside connection? These and other questions are still open for 
future research. 
Having a look at the mere number of founders, we find a negative effect on 
survival. Thus too many founders reduce a firm’s chances to survive. In the 
theoretical part of this paper, we argued that the number of founders may have 
a positive influence since they may all add to the scientific network of the firm. 
However, Cantner, Goethner and Stuetzer (2010) found that the composition of 
the team plays an important role for the success of a firm. Their findings may 
explain our results since they showed that it is not quantity but quality of the 
founding team that counts and our results also go into this direction. 
Additionally, Lobo and Strumsky (2008) argued that the variable network ag-
gregation also indicates whether actors in the region have worked in the same 
technology. Interpreting our results from that angle our results point to the in-
terpretation that variety of technologies in a network is favorable for firms’ 
success.  Since this interpretation is very vague it leaves space for future re-
search. 
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6. Innovative start-up patenting: a new approach towards identifica-
tion and determinants 
6.1 Introduction 
Patents have been and are still frequently used in innovation studies (Brouwer 
and Kleinknecht 1999). Network studies also comprehensively use and have 
used patents as an indicator for cooperative R&D activities (for example Bre-
schi and Lissoni (2006) analysed inventor networks, Cantner and Graf (2006) 
analysed applicant networks). Scherer (1983) was the first to attempt to sys-
tematically investigate firms’ propensity to patent. In his argumentation, one 
reason why patenting is important to firms is that they contribute to monopoly 
power and first mover advantages. In this way, patents are drivers of the 
Schumpeterian (1912) idea of creative destruction and innovative competition 
as drivers for economic development. 
This paper is devoted to this old research question, to which no satisfactory 
answer has yet been found, and it also asks about young and innovative firms: 
What are the determinants of innovative start-ups’ propensity to patent? 
The interesting fact, which is to be analysed in this paper, is that not every firm 
has the same propensity to patent. This means that, given a certain amount of 
innovation intensity, different firms may differ with respect to patenting inten-
sity (Griliches 1990, Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999). The causes for differ-
ences in patenting intensity are manifold. Scherer (1983) analysed the relation-
ship between 1974 R&D expenditures and invention patenting by 4,274 lines 
of business in 433 US industrial corporations and found that the propensity to 
patent strongly varies across sectors but also modestly across firm characteris-
tics such as overseas sales, federal R&D support, diversification, scope of in-
vention use and invention type. 
A year later, Bound et al. (1984) asked the questions: who does R&D and who 
patents? In order to find an answer, they investigated information on sales, em-
ployment, book value, pre-tax income, market value, R&D expenditures and 
patents applied for in 1976 for 2,595 firms in the manufacturing sector. Of 
these firms, 1,492 reported that they conducted R&D in 1976. With respect to 
the first question, they found that the industry determines who conducts R&D. 
Turning to the second question, they found that some of the firms which do 
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R&D also patent, and that there is a strong positive relationship between the 
two activities. Additionally, those small firms that do R&D tend to patent more 
per R&D dollar than larger firms. 
However, Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) criticised these early attempts by 
Scherer (1983) or Bound et al. (1984) by saying that such comparisons have 
the weakness that they cannot distinguish between a less efficient use of R&D 
inputs and (real) differences in the propensity to patent. In their paper, they 
solve this problem by measuring the results of the innovation process such that 
they analyse whether firms with a given innovation output, measured as the 
propensity to file at least one patent, differ with respect to their patenting inten-
sity.  
Moreover, Kleinknecht (1987) compares the results of the official Dutch R&D 
survey with findings of his own innovation survey in the Dutch manufacturing 
industry and concludes that there is an undercounting of small business R&D 
which is often informal and on a smaller scale compared with large firms (see 
also Pavitt and Patel (1988) making the same observation). Additionally, Blind 
et al. (2006) find that larger firms are more often inclined towards patenting 
activity for strategic reasons. This undercounting implies that the propensity to 
patent will be systematically biased by firm size if it is analysed in the way 
Scherer and Bound et al. did (Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999). Moreover, (at 
least applicant-) networks that are created on the basis of patent data are biased 
towards larger firms (ter Wal and Boschma 2009). 
Besides the undercounting of small firm R&D, these findings additionally sug-
gest that different laws may govern the groups of small firms and larger firms 
(Bound et al. (1984) already implicitly mention this point). Hall et al. (2012) 
even argue that start-ups constitute their own group among the group of small 
firms. Although there is now a broad literature investigating small and innova-
tive firms in many respects (for example Acs and Audretsch 1990), there have 
been fewer attempts to analyse the factors related to the propensity to patent of 
these firms, not to mention for the group of innovative start-ups. 
This paper is trying to fill this gap in analysing the propensity to patent of 
young and innovative firms in the eastern German federal state Thuringia. A 
data set is used which comprises information on R&D, capital stock, state pro-
motion etc for 534 firms in their first three business years. Besides having the 
benefit that firm-level data (derived from a questionnaire) is combined with 
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patent data (from the German Patent Office), the analysis has two advantages. 
First, it takes care of the problem that simply relating R&D to patent data leads 
to a mixing of a more or less efficient use of R&D and the propensity to patent 
(Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999). Second, former studies basically matched 
patent data and survey data by searching for company names on the applicant 
side of the patent dataset. However, founders of young firms may show a ten-
dency to apply for patents in their own names in order to avoid the risk of los-
ing the property right after the firm has failed. Thus, the approach which has 
been used in former studies may lead to an undercounting of small and young 
firm patenting, simply because the wrong identification approach has been ap-
plied. A descriptive view on the data at hand reveals that only roughly 5.5% of 
the small and young firms apply for patents in the name of the company, the 
rest applies on the name of the founder(s). According to this, one may argue 
that not taking founders as applicants into account leads to an underestimation 
of small and young firm patenting as in the study of Hall et al. (2013). This 
paper is trying to avoid such undercounting by using a new approach towards 
the identification of firms’ patents. Instead of only searching the patent data 
base for the names of the firms, also the names of the founders have been 
searched such that the tendency in young and innovative firms to apply for 
patents in the founders name has been taken into account. 
 
6.2 Determinants of start-ups’ propensity to patent 
There is already a great deal of literature dealing with the decision to patent or, 
in other words, with the propensity to patent of firms. Hall et al. (2012) give a 
broad literature overview on the choice between formal and informal securing 
of intellectual property rights. They describe the decision to patent or not as a 
trade-off between the benefits from using informal intellectual property rights 
and the costs that arise from it compared to relying on informal methods such 
as secrecy. As regards costs, financial expenditure and the possibility of en-
forcing the property right have to be taken into account. The benefits of safe-
guarding property rights arise basically from the ability to exclude competitors 
from the use of a new technology and from the potential to receive royalty fees 
if the patent is licensed (Arundel 2001, Harter 1994). Additionally however, 
patenting has advantages such as signalling the quality of an invention, improv-
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ing public image, increasing bargaining power and the possibility of signalling 
expertise to potential research collaborators (see Hall et al. 2012). 
However, one main finding of the well-known Yale and Carnegie-Mellon sur-
veys is that patenting strategies vary greatly across firms of different size. Alt-
hough large firms generally use the patent system at a lower cost per patent 
than smaller firms, Hall et al. (2012) argue that those firms specialising in 
knowledge production and the proof of innovative concepts may be small and 
that patenting becomes important for them since their assets are based on 
knowledge. However, even among small firms, start-ups may be a group of 
their own and have strategies that are different from those of established small 
firms (Hall et al. 2012). 
Regarding the patenting behaviour of young and innovative enterprises, two 
time dimensions have to be taken into account. First, there is the pre-founding 
phase, where the founders may work on their business idea and already apply 
for a patent that is then commercialised by means of creating the business 
(Walter et al. 2010). Since the founder’s behaviour may be path-dependent, 
patenting activities in advance of founding the business may influence patent-
ing over the whole lifespan of the firm. Additionally, it may be the case that a 
firm based on an invention which is so important that it has been patented may 
be innovative enough to go on patenting during its business years. 
Second, after the firm has started, its characteristics influence whether it ap-
plies for patents or not. Analysing the 2008 Berkley Patent Survey, Graham et 
al. (2010) as well as Graham and Sichelman (2010) find that there are im-
portant differences in the patenting behaviour regarding the industries the firms 
are working in. Also they find that strategic motives play a large role in start-
ups’ decision to patent. Start-ups seem to value the reputation effect that comes 
with very high rates of patent ownership. However, Graham et al. (2010) also 
find that financial constraints are most frequently the highest barrier to patent-
ing for young firms. Analysing 370 US start-ups in the semiconductor industry, 
Hsu and Ziedonis (2008) find that patents can act as a signal for start-ups’ in-
novativeness such that patenting firms may progress through the venture capi-
tal rounds of financing institutions more successfully. Additionally, Cantner 
and Kösters (2009) find state promotion to have a positive influence on start-
ups’ propensity to patent. Of course, such variables as the R&D intensity, co-
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operation, competition and the characteristics of the innovation (which also 
important for non-start-ups) may also play a role (Hall et al. 2012). 
 
6.2.1 Pre-founding phase 
Before starting-up the firm, the potential founder, known as a nascent entrepre-
neur, is actively engaged in creating a new venture of his own (Wagner 2004). 
Among other activities, nascent entrepreneurs think seriously about their busi-
ness, look for facilities/equipment, initiate savings to invest, invest money in 
the firm, organise the start-up team, write a business plan, buy facili-
ties/equipment, search for financial support and licence/patent (see Wagner 
2004; Reynolds 1997; Reynolds and White 1997). Walter et al. (2010) ana-
lysed the patenting behaviour of scientists before and after creating a spin-off 
and find that scientists increasingly commercialise their inventions through 
firm formation. However, potential founders who are not working as scientists 
may also conduct research and apply for a patent before and after creating a 
start-up. Walter et al. (2010) argue that the nascent entrepreneur (and this also 
holds for the entrepreneur in the business years of the firm) faces a trade-off 
between the patenting or otherwise protection of his business idea. On the one 
hand, patenting safeguards the knowledge base of the new venture against early 
imitation but on the other hand it facilitates early imitation by disclosing exact-
ly this knowledge base (Arundel 2001, Harter 1994). Walter et al. (2010) find 
for academic founders that academics are more likely to patent if the search for 
marketable applications of the invention is highly uncertain, the technological 
field is rapidly changing, the field of research is one with high patent protection 
and the spin-off has high entrepreneurial orientation in the sense that the 
founders of the firm are innovative, pro-active and take risks. Thus, there are 
some factors influencing the nascent entrepreneurs’ propensity to patent. But to 
what extent does this early patenting and R&D activity influence innovative 
success and thus patenting after the business has been launched? Firms that are 
built upon an innovation (be it patented or not) may have a higher propensity to 
innovate successfully in the future and thus patent more during their business 
life. This goes back to Dosi et al.’s (1997) stylised facts of industrial dynamics 
that hold that there is significant heterogeneity in firm characteristics, behav-
iour and performance and that such diversity appears to be persistent. This 
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means that prolific innovators at time t have a higher probability of remaining 
prolific innovators in period t+1. Although Giovanni Dosi did not relate his 
work on stylised facts to entrepreneurial activities, they may hold also for this 
field of research. Crépon and Duguet (1997) indeed find that past success in the 
production of innovation increases R&D efficiency. However, this effect seems 
to be non-linear in the sense that a small but positive number of innovations in 
the past positively affects the production of innovations in the present but this 
effect vanishes if the number of innovations increases. 
Taking into account the arguments made above, one may formulate hypothesis 
6-1 in the following way: 
 
Hypothesis 6-1:  
Patenting behaviour is path-dependent in the sense that patenting in the prepa-
ration process for founding the firm increases the patenting intensity after the 
firm has been founded. 
 
6.2.2 Business years 
In its business years, a start-up may be characterised by certain factors that 
influence the propensity to patent. 
 
a. State promotion 
Cantner and Kösters (2009) find that R&D-subsidised start-ups show a 2.8 
times higher patent output and argue that these estimates provide evidence for 
the additionality of R&D subsidies within the first three business years. They 
reason as follows: state promotion may have an influence on patenting propen-
sity for two reasons. Innovative firms receiving such programmes may have 
more financial scope, which may make it easier to apply for a patent and those 
firms may be more innovative since they have to apply for this support in a 
process where referees evaluate the innovativeness of their business idea. Fol-
lowing these arguments, an overall positive influence of state promotion on the 
propensity to patent may be expected. Hypothesis 6-2 thus states: 
 
Hypothesis 6-2:  
Start-ups receiving state promotion show a higher patenting intensity. 
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b. Venture Capital 
Applying for a patent and managing the patent portfolio is expensive. For small 
high-tech firms, Cordes et al. (1999) find that the costs of applying for and en-
forcing a patent were the leading reason why firms do not generally use pa-
tents. For start-ups, Graham et al. (2010) as well as Graham and Sichelman 
(2010) found that financial constraints are the most significant barrier to pa-
tenting.  
Firms starting with more money may find it easier to patent their business idea 
whereas ‘poorer’ founders may abandon this device of securing their idea and 
use the remaining money for other purposes. Additionally venture capital is 
usually given to young and innovative firms with high growth potential. Thus, 
if a firm receives venture capital, it does not just have more money to work 
with. Receiving venture capital also signals that this firm is seen (at least by the 
investors) as highly innovative with excellent future prospects. 
According to these arguments, Hypothesis 6-3 will be: 
 
Hypothesis 6-3:  
Start-ups with a venture capital budget are more innovative, can more easily 
apply for patents and will therefore patent more. 
 
c. Cooperation 
With respect to cooperative R&D activities, Brouwer and Kleinknecht (1999) 
argue that patenting serves as a vehicle for the formalisation of technology ex-
change agreements. They expect firms engaged in R&D collaboration projects 
to have an above-average propensity to patent since patenting may make it eas-
ier to treat a firm’s knowledge as a tradable asset when it comes to negotiations 
over the conditions of technological partnerships. Additionally, Cowan et al. 
(2006) showed that cooperation has a positive effect on innovativeness and 
thus on patenting. 
Based on these arguments, Hypothesis 6-4 may be formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 6-4:  
Firms that cooperate patent more since they are more innovative. 
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d. Scientific orientation 
In general, patenting is associated with the R&D activity within firms (Hall et 
al. 2012). If a firm’s R&D is basically devoted to the newest scientific insights, 
the results of these activities may be new enough to be patentable. Thus, for 
firms conducting science-oriented R&D, the propensity to patent and their pa-
tenting intensity may be higher. As a consequence one may formulate Hypoth-
esis 6-5 as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 6-5:  
Firms conducting science-oriented R&D are more active in patenting with re-
gard to the number of patents applied for. 
 
6.3 Database and variables 
Most of the recent empirical analyses on the impact of firm and industry char-
acteristics on the propensity to patent use data from the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS), which has the advantage that it contains information on product 
and process innovation and on different channels for appropriability methods.  
Additionally, it provides cross-country insights that have already shown that 
some empirical regularities exist with respect to firms’ propensity to patent. 
However, the database may underrepresent young and innovative start-ups 
since firms have to have at least 10 employees to be considered for the ques-
tionnaire. The questionnaire used as the basis for the data analyzed in this re-
search paper has been specifically addressed to young and innovative firms, 
asking questions about the time period between three years before and after the 
firm was founded. Looking at the number of employees the firms had in the 
third business year, it becomes obvious that 72.68% have fewer than 10 and 
would not have been considered for the CIS.  
Additionally, it is a new and doubtless useful trend to combine the CIS data 
with patent databases (e.g. Hall et al. 2012, Heger and Zaby 2012). This is usu-
ally done by matching the names of firms in the CIS with the names of appli-
cants. However, using these combinations of databases, it is often found that 
small firms are less likely to patent than bigger firms. This paper will not argue 
against this finding but proposes a new approach for identifying firms’ patents 
which may fit better for small firms and especially for young and innovative 
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ones. Usually, when a firm is bankrupt, intellectual property rights are part of 
the remaining assets of the insolvent corporation. For newly-founded firms, the 
hazard of failing may be high enough for it to make sense to apply for a patent 
in the founder’s name rather than in the firm’s name since the founder can 
maintain ownership of the intellectual property even after the firm has col-
lapsed. Therefore, when identifying firms’ patents, patents applied for by the 
founders also have to be taken into account. A short descriptive analysis of the 
data at hand supports this idea. Among 534 firms in the database, 64 (11.89%) 
had patents in the first five business years. However, only 5.46% of the patents 
the 64 patenting firms applied for have been filed under the name of the firm. 
The rest were applied for under the name of the founder(s). 
 
6.3.1 Database 
The data used in the analysis was provided by the Thuringian Founder Study 
(Thüringer Gründer Studie), an interdisciplinary research project on the success 
and failure of innovative start-ups in the eastern German federal state of Thu-
ringia. This dataset draws from the German trade register (Handelsregister, 
Abteilung A/B) for commercial and private companies established in Thuringia 
between the years 1994 and 2006. It is further restricted to start-ups in innova-
tive industries, comprising ‘advanced technology’ and ‘technology-oriented 
services’ according to ZEW classification (Grupp et al., 2000). Furthermore, in 
addition to economic information, it contains information on the socio-
demographic profile and psychological characteristics of the founders. 
The survey population consists of 4,215 founders who registered 2,971 new 
entries in the Handelsregister. From the survey population, a random sub-
sample of 3,671 founders was drawn and contacted. Due to team-started ven-
tures, this corresponds to 2,604 start-ups in innovative industries. From January 
to October 2008, 639 structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
either the solo entrepreneur or with the lead entrepreneur of team start-ups. 
This resulted in a response rate of about 25%. There is no response bias with 
regard to industry structure and gender of founders.  
The structured interviews were carried out by the members of the research pro-
ject who were also supported by trained student research assistants. On aver-
age, an interview took approximately one-and-a-half hours. Retrospective data 
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were collected relating to events in the founder’s life and history of the busi-
ness, covering the venture creation process and the first three business years of 
the start-up. To overcome entrepreneurs’ hindsight bias and memory decay 
(Davidsson 2006), the survey used memory aid techniques drawn from the Life 
History Calendar method (Caspi et al. 1996). The focus on firms in a single 
region (the German federal state of Thuringia) further allows holding constant 
key labour market and environmental conditions. Another important advantage 
of the study design is the possibility of interviewing founders of companies that 
had failed at the time of data collection. Hence, the sample is not biased toward 
surviving or successful firms. 
Due to the fact that some of these start-ups were not genuinely new but subsid-
iaries or diversifications of existing companies and due to incomplete data 
some observations had to be excluded from the analysis. This reduced the 
number of valid interviews to 534. 
Patent information was drawn from the German Patent Office. For the 534 
firms where a face-to-face interview with either the solo entrepreneur or with 
the lead entrepreneur of team start-ups was conducted, the patent data base was 
searched for inventors with the same name as each of the founders. If a match 
was found, the members of the research project contacted the founders person-
ally to ask whether they really applied for these patents. Furthermore, patents 
were searched for that were applied for directly by the start-ups in the sample. 
This procedure captures potential patents for innovations developed by em-
ployees working for the start-ups. The sum of patent applications was calculat-
ed for the three years before the first business year as well as for the first three 
business years. Double counts resulting from co-patenting of the founders were 
eliminated. Out of 534 firms where information on patent activity could be 
found, 64 (11.98%) applied for patents during the first three business years. 
The number of patents ranges between one and 16 patents per firm within the 
first three business years. As an example to stress the worthiness of the new 
approach by considering the following: The 64 firms who applied for patents 
applied for 663 patents in sum. Among these 633 patents, only 38, this makes 
5.46% have been applied for in the name of the company, the rest goes to the 
name(s) of the founder(s). This means that by using the other approach – which 
is identifying the patents only by searching the company name in the patent 
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data base – only 5.46% of the patents that are related to the firms would have 
been identified. 
Summary statistics for the variables used can be found in table 6-1. 
 
6.3.2 Dependent variable and method 
The outcome variable of interest for the analysis conducted in this paper is 
No.Patents, which represents the number of patents applied for by a firm dur-
ing its first three business years. Although the number of patents applied for 
has been researched for all of the firms, it does not mean that each firm has 
also conducted R&D and tried to find a patentable invention. Thus the two rea-
sons for reporting a zero count with regards to the number of patents applied 
for may be that the firm was unsuccessful in its innovation strategy or that the 
firm has simply not tried to be innovative. If the firm didn’t try to innovate, the 
outcome would always be zero. However if the firm tried to innovate, the out-
come could be zero or positive. Thus, two processes are going on that can pro-
duce zeros: unlucky R&D or no R&D at all (Falk 2014).  
Looking at the database with regard to R&D activities in the first three busi-
ness years, one can see that 324 firms are active and 19.75% (64) of them also 
applied for patents. This means that among the observations with a zero count 
in the number of patents, 210 have it because they did not conduct R&D at all 
and 260 count the zero because of unlucky R&D. Of course one has to be 
aware that unlucky R&D can also mean that the firm did not have enough 
money to apply for a patent, didn’t count property rights as the right way to 
protect its knowledge or is waiting to apply for a patent for strategic reasons. 
The most commonly used regression model for count data, which is the Pois-
son regression model, cannot be applied for the data at hand for two reasons. 
Apart from the fact that the variable No.Patents contains excessive zeros, it is 
also not surprisingly the case that 59.57% applied for one or two patents, the 
rest applied for between three and 16 patents. Thus the observations are 
skewed to the left. Additionally, the variance of the outcome variable (1.48) is 
quite large as compared to the mean (0.35), which might be an additional indi-
cation of over-dispersion (Cameron and Trivedi 2013). 
This leads to the conclusion that the Poisson regression model doesn’t fit the 
data and it appears that the variance of No.Patents is increasing faster than the 
 163 
 
 
 
Poisson model allows. In order to correct for overdispersion in the variable, 
negative binomial models have to be used for the analysis (Hausman et al., 
1984). Since, as described above, the excess zeros are generated by a process 
separate from that generating the count values, zero inflated negative binomial 
regression models are used. The zero inflated negative binomial model is a 
combination of two distributions, where the zeros stemming from not conduct-
ing R&D are assigned to the probability p and the rest (1-p) to a negative bi-
nomial distribution (Mwalili et al. 2007). From a formal point of view, the zero 
inflated negative binomial distribution is given by (see Mwalili et al. 2007): 
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where the Y ’s represent the patent counts for a single firm; 

1
 can be inter-
preted as an overdispersion parameter such that when it becomes close to zero, 
the zero inflated poisson model should be used; p  represents the probability of 
excess zeros. The probability of excess zeros in the patent count is then esti-
mated as a logistic regression with  iZ)log( . 
The resulting coefficients can be interpreted as the expected change in the log 
of the number of patents applied for if the explanatory variable is increased by 
one unit (holding the other variables constant). 
 
6.3.3 Inflation 
As already described above, the excess zeros in the count outcome variable 
No.Patents can result from unsuccessful R&D or no R&D at all. Since R&D 
activities usually take some time until a patentable innovation can be obtained, 
the inflation has to be analysed using the variable R&DpreFounding which is a 
binary variable indicating whether there have already been R&D activities in 
the three years before the firm has been founded. This variable has been de-
rived from the question: With respect to your product or service: did you con-
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duct R&D in the three years before you started your business? Having a de-
scriptive look at the data at hand, one finds that 42.1% of all firms (532) had 
already conducted R&D in the three years before the firm was founded. Of 
these, 21% (47) applied for patents in the first three years after the firm was 
founded. 
 
6.3.4 Negative Binomial Regression 
a. Pre-founding patenting 
Hypothesis 6-1 states that the patenting behaviour of a firm during its business 
years is dependent on past behaviour. The variable PatentsBefore measures 
whether one of the founders applied for a patent in the three years before 
founding the firm. Looking at the data, one sees that about half of the firms that 
applied for patents in the three years before the firm has been founded also 
applied for patents in the three years afterwards. 
 
b. R&D promotion 
The variable R&DPromotion was derived from the question: Did your firm 
draw on promotion for research and development in the first three business 
years? This variable is one if the firm received state support and zero if not. In 
order to make it easier to remember this detail for the founder being inter-
viewed, a list of German and Thuringian R&D promotion programmes was 
provided. As argued above, promotion for R&D may positively influence the 
patent output in terms of the number of patents a firm applies for. 
Descriptive statistics reveal that among 353 firms where there is an observa-
tion, only 35.7% (126) received R&D support. 27.0% (34) of them applied for 
a patent in the first three business years. 
 
c. Venture capital 
The binary variable VC measures whether the firm received venture capital at 
the beginning of the first business year and is derived from the question: Was 
there private venture capital available to your firm at the beginning of the first 
business year? This variable is one if the answer is yes and zero otherwise. 
Venture capital, also called risk capital, is a temporary financial interest in 
young, innovative and non-market listed companies that are characterised by 
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an above average growth potential. Thus, a firm receiving venture capital is 
evaluated by external persons to be more innovative than other firms and by 
receiving the money, this firm may find it easier to patent. 
In the database at hand, receiving venture capital is quite a rare event. Only 21 
of 364 firms (there have been many omissions in the database) received ven-
ture capital, which is a share of 5.7%. Four of them (19.0%) applied for a pa-
tent within the first three business years. 
 
c. Cooperation 
The variable cooperation is a binary variable and indicates whether the firm 
had cooperation projects in R&D or not. It is derived from the question: Within 
the first three business years, did you cooperate in R&D? The variable is one if 
the answer is yes and zero otherwise. As described above, cooperating firms 
are more innovative as compared to isolated (non-cooperative) firms and it is 
more probable that they need to secure their knowledge as tradable asset, so 
they apply more often for patents. 144 of 317 (45.4%) firms for which there is 
an observation on cooperative behaviour reported having cooperated in R&D 
in the first three business years. 
 
d. Scientific orientation 
The variable MeaningRes measures the meaning of scientific insights for the 
development of the firm’s product or service. It is derived from the question: 
Which meaning had scientific insights and specific competencies of research 
institutes for the development of your product/service before the first business 
year? MeaningRes ranges from one to five with one meaning ‘completely un-
important’ and five meaning ‘very important’. The more important scientific 
findings are to the development of the business idea, the more innovative it is 
expected to be. 
 
6.3.5 Controls 
a. Product vs. Process firm 
Product controls whether the firm is more devoted to offering products rather 
than services. This variable is derived from the question: From which kind of 
output did you make the biggest share of your revenue? This variable becomes 
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one if the firm made the most of its revenue from a product and zero if it made 
it from a service or from a product and service equally. Product innovations are 
easier to patent than service innovations. Therefore firms offering products 
may have a higher propensity to patent and the number of patents applied for 
may be higher (Hall et al. 2012). 
 
b. Scientific education of the founder(s) 
Persons having a PhD already have experience in R&D and may also intrinsi-
cally be devoted to innovations and patenting such that those persons in the 
founding team may carry out more patenting activity than those with a univer-
sity degree as their highest degree. The variable measuring the share of found-
ers with a PhD in the founding team is Sh.Founders.PhD. It can be expected 
that a higher proportion of founders with PhDs signals a higher technological 
level in the firm. This may be combined with a higher degree of innovativeness 
and thus patenting activity. 
 
c. Team size 
The more founders in the team, the more likely it is that one of them will have 
an idea that is patentable. Thus, the number of founders (No.Founders) is used 
as control variable in the respective estimations. 
 
d. Spin-off 
It has been found for this database that spin-offs have a higher propensity to 
patent (Cantner and Göthner 2011). Thus, the variable Spin-off is a binary vari-
able, measuring whether the firm is a spin-off of a firm, university or research 
institute or not. 
 
e. Patent intensive sector 
As described in section 6.3.1 of this paper, the sample has already been select-
ed into the direction of innovative industries such as ‘advanced technology’ 
and ‘technology-oriented services’ according to the ZEW classification (Grupp 
et al., 2000). However, in the questionnaire the interviewed founders could 
assign their firm to one of the seven sector categories. Since biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals have been found in earlier studies to be quite 
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patent intensive (e.g. Bound et al. 1984), the dummy variable BioChem has 
been created to control for these patent intensive sectors. 
 
f. Jena 
The city of Jena can be said to be the innovative centre of the small German 
federal state Thuringia and it has the only University in Thuringia with so 
called ‘Promotionsrecht’, which is the admission to grant doctoral degrees. 
Thus, it may be the case that this region drives the result found in the estima-
tions even more than the patenting itself. The dummy variable Jena is therefore 
used in order to control for this. 
 
Table 6-2 depicts the correlations between all variables used in the analysis. 
 
6.4 Results 
This section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Before 
doing this, however, some remarks concerning the control variables have to be 
made. First, the variable Product which is measuring whether the firm is offer-
ing products rather than services becomes significant over all estimations 
where it is included. Here a positive correlation with the number of patents 
applied for in the first three business years can be found. Thus, the former find-
ings by Hall et al. (2012) can be supported; products are easier to patent than 
services. 
The second control variable No.founders representing the size of the founding 
team is in one of the estimations significant and positive. Thus, the results hint 
in the expected direction: the more founders a firm has, the higher the probabil-
ity is that they come to patentable ideas. 
The dummy variable Jena has been included since a bias towards this region 
could have been expected. However, the estimations show that Jena has a sig-
nificant but negative relationship with the number of patents applied for in the 
first three business years. This result is quite unexpected. It would mean, com-
pared to all other regions in Thuringia, firms in Jena on average patent less. 
Since the number of patents a firm applies for is extremely skewed to the left 
and only 4% of the firms apply for more than five patents, the probability that 
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these firms come from Jena is quite small, which may explain the unexpected 
finding. 
 
The educational background of the founders (Sh.Founders.PhD), spin-offs 
(Spinoff) and the dummy for the most patent intensive sectors in the sample, 
namely biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and chemicals (BioChem), do not show 
any significant relation to the number of patents applied for in the first three 
business years. 
 
6.4.1 Pre-founding phase 
It has been argued earlier in this paper that patenting activities may be path 
dependent such that patenting carried out by the founders in the pre-founding 
phase may be positively related to patenting during the firms’ business life. 
Table 6-3 shows the results. 
For all estimations, patenting before founding the firm shows a positive and 
significant correlation with the number of patents applied for (patenting inten-
sity). For all estimations, the observed coefficient ranges around 1.4. This indi-
cates that the expected number of patents applied for by firms whose founders 
have already patented before starting it up is exp(1.4)=4.06 times the expected 
number of patents applied for by firms whose founders do not have patenting 
experience. Hypothesis 6-1, stating that patenting is path dependent in the 
sense that if it is pursued during the process of preparing to found the firm, this 
increases the patenting intensity after the firm has been launched, can therefore 
not be rejected. 
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Table 6-1 Variables used for the analysis of the propensity to patent of young and innovative firms 
 
Use Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
No.Patents Number of Patents a firm applied for in the first three business 
years. 
534 0.4064 1.5931 0 16 
H6-1 PatentsBefore Dummy variable, indicating whether the founders were already 
active in patenting before founding the firm (1) ot not (0). 
534 0.0880 0.2836 0 1 
H6-2 statepromotion Dummy variable which indicates whether the firm received 
R&D promotion in the first three business years (1) or not (0). 
534 0.2116 0.4088 0 1 
H6-3 VentureCapital Dummy variable is 1 if the firm received venture capital at the 
beginning of its first three business years and 0 otherwise. 
364 0.0577 0.2335 0 1 
H6-4 Cooperation Dummy variable which indicates whether the firm cooperated 
in R&D in the first three business years (1) or not (0). 
317 0.4543 0.4987 0 1 
H6-5 ScienceOrientation Five digit variable, indicating the meaning of scientific insights 
and specific competencies of research institutes for the devel-
opment of the firms' product or service. 
447 2.5615 1.5932 1 5 
Controls Products Dummy variable, indicating whether the firm is more devoted 
to products (1) or services (0). 
387 0.3850 0.4872 0 1 
 Sh.Founders.PhD Share of founders holding a PhD. 473 0.1024 0.2529 0 1 
 No.Founders Total number of founders. 534 2.1479 1.1156 1 5 
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Table 6-1 continued 
 
Use Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
No.Patents Number of Patents a firm applied for in the first three business 
years. 
534 0.4064 1.5931 0 16 
Controls Spinoff Dummy variable, indicating whether the firm is an academic 
spin-off (1) or not (0). 
534 0.2228 0.4165 0 1 
 BioChem Dummy variable indicating whether the founders allocate their 
firm to the sector of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and chemi-
cals (1, zero otherwise). 
532 0.0320 0.1760 0 1 
 Jena Dummy variable indicating whether the firm is located in Jena 
(1) or elsewhere in Thuringia (0). 
534 0.1255 0.3316 0 1 
 R&DpreFounding Dummy variable, indicating whether the founders already con-
ducted R&D in the preparation process of their firm founding. 
532 0.4211 0.4942 0 1 
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Table 6-2 Correlation between the variables used for estimating the propensity to patent of young firms 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 No.Patents 1 
           2 PatentsBefore 0.4938* 1 
          3 R&Dpromotion 0.1694* 0.1156* 1 
         4 VentureCapital 0.0021 -0.0031 -0.1212 1 
        5 Cooperation 0.2083* 0.1459* 0.1512* 0.0188 1 
       6 ScienceOrientation 0.2247* 0.2243* 0.2438* 0.0083 0.2730* 1 
      7 Products 0.1875* 0.1631* 0.2401* 0.0738 0.0344 0.0514 1 
     8 Sh.Founders.PhD 0.1961* 0.1242* 0.1616* 0.0234 0.2229* 0.2776* -0.0128 1 
    9 No.Founders 0.1632* 0.1588* 0.1656* -0.0096 0.1352* 0.1617* 0.0392 0.0838 1 
   10 Spinoff 0.1551* 0.1278* 0.1071* -0.0106 0.1243* 0.1389* -0.0474 0.1700* 0.2218* 1 
  11 BioChem 0.1041* 0.1199* 0.0957 0.1578* 0.0622 0.1254* 0.0761 0.2197* 0.0359 0.0487 1 
 12 Jena 0.1143* 0.1102* 0.1458* 0.0491 0.073 0.0982* 0.0251 0.0794 0.1465* 0.1017* 0.0498 1 
*p<=.05 
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6.4.2 Business life 
a. R&D promotion 
R&DPromotion is a binary variable, indicating that a firm received public 
R&D support. In table 6-3 the coefficient for this variable becomes significant 
and positive for all estimations, indicating that there is a positive correlation 
between receiving this kind of state promotion and the patenting intensity of 
start-ups. More specifically, the expected number of patents applied for by 
firms which have received state promotion would be exp(0.96)=2.65 times the 
expected number of patents applied for by firms without state promotion. Hy-
pothesis 6-2 stating that start-ups that receive state promotion have higher pa-
tenting intensities cannot be rejected. 
 
b. Venture Capital 
Hypothesis 6-3 says that start-ups with a venture capital budget can more easily 
apply for patents and will therefore patent more. The respective variable Ven-
tureCapital does not show any significant relation to the dependent variable, 
namely the number of patents applied for, which leads to a rejection of hypoth-
esis 6-3. 
 
c. Cooperation 
Looking at the results in table 6-3, cooperation in R&D has a significant posi-
tive correlation with effect on the number of patents applied for and this find-
ing is stable over three of the four models. The expected number of patents 
applied for by cooperative firms is about exp(1)=2.72 times the expected num-
ber of patents applied for by non-cooperative firms. This finding also fits to 
earlier studies on the positive effect of cooperation on innovativeness (Cowan 
et al. 2006). Cooperating firms are more frequently successful in creating inno-
vations and thus apply more frequently for patents as compared to isolated 
(non-cooperative) firms. Thus, hypothesis 6-4 indicating that cooperation posi-
tively relates to patenting activities cannot be rejected. 
 
d. Scientific orientation 
The variable indicating a firms’ scientific orientation is ScienceOrientation, 
which comprises the meaning of scientific insights for the development of the 
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firm’s product or service. Significant and positive results have been found in 
models 1 and 3 such that hypothesis 6-5, indicating that firms conducting R&D 
and basing their activities on scientific insights patent more, cannot be rejected. 
However, this effect seems to be related to the region of Jena since no signifi-
cant result can be found if the dummy (Jena) is excluded. 
 
6.4.3 Inflation parameter 
Since the excess zeros in the outcome variable No.Patents can be the result of 
unsuccessful R&D or no R&D at all, R&D activities in the three years before 
the firm was started-up have been taken as inflation variable. However, the 
results in table 6-3 show that there is no significant correlation between re-
search activities before the start-up is launched and the number of patents ap-
plied for in the first three business years. 
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Table 6-3 What influences the propensity to patent for young firms? 
Method Zero-inflated negative binomial regression 
Depvar No.Patents        
 model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  
PatentsBefore 1.3212 *** 1.7124 *** 1.3011 *** 1.3291 ** 
(3.03)  (2.93)  (3.03)  (2.24)  
R&Dpromotion 1.1281 ** 0.7660 * 1.0791 ** 0.9418 * 
(2.33)  (1.90)  (2.46)  (1.77)  
VentureCapital 0.1975  -0.5539  0.2499  -0.1478  
(0.34)  (-0.77)  (0.47)  (-0.17)  
Cooperation 0.8804 ** 1.2656 *** 0.8704 ** 0.5399  
(2.41)  (3.28)  (2.41)  (1.24)  
ScienceOrientation 0.2108 * 0.1417  0.2111 * 0.1074  
(1.65)  (1.04)  (1.66)  (0.58)  
Products 1.0822 *   1.0817 * 1.2691 ** 
(1.70)    (1.71)  (2.16)  
Sh.Founders.PhD -0.9912    -0.9881  -0.4543  
(-1.62)    (-1.61)  (-0.39)  
No.Founders 0.2230    0.2052 * 0.2095  
(1.58)    (1.69)  (1.24)  
Spinoff -0.0882      0.0907  
(-0.24)      (0.21)  
BioChem 0.7940    0.2052  0.7344  
(0.54)    (0.58)  (0.26)  
Jena -1.1630 ***   -1.1476 ***   
(-3.30)    (-3.30)    
Constant -2.6805 *** -2.0586 *** -2.6396 *** -2.5995 *** 
(-4.29)  (-3.03)  (-4.41)  (-3.83)  
Inflate         
R&DpreFounding -0.1999  -1.0375  -0.2072  -0.2618  
(-0.28)  (-1.30)  (-0.29)  (-0.33)  
Constant 0.2372  0.5633  0.2478  0.0609  
(0.35)  (0.57)  (0.37)  (0.07)  
No. of Obs. 114  185  114  114  
Zero Obs 88  150  88  88  
Prob>Chi 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  
/lnalpha -19.5512  0.1444  -15.659  -1.6621  
 (-0.03)  (0.13)  (-0.02)  (-1.07)  
alpha 0.0000  1.1553  0.0000  0.1897  
Robust z statistics in parentheses 
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
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6.5 Conclusions 
In this paper, economic information as well as information about the socio-
demographic and psychological profiles of the founders of 534 young firms 
operating in innovative industries has been analysed. The aim was to find out 
which factors are related to the propensity to patent in the form of the number 
of patents applied for by the group of young enterprises and in this way to as-
sess the validity of patent data as measurement of innovative and cooperative 
activities. Contrasting with earlier studies e.g. by Hall et al. (2013), this paper 
identifies a start-up’s patents by taking applications made by the founders into 
account. Descriptive analyses have shown that only about 5.5% of start-up pa-
tents are applied for under the name of the firm. Thus, the undercounting of 
young and innovative firms’ patenting activity in other studies e.g. in the 
above-mentioned may have been avoided here. 
Regarding the whole database, it emerges that while 60.53% (322) of the firms 
report conducting R&D in the first three business years, 64 firms (19.88%) 
applied for patents. Arundel and Kabla (1998) find that 35.9% of product inno-
vations are patented which would mean that the share of patenting firms among 
those conducting R&D should be around 36%. Since they analyse Europe’s 
largest industrial firms and this paper’s analysis looks at Thuringia’s smallest 
firms (although the results are by no means comparable) it shows that on a 
comparative basis small firms seem to have a relatively high rate of patenting 
(20%) and that this can be detected more easily if the proposed procedure of 
identifying small firm’s patents is applied, as in this paper. 
It emerges that the main factors governing small firms’ patent applications are 
‘patents before the firm founding’, ‘state promotion’, scientific orientation’ and 
‘cooperation’. 
Regarding the pre-founding patenting behaviour, this paper’s analysis detects a 
path dependency that goes in the direction of the success-breeds-success hy-
pothesis formulated by Dosi et al. (1997). When founders have already con-
ducted R&D and applied for patents in the nascent phase, they will also go on 
patenting after starting up the business. If patenting is considered a factor of 
success, policymakers should not ignore this relationship and include this indi-
cator when considering funding for young and innovative firms. Additionally, 
cooperation in R&D seems to support innovative success. 
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R&D promotion is also positively connected to patenting activities. As Cantner 
and Kösters (2009) argue, R&D support from the state may promote patenting 
activities for two reasons. Firstly, firms receiving such support have more fi-
nancial scope and secondly, referees have evaluated the innovativeness of their 
business idea such that their patenting propensity may also be higher. When 
taking patents as an indicator of innovative success, the finding that state pro-
motion positively influences patenting can be taken as a sign of successful state 
programmes. 
Cooperation serves as a vehicle for the formalisation of technology exchange 
agreements (Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999) and, following the arguments of 
the resource-based-view of the firm (Penrose 1959), they have a positive effect 
on firms’ innovativeness (Cowan et al. 2006) such that cooperative firms may 
have a higher propensity to be active in patenting. The results for small and 
innovative start-ups in this paper indicate this. Policymakers thinking about 
programmes to enhance innovativeness in start-ups may therefore consider 
financial support for cooperative R&D projects. 
The result that the scientific orientation or otherwise of the firms’ R&D activi-
ties plays a role in patenting activity suggests that researchers should consider 
what kind of firms are in the sample if they analyse patent data. Taking all the 
findings together, one may argue that, when using patents as indicator for in-
novation or cooperation, one has to be aware of the fact that only the science-
oriented ones, conducting R&D in advance and having R&D cooperation when 
the firm is founded are taken into account among all start-ups. However, alt-
hough it has been argued that small firms may be a group of their own (Hall et 
al. 2012) and that different laws may govern the groups of small firms and 
larger firms (Bound et al. 1984), the findings suggest that small firm patenting 
behaves in basically the same way as larger firm patenting. It is past success in 
patenting, cooperation and orientation towards the latest scientific insights that 
drives innovative start-up patenting. 
Unfortunately, this study has some drawbacks that may be solved by future 
research. First, the firm database contains only Thuringian firms, which only 
represent a small part of Germany. Thus, it could be argued that future analyses 
should conduct a regionally broader analysis. However, a look at the maps cre-
ated by Aamoucke and Fritsch (2013) shows that Thuringia is representative of 
most of Germany with respect to the average yearly number of start-ups in 
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technology-oriented industries. This indicates the worthiness of the analysis, 
particularly for political decision-making. 
Second, this analysis has been carried out under the assumption that all the 
firms have the same strategic reason for patenting, which is mainly the reputa-
tion effect (Hall et al. (2012)). Unfortunately, such a question was missing in 
the questionnaire provided by the Thuringian Founder Study. In future ques-
tionnaires, this kind of item should be included. 
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7. Conclusions of the thesis 
Since each my chapters presents its own conclusion, I want to keep the closing 
remarks of my dissertation as short and non-redundant as possible and put the 
dissertation into a wider perspective. 
 
Before the occurrence of the industrial revolution, the economy was character-
ized by a very long period of stagnation (Bairoch 1993). In fact, Bairoch 
(1993) argues that in the last 700 years before the industrial revolution was 
born, the economy grew about 2% in an optimistic calculation. In comparison, 
for the 290 years after 1700, he finds a growth rate of about 45%. The world 
we live in today is the result of this industrialization process which started 
around 1760 in the United Kingdom. An agricultural revolution which began in 
1660 had led to changes in the demand for new materials, breeds, and transpor-
tation which has been satisfied by new technologies (innovation). Since then 
the world has changed dramatically, labor has been organized differently and 
the economy became a complex system which is neither easy to understand nor 
to predict. The first scholars that found theories to explain economic develop-
ment were Adam Smith (1976), David Ricardo (1817) and Karl Marx (1967). 
Schumpeter (1912) was the first to announce creative destruction caused by 
innovation as the main driver of economic growth. In response to the growth 
model of Solow (1956) which sees technological change as something exoge-
nous that falls like manna from heaven, Nelson and Winter (1982) introduced 
their Neo-Schumpeterian view on economic growth and built the foundation of 
modern evolutionary theorizing on growth. In their theory, entrepreneurs or 
institutionalized R&D activities destroy existing market equilibria via innova-
tion leading to economic growth. This means that innovation happens at the 
firm level, which is an absolutely micro-based view on economic development. 
Until today, many researchers tried to formally model the economic growth 
process but still there is no definite model of the processes. Additionally, the 
most pressing economic problems of today, like slowing growth and innova-
tion rates, inequality, unemployment and economic crisis can only be solved if 
the evolutionary mechanisms of growth are fully understood. My dissertation 
adds to the understanding of these mechanisms by analyzing the micro behav-
ior of entrepreneurs and firms that pursue institutionalized R&D. In the 
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knowledge-based economy, innovation cannot be produced without interac-
tions and cooperation between agents. What I am looking at is, therefore, the 
role cooperation and knowledge exchange play for the success and failure of 
innovative firms. As argued above, by introducing innovation to the market, 
these firms push the economy out of its temporal (equilibrium) and lead to evo-
lutionary economic growth. If we learn more about how interaction and 
knowledge networks influence their behavior, we might make a step further in 
understanding this kind of growth. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation look at the determinants of cooperation 
dynamics. While chapter 2 finds that cooperation is not pursued if the costs of 
finding a partner are too high and that cooperation break-up is very often the 
result of trust problems, chapter 3 shows that dynamics in cooperation relation-
ships are a quite common feature and that many changes in the partner can 
even be favourable under the right circumstances. Chapters 4 and 5 go one step 
further and analyze the role of the regional innovator network for the success 
and failure of entrepreneurial ventures. The analyses show that the size and 
density of the network as such as well as central position in the network help 
firms in keeping competitive advantages and staying in the market, but this 
seems to be dependent of the stages in the organizational life cycle. Chapter 6 
is more devoted to the questions, how to identify patents for entrepreneurial 
ventures and what the determinants of their patenting behavior are. I find that 
when analyzing innovation of young and innovative ventures by patents, it is 
crucial to add the patents applied for in the name of the founders to the firm’s 
patents.  
 
How can the results be helpful for evolutionary models of economic growth? 
After Nelson and Winter (1982) lots of research was devoted to the modeling 
of evolutionary growth (e.g. Dosi and Fabiani 1994, Silverberg and Verspagen 
1995/1998). These models also consider behavioral aspects as one factor enter-
ing into this analysis. The research done in this dissertation analyzed two inter-
related aspects of the micro behavior of firms, namely R&D cooperation and 
innovative networks. It has been shown that dynamics of cooperative relation-
ships and networks are important and positive for firm success. Therefore, the 
knowledge about the impact of these interactions should be also used and inte-
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grated into the analysis of evolutionary models for economic growth as one 
feature of behavioral differences among firms. 
 
After proposing to use the first insights this dissertation gave on the role of 
interaction and social scientific networks on the success and failure of innova-
tive firms in models of evolutionary growth, also some policy implication 
might be drawn from this work. From chapters 2 and 3 one could conclude that 
on the one side a good intermediation infrastructure would help in getting more 
firms into cooperation. Additionally, a very clear and easy to dispose of a sys-
tem of intellectual property rights, maybe even consulting agencies for this 
purpose would prevent a cooperation break-off for the reason of trust problems. 
However, dynamics of cooperation is not at all negative and should not be tak-
en as bad characteristic if selecting firms for cooperative R&D funding. 
Chapters 4 and 5 go one step further and analyze the role of the regional inno-
vator network for the success of entrepreneurial firms. If a policy maker is 
about to choose firms to fund, this social connection aspect should be taken 
into account. According to chapter 6, the tendency of founders of young and 
innovative firms to apply for patents on their own names rather than on the 
name of the firms should also be taken into account by policy makers when 
they have to make funding decisions. 
 
For sure, this dissertation leaves open room for future research. As for chapter 
2, it would be interesting to analyze the determinants of cooperation failure in 
more detail and to use a specialized questionnaire only for this kind of ques-
tion. Additionally, it would be interesting to see how the determinants of coop-
eration failure develop over time, meaning that the analysis should be repeated 
in a panel setting. In chapter 3 my co-authors and I are stepping into a research 
stream which is still in its infancy, the dynamic analysis of networks. In the 
future, these models will be refined and developed further such that the analy-
sis could maybe be repeated with more appropriate empirical methods. As for 
the analysis of the social scientific network of firm founders and their influence 
on the success of their firms, on could also analyze the networks with respect 
to a technological framework. This might be questions like: Is it more favora-
ble to be connected to a technologically fragmented network or is the firm 
positively influenced by specialized networks? 
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Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung 
Diese Arbeit trägt zu einem besseren Verständnis der Bedeutung von Koopera-
tionen und Wissensaustausch für den Erfolg innovativer Unternehmen bei. Da-
bei gründet sie im Wesentlichen auf Josef Alois Schumpeters ‚Theorie der 
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung‘ aus dem Jahre 1912. Schumpeter war der erste, 
der den evolutionären Prozess hinter der Entstehung von Innovationen erkannt 
und beschrieben hat. Das Bild des Innovators, welches er dabei vor Augen hat-
te war sicher von Personen wie Gottlieb Daimler oder Werner von Siemens 
geprägt, die mit Gründung ihres Unternehmens eine Erfindung auf den Markt 
brachten und damit einen selektiven Wettbewerb anstießen, welcher zur wirt-
schaftlichen Entwicklung beitrug. Neuere Theorien, wie der ‚resource based 
view of the firm‘ (Penrose 1959) oder die ‚knowledge based theory of the firm‘ 
(Grant 1996) sehen hingegen einen kollektiven Prozess des Lernens und Um-
setzens von neuem Wissen in Innovationen als wesentliche Treiber der wirt-
schaftlichen Entwicklung (Cantner und Meder 2007, Lundvall 1992, Kogut et 
al. 1992). Gründe hierfür sind, dass einerseits Innovationsaktivitäten mit einem 
hohen Unsicherheitsgrad in Bezug auf die Kosten, das Ergebnis und die zeitli-
che Dimension verbunden sind (Bayona et al. 2001) und andererseits, dass das 
Wissen der heutigen Zeit eine Komplexität erreicht hat, die es einem einzelnen 
Akteur nicht mehr erlaubt ohne externe Einflüsse neue Kombinationen des 
existierenden Wissens zu generieren (Cowan et al. 2006, Haagedorn 2002, 
Freeman 1991). Somit ist es für Unternehmen, die im innovativen Wettbewerb 
bestehen wollen von starker Bedeutung bei ihren F&E Anstrengungen zu ko-
operieren und so externe Ressourcen einzubinden. 
 
Solche Forschungskooperationen sind nicht immer erfolgreich und unterliegen 
bestimmten Dynamiken. Beide Phänomene (Misserfolg und Dynamiken von 
Kooperationen) sind bis heute nur unzureichend untersucht worden, nicht zu-
letzt aufgrund der Komplexität der Fragestellung. Kapitel 2 und 3 der vorlie-
genden Dissertation widmen sich der Untersuchung bilateraler Forschungsver-
bindungen im Hinblick auf die Determinanten dieser Phänomene. 
 
Kapitel 2 trägt den Titel ‚Success and failure of firms' innovation cooperations: 
the role of intermediaries and reciprocity’. Dieses Papier wurde zusammen mit 
Uwe Cantner und Andreas Meder erarbeitet und untersucht anhand von 832 
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Firmen, inwiefern fehlende Intermediation und Gegenseitigkeit sich auf den 
Misserfolg von Forschungskooperationen auswirken. Obwohl Kooperationen 
generell positiv auf die Erfolgsaussichten für F&E-Aktivitäten wirken, stehen 
der Aufbau und Erhalt ebendieser Beziehungen vor Problemen die sich negativ 
auf die Generierung neuen Wissens auswirken können. Nehmen wir einmal an, 
alle existierenden Unternehmen möchten generell ihre F&E-Aktivitäten in Ko-
operation mit anderen Akteuren durchführen, wir finden aber in der Realität 
nur ein geringes Maß an F&E-Kooperationen. Ein Grund hierfür kann sein, 
dass die Unternehmen nicht wissen, wie sie geeignete Partner finden und be-
werten sollen. Hier liegt ein so genanntes Intermediationsproblem vor (Cantner 
und Graf 2003). Dieses Problem ist ähnlich dem Problem der asymmetrischen 
Information zwischen Kreditgebern und –nehmern auf Finanzmärkten (Willi-
amson 1986). Mit der Suche nach einem geeigneten Kooperationspartner sind 
hohe Transaktionskosten für die Suche nach potenziellen Partnern und Infor-
mationen über deren Wissensbasis und Reputation verbunden. Diese Kosten 
könnten dazu führen, dass von der Suche nach Partnern Abstand genommen 
und allein F&E betrieben wird. Intermediäre sind beispielsweise Technologie-
transferstellen, öffentliche Einrichtung mit der Aufgabe der Kooperationsan-
bahnung, aber auch Messen, Konferenzen und Mitarbeitermobilität, welche 
allesamt die Aufgabe haben das Intermediationsproblem zu lösen (Cantner und 
Graf 2003, Karlsson 1997). 
Ein zweiter Grund für die oben angesprochene Zurückhaltung bezüglich ko-
operativer F&E-Anstrengungen kann das Fehlen von Vertrauen und Gegensei-
tigkeit in den Kooperationen sein, das so genannte Reziprozitätsproblem 
(Cantner und Graf 2003). Gouldner (1960), Güth und Yaari (1992) sowie Cial-
dini und Trost (1998) untersuchten die Prinzipien von Gegenseitigkeit und 
Fairness ökonomischer Akteure, Phänomene, die auch auf kooperative Erfin-
dungen und Innovationen zutreffen. Kooperationen basieren auf dem ur-
menschlichen Prinzip der Gegenseitigkeit und können nur funktionieren, wenn 
beide Partner Wissen austauschen (Fähr und Gächter 2000, Nooteboom 1999). 
Ist diese Gegenseitigkeit nicht gegeben, so können Kooperationen nicht zu-
stande kommen (ex-ante Reziprozitätsproblem) bzw. werden scheitern (ex-post 
Reziprozitätsproblem) (Cantner 2000). 
Determinanten erfolgreicher Kooperationen wurden in der innovationsökono-
mischen Literatur bereits breit analysiert (u. a. Katz 1986, Häusler et al. 1994, 
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Belderbos et al. 2004, Okamuro 2007). Hingegen blieb die Untersuchung von 
Scheiternsdeterminanten eher unberücksichtigt. Das vorliegende Kapitel wid-
met sich dieser Forschungslücke und macht einen, wenn auch kleinen, Schritt 
hin zur empirischen Aufklärung missglückter Kooperationen. 
Um die beiden genannten Probleme zu untersuchen, wurden Daten verwendet, 
die im Rahmen des von der Volkswagen Stiftung finanzierten Projekts ‚Second 
Order Innovations‘ erhoben wurden, verwendet. Hierfür wurden 832 Unter-
nehmen aus den regionalen Innovationssystemen Jena, Nordhessen und Sophia 
Antipolis zu ihren Innovations- und Kooperationsaktivitäten befragt. 
Aufgrund der binären oder skalierten Natur der abhängigen Variablen wurden 
zur Auswertung (geordnete) logistische Regressionen herangezogen. 
Die Ergebnisse deuten nicht darauf hin, dass in den untersuchten Regionen ein 
Intermediationsproblem vorliegt, welches die Kooperationsneigung und den 
Erfolg mindert. Dennoch konnten die Analysen zeigen, dass innerhalb der 
Gruppe kooperierender Unternehmen ein positiver Einfluss der empfundenen 
Bedeutung von Intermediären auf den Kooperationserfolg ausgeht. Dies deutet 
darauf hin, dass es für Intermediäre wichtig ist von potenziellen Kunden gese-
hen und für wichtig empfunden zu werden, damit ihre Dienste auch in An-
spruch genommen werden. 
In Bezug auf das Reziprozitätsproblem zeigt sich, dass fehlendes Vertrauen 
zum Partner einen wesentlichen Grund für das Scheitern einer Kooperationsbe-
ziehung darstellt. 
 
Kapitel 3 trägt den Titel ‚The Coevolution of Innovative Ties, Proximity, and 
Competencies: Toward a Dynamic Approach to Innovation Cooperation’ und 
wurde zusammen mit Uwe Cantner und Susanne Walter (geb. Hinzmann) er-
stellt. Anhand von Kooperationsdaten zu deutschen Unternehmen in der Bio-
technologiebranche wird die Koevolution von Kooperationsbeziehungen und 
drei verschiedenen Dimensionen der Nähe zwischen den Partnern dynamisch 
untersucht. Bei diesen drei Dimensionen der Nähe handelt es sich um kognitive 
Nähe, soziale Nähe und Ähnlichkeit/Nähe in Bezug auf die Attraktivität des 
jeweiligen Partners.  
Boschma (2005) definiert kognitive Nähe als Unterschied in den Wissensbasen 
zweier Kooperationspartner. Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Höhe der kog-
nitiven Nähe und der Möglichkeit Wissen auszutauschen nimmt dabei einen 
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umgekehrt u-förmigen Verlauf an (Nooteboom 1998). Sind die Partner sich in 
Ihren Wissensbasen zu ähnlich, gibt es vergleichsweise wenig Potenzial zum 
Wissensaustausch. Sind die Wissensbasen zu weit voneinander entfernt, fehlen 
absorptive Fähigkeiten um einen Wissensaustausch möglich zu machen. In 
dem Falle, dass eine Kooperation eingegangen wurde, tauschen die Partner im 
Zuge ihrer gemeinsamen Forschungsaktivitäten Wissen aus, was ihre kognitive 
Nähe zueinander erhöht. Das geht so weit bis es keine Potenziale für neue Wis-
senskombinationen der Partner mehr gibt und aus theoretischer Sicht ein Ab-
bruch der Kooperation sinnvoll erscheint. 
Soziale Nähe geht mit Vertrauen, sozialen Normen und Kontrolle über uner-
wünschtes Verhalten einher (Boschma 2005, Granovetter 2005, Walker et al. 
2003) und beeinflusst ebenso den Fortgang einer Kooperationsbeziehung, aber 
eher umgekehrt (Dahlander und McFahrland 2013, Gulati 1995). Je höher die 
soziale Nähe zwischen zwei Kooperationspartnern, desto eher wird ihre Ko-
operationsbeziehung fortbestehen. 
Frühere Studien haben gezeigt, dass die Attraktivität als Kooperationspartner 
durch Erfahrung mit Innovationen und Kooperationen erhöht wird (Ahuja 
2000, Gulati 1999, Stuart 2000). Dies hängt auch damit zusammen, dass  Ko-
operationen und der Umgang mit den Rechten am entstandenen Wissen nicht 
trivial sind und sich gemachte Erfahrungen positiv auf den Erfolg zukünftiger 
Kooperationen auswirken. Kooperationen von Partnern mit Vorerfahrungen 
haben daher, im Vergleich zu Kooperationen unerfahrener Partner, eine erhöh-
te Wahrscheinlichkeit erfolgreich zu sein und fortzubestehen. 
Im zeitlichen Verlauf einer Kooperationsbeziehung entwickeln sich die kogni-
tive und die soziale Nähe der Partner aufeinander zu bzw. werden größer (Bro-
ekel 2015, Balland et al. 2015, ter Wal 2014). Auch die Erfahrung der Partner 
verändert sich im Zeitverlauf. Bisherige Untersuchungen haben diese Dimensi-
onen anhand eines statischen Ansatzes aufgearbeitet. Kapitel 3 dieser Arbeit 
löst sich davon und untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen den genannten 
Dimensionen der Nähe und der Entwicklung der Kooperation unter Zuhilfen-
ahme eines dynamischen Ansatzes. 321,683 potenzielle Kooperationspaare 
werden über einen Zeitraum von 32 Jahren beobachtet und dabei die Auswir-
kung der Veränderung der drei Nähedimensionen auf die Kooperationsentste-
hung, -fortführung und -beendigung analysiert. Die Daten hierfür stammen von 
der OECD REGPAT Database (Januar 2012). 
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Da es sich bei der Entscheidung zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt mit einem 
bestimmten Akteur zu kooperieren um eine binäre Entscheidung handelt, wird 
ein logistisches random-effects panel model angewendet, welches 1,000-fach 
repetiert wurde. 
Die deskriptive Analyse zeigt, dass das Wiederholen von Kooperationen nicht 
zum ‚normalen‘ Verhalten der Unternehmen in der Stichprobe gehört. Viel-
mehr werden die Partner häufig gewechselt, eine Beobachtung welche auch 
Cantner und Graf (2006) machen. Auf Ebene der kognitiven Nähe wurden die 
drei Dimensionen overlap, reciprocal potential und knowledge transfer unter-
sucht. Es zeigt sich, dass ein großer overlap der Wissensbasen in Verbindung 
mit einem geringeren reciprocal potential die Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöht, dass 
ein potenzielles Kooperationspaar tatsächlich eine Kooperationsbeziehung ein-
geht. Soziale Nähe hingegen scheint in der vorliegenden Datenbasis keine Rol-
le für dynamische Entwicklungen in den Kooperationsbeziehungen zu spielen. 
Vorerfahrungen mit Kooperationen hingegen haben dann einen positiven Ein-
fluss auf die Kooperationswahrscheinlichkeit, wenn beide Partner ein hohes 
Maß davon mitbringen. 
 
Verlässt man die Ebene bilateraler Kooperationsbeziehungen und betrachtet die 
Gesamtheit der vorliegenden Kooperationen (ob in einer Branche, einer Tech-
nologie oder einer Region), so stößt man auf die Ebene der Innovationsnetz-
werke. Kapitel 4 und 5 der vorliegenden Dissertation bewegen sich auf diesem 
Terrain und analysieren die Rolle von Innovationsnetzwerken für den Erfolg 
und das Überleben junger Unternehmen. 
Ein wichtiger Motor für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung sind Innovationen 
(Pyka 1999). Innovationen sind allerdings in der Regel das Ergebnis eines 
komplexen Prozesses und der Rekombination von neuem und altem Wissen, 
welcher ohne kollektive, soziale Prozesse kaum mehr möglich ist (Lundvall 
1992, Doloreux und Parto 2005, Jaffe 1986, Bagchi-Sen 2002). Diese interak-
tiven Kontakte zwischen Angestellten von Unternehmen, Forschungsinstituten 
oder Universitäten bilden ein komplexes Netzwerk von Akteuren, die Innovati-
onen generieren und diese entweder mit einem existierenden Unternehmen 
oder durch die Gründung eines neuen Unternehmens auf den Markt bringen. 
Dieses soziale Netzwerk ist das so definierte Innovatorennetzwerk nach Cant-
ner und Graf (2007). 
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Das gemeinsam mit Uwe Cantner verfasste Kapitel 4 trägt den Titel ‚On regio-
nal innovator networks as hubs for innovative ventures’ und untersucht, inwie-
fern sich die Verbindung zu einem solchen Innovatorennetzwerk auf die Über-
lebenschancen junger Unternehmen auswirkt. Hierfür werden Handelsregister-
daten und Patentdaten für 2,199 Thüringer Unternehmen, die in den Jahren 
1993-2004 gegründet wurden, analysiert. Da es sich bei der gemessenen Er-
folgsvariable um eine Überlebenswahrscheinlichkeit (hazard rate) handelt, wird 
Cox’s proportional hazards model (1972) angewendet, ein Modell welches 
speziell für die Untersuchung von Überlebensdaten entwickelt wurde. 
Der erste Teil der Analyse zeigt, dass sich der verwendete Datensatz verhält 
wie die von anderen Forschern verwendeten Datensätze auch. Innovationen 
erweisen sich generell als Erfolgsgarant für Unternehmen. In einem zweiten 
Schritt wurde für 442 innovative Unternehmen untersucht, inwiefern sich deren 
Erfolg unterscheidet, wenn sie isoliert oder verbunden mit dem Netzwerk in-
novieren. Die Analysen zeigen, dass innovative, mit dem Innovatorennetzwerk 
verbundene Unternehmen vergleichsweise höhere Überlebenschancen aufwei-
sen. 
 
Kapitel 5 mit dem Titel ‚ The selective nature of innovator networks: from the 
nascent to the early growth phase of the organizational life cycle’ wurde eben-
falls mit Uwe Cantner gemeinsam erarbeitet und untersucht anschließend an 
die Erkenntnisse aus Kapitel 4, welche Netzwerkstruktur und Positionen im 
Netzwerk vorteilhaft für die Überlebenschancen der Unternehmen sind. Diese 
Zusammenhänge können allerdings nicht unabhängig vom Lebenszyklus des 
Unternehmens betrachtet werden (Hite und Hesterly 2001). In den ersten drei 
Phasen des Lebenszyclus, namentlich der Nascent-Pase, der Emergence-Phase 
und der Early-Growth-Phase wirken Netzwerkstruktur und Position im Netz-
werk unterschiedlich auf die Überlebenschancen des Unternehmens. Wissen-
spillover sind ein wesentlicher Aspekt bei der Generierung von Innovationen 
und der Realisierung technologischer Potentiale (Meagher und Rogers 2004, 
Feldman und Audretsch 1999, Griliches 1992). Diese Wirkung basiert auf Wis-
sensspillovers aus dem Netzwerk. Für die Innovationsleistung von Unterneh-
men die mit einem Innovatorennetzwerk verbunden sind, spielt die Struktur 
jenes Netzwerkes eine entscheidende Rolle. In Abhängigkeit der Netz-
werkstruktur können Wissenspillover vereinfacht oder behindert werden. In 
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Netzwerken mit einem hohen Fragmentierungsgrad können Wissenspillover 
nur vergleichsweise schlecht zwischen den einzelnen Netzwerkakteuren flie-
ßen, wohingegen in eng verstrickten Netzwerken viele Wissensflüsse möglich 
sind (Gilsing et al. 2008, Fershtman und Gandal 2011, Meagher und Rogers 
2004). Allerdings sind sehr dichte Netzwerke mit hohen Kosten für die Kon-
taktpflege, einer hohen Gefahr von unerwünschtem Wissensabfluss und weni-
gen Möglichkeiten für neue Wissenszuflüsse verbunden (Gilsing und Noote-
boom 2005, Burt 1992, Gilsing et al. 2008). In den verschiedenen Phasen des 
Unternehmenslebenszyklus wirken sich diese Prozesse unterschiedlich aus. 
Während der Nascent-Phase spielen für das Überleben andere Faktoren, wie 
die Aufbringung von ausreichend Startkapital, Erfahrung in dem Sektor und 
Gründungserfahrung eine übergeordnete Rolle (Cantner und Stuetzer 2013). 
Hingegen wird es nach der formalen Gründung des Unternehmens, also in der 
Emergent-Phase, umso wichtiger zu einem engen Innovatorennetzwerk ver-
bunden zu sein und dort enge Kontakte zu pflegen. So kann das neue Unter-
nehmen möglichst viele Informationen aus dem Netzwerk akquirieren und ab-
sorbieren. Enge Netzwerke gehen allerdings mit einem hohen Risiko für Re-
dundanzen und unerwünschte Wissensabflüsse einher. Das ist anfangs noch 
gut, denn so kann das neue Unternehmen möglichst viele Informationen, auch 
von Konkurrenten erhalten. Im Laufe der Entwicklung, wenn sich das Unter-
nehmen am Markt etabliert hat, ist es dann vorteilhaft Redundanzen zu reduzie-
ren und den eigenen Wissensabfluss zu minimieren. Somit wandelt sich der 
Bedarf des Unternehmens nach einem engen Netzwerk im Laufe der ersten 
beiden Phasen des Lebenszyklus hin zu einem möglichst fragmentierten Netz-
werk, welches viele Möglichkeiten zur Kontrolle der Wissensflüsse bietet (Hite 
und Hesterly 2001, Burt 1992). 
Doch nicht nur die Struktur des Netzwerkes zu dem ein Unternehmen verbun-
den ist, sondern auch die Position im Netzwerk spielt eine entscheidende Rolle. 
Ist ein Akteur sehr zentral im Netzwerk, so besitzt er viele Kontakte, ist quasi 
prominent (Wasserman und Faust 2009). In einer solchen Position kann der 
Akteur von zahlreichen Wissenszuflüssen profitieren und im besten Fall sogar 
noch steuern, welches Wissen im Netzwerk welche Wege nimmt (Gilsing et al. 
2008). Sehr oft besteht ein Netzwerk aus mehreren kleineren Unternetzen, die 
nicht notwendigerweise miteinander verbunden sind (Wasserman und Faust 
2009). Innerhalb jedes dieser Netzwerke gibt es Wissensflüsse, wobei davon 
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ausgegangen werden kann dass die meisten davon in der Hauptkomponente 
(der größten miteinander verbundenen Gruppe im Netzwerk) zu finden sind 
(Powell et al. 1996). Burt (1992) spricht von einer möglichen Brückenfunktion 
von Akteuren im Netzwerk. Sind zwei Komponenten nur über einen einzelnen 
Akteur miteinander verbunden, so besitzt dieser quasi die Macht über das zwi-
schen den beiden Komponenten ausgetauschte Wissen. Auch für die Rolle des 
Ego-Netzwerks für das Überleben eines jungen Unternehmens sind Verände-
rungen im Laufe des Unternehmenslebenszyklus zu erwarten. Während ein 
dichtes Ego-Netzwerk in der Emergent-Phase von Vorteil ist, genießen  in der 
Early-Growth-Phase Unternehmen mit einem auf sie selbst zentralisierten 
Netzwerk Vorteile bezüglich Ihrer Überlebenschancen. 
Ebenso, wie im Kapitel 4 werden Daten aus dem Thüringer Handelsregister 
und vom Deutschen Patent- und Markenamt für die Analyse verwendet. Auch 
in Kapitel 5 wir als Erfolgsvariable die Überlebenswahrscheinlichkeit (hazard 
rate) für die Unternehmen gemessen und Cox’s proportional hazards model 
(1972) geschätzt. 
Die Ergebnisse weisen auf einen umgekehrt u-förmigen Zusammenhang zwi-
schen der Dichte des jeweiligen Netzwerks und der Sterbewahrscheinlichkeit 
der Unternehmen hin. Somit sind sowohl dichte, als auch fragmentierte Netz-
werke von Vorteil, nicht aber eine Kombination der beiden. Burt (1992) und 
Coleman (1988) hatten somit womöglich beide Recht. In Bezug auf die Netz-
werkposition erweist sich die Mitgliedschaft in der Hauptkomponente als nega-
tiver Einflussfaktor für das Überleben von Unternehmen. 
 
In den Kapiteln 4 und 5 gelingt es erstmals das Innovatorennetzwerk als inter-
nes Charakteristikum des Unternehmens zu betrachten und zu analysieren, eine 
Forschungslücke deren Schließung mit den beiden vorliegenden Kapiteln ein 
Stück näher gekommen wird. Mit Hilfe der Namen der Unternehmensgründer 
und der Patentanmelder werden die Patente des Unternehmens identifiziert, ein 
Ansatz, der insbesondere bei kleinen, jungen Unternehmen sinnvoll ist. Unter-
nehmensgründer melden häufig Patente für das Unternehmen auf den eigenen 
Namen an, damit diese im Falle eines Scheiterns nicht in die Insolvenzmasse 
fließen (siehe auch Kapitel 6 dieser Dissertation). Mit Hilfe der Patentdaten 
wurden dann Innovatorennetzwerke für die von Granato und Farhauer (2008) 
identifizierten Arbeitsmarktregionen in Thüringen erstellt. In Anlehnung an die 
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Untersuchungen von Murray (2004) wurde dann davon ausgegangen, dass der 
Unternehmensgründer sein soziales wissenschaftliches Netzwerk in das wis-
senschaftliche Netzwerk des Unternehmens überträgt und damit das Unter-
nehmen über den Gründer mit dem Innovatorennetzwerk verbunden ist. 
 
Das abschließende Kapitel der Dissertation trägt den Titel ‚Innovative start-up 
patenting: a new approach towards identification and determinants’ und wur-
de in Alleinautorenschaft verfasst. In den Kapiteln 4 und 5 wurde anhand von 
Patentdaten bereits der Einfluss des Innovatorennetzwerks auf innovative Un-
ternehmensgründungen untersucht. Eine deskriptive Analyse der Befragungs-
daten aus der Thüringer Gründer Studie zeigt jedoch, dass die Anmeldung von 
Patenten für junge, kleine Unternehmen ein sehr seltenes Ereignis ist. Von 534 
Unternehmen, die in innovativen Branchen tätig sind (Grupp et al. 2000) mel-
deten nur etwa 64 (12%) Patente an. Zwar gibt es einige Forschungspapiere, 
die sich mit der Patentierungsneigung von Unternehmen beschäftigen (z.B. 
Scherer 1983, Bound et al. 1984, Brouwer und Kleinknecht 1999, Blind et al. 
2006, Hall et al. 2012), sie tun dies allerdings vorwiegend anhand von Daten 
etablierter, größerer Unternehmen. Eine detaillierte Analyse der Patentierungs-
neigung für kleine, junge Unternehmen, die in der Regel weniger als 10 Mitar-
beiter haben wurde bis heute noch nicht veröffentlicht. Das vorliegende Kapitel 
6 schließt ebendiese Forschungslücke und untersucht die Determinanten der 
Patentierungsneigung junger und innovativer Unternehmen in Thüringen. Dar-
über hinaus wendet die Analyse auch eine bisher nicht beachtete Identifizie-
rungsstrategie für die Patente junger Unternehmen an. Von den 64 Unterneh-
men im Datensatz, die Patente angemeldet haben, haben gerade einmal 5,5% 
das Patent auf den Namen des Unternehmens angemeldet. Alle weiteren Paten-
te liefen auf die Namen der Unternehmensgründer. Deshalb wurden -unter der 
Annahme dass die Gründer ihre Patente im Rahmen ihres Unternehmens 
Kommerzialisieren wollen- für die Analyse auch Patente der Gründer in Be-
tracht gezogen. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Vorerfahrungen in der Patentierung, Kooperatio-
nen, F&E-Förderung und Wissenschaftsorientierung positive Determinanten 
der Patentierungsneigung junger Unternehmen sind. 
